Sterister
1fb59a7076
Two unblocking changes for first-contact flows.
Sender attribution: relay captures shortHash(senderSigningKey) at
PUT time (after signature verification, no new trust surface) and
surfaces it on bridge push (IncomingMessage.from) + inbox-fetch
(FetchedBlob.from) + DecryptHandler raw arg. Apps receiving a prekey
envelope from a never-before-seen peer can now bootstrap X3DH via
shade.receive('fp:<hex>', env) — pre-4.8 the wire envelope didn't
authenticate the sender and there was no out-of-band hint to use.
Idempotent ALTER TABLE migrations for SQLite + Postgres add a
sender_fp TEXT column; legacy rows surface as from=undefined
(inter-version compat).
Inbox.start() race: pre-4.8 start() called register() fire-and-forget
AND schedulePoll(0) synchronously, so the first poll on a fresh
address often beat the register HTTP RTT and got SHADE_NOT_FOUND.
start() now defers; register() success kicks schedulePoll(0). Manual
tick() is unaffected (deliberate user action, no gating).
Both reported by Prism. Tests cover all five acceptance criteria
from the sender-attribution request (PUT capture, bridge surface,
fetch surface, inter-version compat, end-to-end pair smoke) plus
the three from the race-fix request.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@shade/recovery
Social key recovery for Shade — V3.10.
Shamir Secret Sharing over GF(2^8) splits the user's identity backup
key into n shares; any threshold-many k together reconstruct the
identity onto a new device. Distribution and reconstruction ride
existing 1:1 Shade sessions — no centralized recovery agent.
Install
bun add @shade/recovery
Quick wire-up
import {
setupRecovery,
attachGuardian,
requestRecovery,
MemoryRecoveryStore,
} from '@shade/recovery';
// Primary (Alice's existing device)
await setupRecovery({
shade,
guardians: ['bob', 'carol', 'dan', 'eve', 'faythe'],
threshold: 3,
deliver: async (to, envelope) => myOutbox.send(to, envelope),
});
// Each guardian
attachGuardian({
shade,
store: new MemoryRecoveryStore(), // swap for persistent store in prod
approve: async (ctx) => askUser(ctx),
deliver: async (to, envelope) => myOutbox.send(to, envelope),
});
// New device (Alice on a fresh phone)
await requestRecovery({
shade: tempShade,
originalAddress: 'alice',
setupId: '<from recovery card>',
threshold: 3,
guardians: ['bob', 'carol', 'dan', 'eve', 'faythe'],
deliver: async (to, envelope) => myOutbox.send(to, envelope),
});
See docs/recovery.md for the full
threat model, persistence recommendations, and guardian-UX guidance.
Tests
bun test # all
bun test tests/shamir # Shamir primitives
bun test tests/integration # 3-of-5 end-to-end
bun test tests/adversarial # k-1 collusion + forged shares + OOB-gate