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V3.1 → V3.12 consolidated and tagged for the first GA release. Wire format unchanged from 0.4.x — 4.0 peers interoperate with 0.4.x peers byte-for-byte. The version bump is semantic: audit-cycle complete, opt-in surface fully exposed, threat model refreshed for every new surface. Highlights: - All 24 @shade/* packages bumped to 4.0.0 in lockstep. - CHANGELOG 4.0.0 section is the canonical manifest of what landed. - THREAT-MODEL extended (§10 fingerprint gates, §11 WebRTC P2P, §12 Web-Worker boundary) + residual-risks table refreshed. - OpenAPI now covers all 27 routes: prekey, transfer, KT, inbox, bridge, observer, /metrics, /healthz, /ready. - MIGRATION 0.3.x → 4.0 documented + smoke-tested against shade migrate-storage on a real SQLite DB. - docs/audit/REVIEW-BUNDLE.md + SCOPE.md ready for external reviewer. - scripts/soak.ts harness for the GA-stable 2-week soak window. - All V*.md plans archived under docs/archive/ with Status: Done. - Voice/Video carved out into V5.0; 4.0 audit focuses on the frozen non-realtime stack. Tests: TS 1000/1000 + Kotlin 11/11 cross-platform vectors green. Docker: gt.zyon.no/stian/shade-prekey:4.0.0 builds and reports version 4.0.0 on /health. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
307 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript
307 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript
import type { CryptoProvider } from './crypto.js';
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import type { KeyPair, SessionState, ChainState, RatchetMessage } from './types.js';
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import { MAX_SKIP, MAX_CACHED_SKIPPED_KEYS } from './types.js';
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import { kdfRootKey, kdfChainKey } from './keys.js';
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import { DecryptionError, MaxSkipExceededError } from './errors.js';
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/**
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* Double Ratchet — per-message forward secrecy and post-compromise recovery.
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*
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* Combines a symmetric-key ratchet (chain keys → message keys) with a
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* Diffie-Hellman ratchet (new DH keypair per conversation turn).
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*
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* Reference: https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/
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*/
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// ─── Utility ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
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function toBase64(buf: Uint8Array): string {
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// Use a simple hex encoding for map keys (avoids btoa issues with Uint8Array)
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return Array.from(buf, (b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
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}
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function skippedKeyId(dhPublicKey: Uint8Array, counter: number): string {
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return `${toBase64(dhPublicKey)}:${counter}`;
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}
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/** Encode a RatchetMessage header as bytes for use as AES-GCM AAD */
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function encodeHeader(msg: Pick<RatchetMessage, 'dhPublicKey' | 'previousCounter' | 'counter'>): Uint8Array {
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// dhPublicKey (32) + previousCounter (4, big-endian) + counter (4, big-endian)
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const buf = new Uint8Array(40);
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buf.set(msg.dhPublicKey, 0);
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new DataView(buf.buffer).setUint32(32, msg.previousCounter, false);
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new DataView(buf.buffer).setUint32(36, msg.counter, false);
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return buf;
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}
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// ─── Session Initialization ──────────────────────────────────
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/**
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* Initialize a session as the sender (Alice, after X3DH).
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*
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* Alice knows the root key and Bob's signed prekey (initial remote DH key).
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* She generates her first DH ratchet keypair and performs the first DH ratchet step.
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*/
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export async function initSenderSession(
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crypto: CryptoProvider,
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rootKey: Uint8Array,
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remoteIdentityKey: Uint8Array,
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remoteDHPublicKey: Uint8Array,
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): Promise<SessionState> {
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// Generate first DH ratchet keypair
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const dhSend = await crypto.generateX25519KeyPair();
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// First DH ratchet step
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const dhOutput = await crypto.x25519(dhSend.privateKey, remoteDHPublicKey);
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const { newRootKey, chainKey } = await kdfRootKey(crypto, rootKey, dhOutput);
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return {
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remoteIdentityKey,
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rootKey: newRootKey,
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sendChain: { chainKey, counter: 0 },
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receiveChain: null,
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dhSend,
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dhReceive: remoteDHPublicKey,
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previousSendCounter: 0,
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skippedKeys: new Map(),
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};
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}
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/**
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* Initialize a session as the receiver (Bob, after X3DH).
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*
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* Bob knows the root key and his own signed prekey (which was used as
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* the initial DH ratchet keypair). The keypair is COPIED into the
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* session — the receiving side's DH ratchet will eventually rotate
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* `dhSend` and zeroize the previous private key, and that scratch
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* buffer must NOT be the same memory as the persisted signed prekey
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* (which is shared with future X3DH establishments from other senders).
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*/
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export function initReceiverSession(
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rootKey: Uint8Array,
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remoteIdentityKey: Uint8Array,
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localDHKeyPair: KeyPair,
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): SessionState {
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return {
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remoteIdentityKey,
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rootKey,
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sendChain: { chainKey: new Uint8Array(32), counter: 0 },
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receiveChain: null,
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dhSend: {
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publicKey: new Uint8Array(localDHKeyPair.publicKey),
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privateKey: new Uint8Array(localDHKeyPair.privateKey),
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},
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dhReceive: null,
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previousSendCounter: 0,
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skippedKeys: new Map(),
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};
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}
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// ─── Encrypt ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/**
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* Encrypt a plaintext message using the Double Ratchet.
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*
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* Advances the sending chain by one step, derives a message key,
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* encrypts the plaintext with AES-256-GCM, and returns a RatchetMessage.
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*/
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export async function ratchetEncrypt(
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crypto: CryptoProvider,
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session: SessionState,
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plaintext: Uint8Array,
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): Promise<RatchetMessage> {
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// Advance sending chain — old chain key is replaced, zero the old one
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const oldChainKey = session.sendChain.chainKey;
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const { newChainKey, messageKey } = await kdfChainKey(crypto, oldChainKey);
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crypto.zeroize(oldChainKey);
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const counter = session.sendChain.counter;
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// Build header for AAD
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const header: Pick<RatchetMessage, 'dhPublicKey' | 'previousCounter' | 'counter'> = {
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dhPublicKey: session.dhSend.publicKey,
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previousCounter: session.previousSendCounter,
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counter,
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};
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const aad = encodeHeader(header);
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// Encrypt, then zero the message key (used once)
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const { ciphertext, nonce } = await crypto.aesGcmEncrypt(messageKey, plaintext, aad);
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crypto.zeroize(messageKey);
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// Update session state
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session.sendChain.chainKey = newChainKey;
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session.sendChain.counter = counter + 1;
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return {
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dhPublicKey: session.dhSend.publicKey,
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previousCounter: session.previousSendCounter,
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counter,
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ciphertext,
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nonce,
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};
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}
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// ─── Decrypt ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/**
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* Decrypt a RatchetMessage using the Double Ratchet.
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*
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* Handles three cases:
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* 1. Message from a skipped key (out-of-order delivery)
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* 2. Message from the current receiving chain
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* 3. Message with a new DH key (triggers a DH ratchet step)
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*/
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export async function ratchetDecrypt(
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crypto: CryptoProvider,
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session: SessionState,
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message: RatchetMessage,
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): Promise<Uint8Array> {
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// Case 1: Try skipped keys first
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const skipId = skippedKeyId(message.dhPublicKey, message.counter);
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const skippedKey = session.skippedKeys.get(skipId);
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if (skippedKey) {
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session.skippedKeys.delete(skipId);
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try {
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return await decryptWithKey(crypto, skippedKey, message);
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} finally {
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crypto.zeroize(skippedKey);
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}
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}
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// Case 2 or 3: Check if this is a new DH ratchet
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const isNewRatchet = !session.dhReceive || !arraysEqual(message.dhPublicKey, session.dhReceive);
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if (isNewRatchet) {
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// Skip any remaining messages in the current receiving chain
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if (session.receiveChain && session.dhReceive) {
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await skipMessageKeys(crypto, session, session.dhReceive, session.receiveChain, message.previousCounter);
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}
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// Perform DH ratchet step
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await performDHRatchetStep(crypto, session, message.dhPublicKey);
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}
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// Skip to the message's counter in the current receiving chain
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if (!session.receiveChain) {
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throw new DecryptionError('No receiving chain available');
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}
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await skipMessageKeys(crypto, session, message.dhPublicKey, session.receiveChain, message.counter);
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// Advance the receiving chain one more step to get this message's key
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const oldChainKey = session.receiveChain.chainKey;
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const { newChainKey, messageKey } = await kdfChainKey(crypto, oldChainKey);
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crypto.zeroize(oldChainKey);
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session.receiveChain.chainKey = newChainKey;
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session.receiveChain.counter = message.counter + 1;
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try {
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return await decryptWithKey(crypto, messageKey, message);
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} finally {
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crypto.zeroize(messageKey);
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}
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}
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// ─── DH Ratchet Step ─────────────────────────────────────────
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/**
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* Perform a DH ratchet step when receiving a message with a new DH public key.
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*
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* 1. DH(current send key, new remote key) → advance root key, get new receiving chain
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* 2. Generate new DH keypair
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* 3. DH(new keypair, remote key) → advance root key, get new sending chain
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*/
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async function performDHRatchetStep(
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crypto: CryptoProvider,
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session: SessionState,
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remoteDHKey: Uint8Array,
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): Promise<void> {
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// Save previous send counter
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session.previousSendCounter = session.sendChain.counter;
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// Update remote DH key
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session.dhReceive = remoteDHKey;
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// DH with current send key → new receiving chain
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const dh1 = await crypto.x25519(session.dhSend.privateKey, remoteDHKey);
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const oldRootKey1 = session.rootKey;
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const recv = await kdfRootKey(crypto, oldRootKey1, dh1);
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crypto.zeroize(oldRootKey1);
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crypto.zeroize(dh1);
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session.rootKey = recv.newRootKey;
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session.receiveChain = { chainKey: recv.chainKey, counter: 0 };
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// Generate new DH keypair, zero the old one's private key
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const oldDhPrivate = session.dhSend.privateKey;
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session.dhSend = await crypto.generateX25519KeyPair();
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crypto.zeroize(oldDhPrivate);
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// DH with new send key → new sending chain
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const dh2 = await crypto.x25519(session.dhSend.privateKey, remoteDHKey);
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const oldRootKey2 = session.rootKey;
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const send = await kdfRootKey(crypto, oldRootKey2, dh2);
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crypto.zeroize(oldRootKey2);
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crypto.zeroize(dh2);
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session.rootKey = send.newRootKey;
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// Zero the old send chain key if present
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if (session.sendChain.chainKey.length > 0) {
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crypto.zeroize(session.sendChain.chainKey);
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}
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session.sendChain = { chainKey: send.chainKey, counter: 0 };
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}
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// ─── Skip Message Keys ──────────────────────────────────────
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/**
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* Advance a chain, caching skipped message keys for out-of-order decryption.
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*/
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async function skipMessageKeys(
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crypto: CryptoProvider,
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session: SessionState,
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dhPublicKey: Uint8Array,
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chain: ChainState,
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untilCounter: number,
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): Promise<void> {
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const toSkip = untilCounter - chain.counter;
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if (toSkip < 0) return; // already past this point
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if (toSkip > MAX_SKIP) {
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throw new MaxSkipExceededError(toSkip, MAX_SKIP);
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}
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for (let i = chain.counter; i < untilCounter; i++) {
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const { newChainKey, messageKey } = await kdfChainKey(crypto, chain.chainKey);
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const id = skippedKeyId(dhPublicKey, i);
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session.skippedKeys.set(id, messageKey);
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chain.chainKey = newChainKey;
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chain.counter = i + 1;
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// Evict oldest if we have too many cached keys
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if (session.skippedKeys.size > MAX_CACHED_SKIPPED_KEYS) {
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const firstKey = session.skippedKeys.keys().next().value;
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if (firstKey) session.skippedKeys.delete(firstKey);
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}
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}
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}
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// ─── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
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async function decryptWithKey(
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crypto: CryptoProvider,
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messageKey: Uint8Array,
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message: RatchetMessage,
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): Promise<Uint8Array> {
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const aad = encodeHeader(message);
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try {
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return await crypto.aesGcmDecrypt(messageKey, message.ciphertext, message.nonce, aad);
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} catch {
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throw new DecryptionError('Failed to decrypt message — wrong key or tampered data');
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}
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}
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function arraysEqual(a: Uint8Array, b: Uint8Array): boolean {
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if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
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for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) {
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if (a[i] !== b[i]) return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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