Sterister 2b1b4d6630 release(v4.5.0): browser-side encrypted storage + multi-factor unlock ...

Adds the foundations Prism's web client (and any future browser-based
Shade app) needs: at-rest-encrypted IndexedDB storage that mirrors the
SQLite backend byte-for-byte at the AAD/nonce level, browser-safe
subpath imports so Vite/webpack/esbuild stop hitting bun:sqlite, and
KeyManager support for argon2id and N-factor composite unlock.

@shade/storage-encrypted
- EncryptedIndexedDBStorage (subpath: /idb) — full StorageProvider
  using one object store per _enc table; reuses aeadSeal/aeadOpen +
  row-codec sealers so a row sealed under the SQLite or Postgres
  backend decrypts under IDB given the same KeyManager.
  bumpPeerIdentityVersion is atomic under one IDB transaction.
- KeyManager argon2id source — memory-hard KDF for low-entropy
  secrets (PINs). Backed by @noble/hashes/argon2 (already a transitive
  dep). DEFAULT_ARGON2ID exported (m=64 MiB, t=3, p=1).
- KeyManager composite source — HKDF-combine N sub-sources into one
  master. Every source mandatory; order significant by design;
  composite-of-composite rejected; optional info string for app-level
  domain separation.
- Subpath exports (/crypto, /sqlite, /postgres, /idb) plus a `browser`
  condition on the default import that resolves to a barrel
  excluding the Bun- and Postgres-specific entries. Browser bundles
  no longer pull bun:sqlite transitively.

Tests
- 73 tests in shade-storage-encrypted (was 31). New coverage:
  argon2id determinism + reject paths, composite same-factors → same
  master, wrong-PIN/passphrase/order-swap → different master, info
  domain separation, all 28 StorageProvider methods on
  EncryptedIndexedDBStorage, fingerprint-mismatch rejection, and
  cross-impl roundtrip with EncryptedSQLiteStorage proving the AAD/
  nonce derivation is implementation-agnostic.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-05-07 10:58:49 +02:00

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