Sterister
8c606ad498
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Two interlocking robustness fixes for the duplicate-fan-out / first-contact
class of failures Prism reported.
1. `Shade.receive(from, env)` now queues its `manager.decrypt` step
per `from` so concurrent dispatches can't race the SessionManager
ratchet or the StorageProvider (sqlite "database is locked", IDB
transaction conflicts). User message handlers run *outside* the
queue so streams + file-RPC's nested `shade.receive` calls don't
self-deadlock.
2. Bridge WS + SSE handlers now run a per-connection bounded msgId
LRU as defense-in-depth against any flushTo re-entry (event-storm,
future refactor). Pending-flush chains are wrapped in `.catch(() =>
{})` so a transient `ws.send` rejection no longer poisons the
connection's flush loop.
Tests: storming `inbox.blob_stored` 10× per PUT yields exactly one WS/
SSE frame; 8 concurrent `bob.receive('alice', envelope)` calls keep
the ratchet intact and never surface "database is locked".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@shade/recovery
Social key recovery for Shade — V3.10.
Shamir Secret Sharing over GF(2^8) splits the user's identity backup
key into n shares; any threshold-many k together reconstruct the
identity onto a new device. Distribution and reconstruction ride
existing 1:1 Shade sessions — no centralized recovery agent.
Install
bun add @shade/recovery
Quick wire-up
import {
setupRecovery,
attachGuardian,
requestRecovery,
MemoryRecoveryStore,
} from '@shade/recovery';
// Primary (Alice's existing device)
await setupRecovery({
shade,
guardians: ['bob', 'carol', 'dan', 'eve', 'faythe'],
threshold: 3,
deliver: async (to, envelope) => myOutbox.send(to, envelope),
});
// Each guardian
attachGuardian({
shade,
store: new MemoryRecoveryStore(), // swap for persistent store in prod
approve: async (ctx) => askUser(ctx),
deliver: async (to, envelope) => myOutbox.send(to, envelope),
});
// New device (Alice on a fresh phone)
await requestRecovery({
shade: tempShade,
originalAddress: 'alice',
setupId: '<from recovery card>',
threshold: 3,
guardians: ['bob', 'carol', 'dan', 'eve', 'faythe'],
deliver: async (to, envelope) => myOutbox.send(to, envelope),
});
See docs/recovery.md for the full
threat model, persistence recommendations, and guardian-UX guidance.
Tests
bun test # all
bun test tests/shamir # Shamir primitives
bun test tests/integration # 3-of-5 end-to-end
bun test tests/adversarial # k-1 collusion + forged shares + OOB-gate