V4.0 acceptance §"All docs/V*.md arkivert med DONE-status" requires every archived plan to carry an explicit Status field. V2.1 / V2.2 / V2.3 inherited their pre-status format; V3.12-DESIGN was still "Approved". Mark all four as Done with a one-line pointer to where the work actually landed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Shade V2.1 — Improvements (infrastructure, storage, operations, security)
Status: Done — superseded by the V3.1 → V3.12 plans, all of which
landed in the 4.0 GA release. This document is preserved as historical
context for the original V2.1 backlog; the concrete deliverables live
under docs/archive/V3.*.md.
This document describes improvements agreed for next-generation work on Shade: clearer product story, stronger storage, mobile parity, operational hardening, transfer abuse, and a formal security narrative.
1. Clear “who is the server?” and data flow
Problem: New users may think the prekey server is a message hub or that all E2EE traffic goes through the Shade container.
Goal: One consistent explanation across the root README, package READMEs, and optional onboarding: the prekey server distributes public keys and bundles; actual messages and (typically) file chunks go through your app’s own channel (your transport, your backend, your URLs).
Deliverables (proposal):
- Diagram + short “keys vs payloads” text in the root README and in
@shade/serverREADME. - Link to
THREAT-MODEL.mdfrom the same section (MITM on first contact ↔ safety numbers). - Optionally one “concept page” (or extend
MIGRATION.md) with typical architecture: A ↔ B via app; both talk to the prekey host for X3DH material.
Acceptance criteria: A new developer without domain background understands in one reading what goes to the Shade server and what does not.
2. Optional encryption of storage (at-rest)
Problem: THREAT-MODEL.md states that a stolen DB + filesystem can expose private keys because Shade does not encrypt the storage layer by default.
Goal: Opt-in protection for sensitive state (identity, session, optional stream resume secrets) with keys that do not live in plaintext in the DB — e.g. OS keychain/Keystore, passphrase + KDF, or an explicit device key injected by the app.
Design principles:
- Default developer experience (dev, simple demos) stays unchanged or includes a clear “insecure mode” warning in docs.
- APIs implementable per platform (Bun/SQLite, Postgres, web/IndexedDB, Android).
- Document limitations: what remains uncovered (e.g. active memory compromise).
Acceptance criteria: Threat model updated for “when encrypted storage is enabled”; at least one reference implementation + migration note.
3. Android parity and a published roadmap
Problem: shade-android is under development; drift from the TS SDK undermines the “byte-compatible” promise.
Goal: A published roadmap (milestones + what counts as parity vs TS-only) and CI running shared test vectors as a merge gate before release.
Deliverables:
- Roadmap section in
android/shade-android/README.mdor dedicatedROADMAP-ANDROID.mdwith explicit cross-checkpoints: wire format, fingerprints, rotations, streams (0x11) where applicable, resume semantics. - CI job that fails on Kotlin vs TS vector mismatch.
Acceptance criteria: Parity coverage is visible and enforceable; the first critical cross-surface (e.g. core ratchet + proto) is green before a “production” label.
4. Operational hardening — prekey container and production
Problem: Many teams deploy the Docker image quickly; mistakes around TLS, backups, and secrets add avoidable risk.
Goal: A production checklist: TLS termination, volume backup (/data), rotation of SHADE_OBSERVER_TOKEN, use of SHADE_PREKEY_PG_URL vs SQLite, observability hooks, logging levels, meaning of stale cleanup parameters.
Deliverables:
- Extend
docs/DEPLOYMENT.mdor add shortdocs/PRODUCTION-CHECKLIST.mdwith bullet defaults. - Link from the main README under “Deployment”.
Acceptance criteria: A checklist operators can follow without reading the whole codebase first.
5. Abuse and resource limits on the transfer plane
Problem: Parallel lanes and large uploads can be abused for resource or storage if consumer mounts of createTransferRoutes() share no coherent policy.
Goal: Documented limits and patterns: authentication (already an active SDK topic), max stream size, TTL for temporary chunk storage, quotas per identity or IP where sensible.
Deliverables:
- Guidelines in
docs/streams.mdor a dedicated “Transfer hardening” section. - Optional helpers or middleware examples in
@shade/transfer/ server routes for common limits (without forcing every deployment into one DB model).
Acceptance criteria: A clear “recommended minimum” for production that teams can copy.
6. Security review and formal test / narrative
Problem: Enterprises and security-conscious users often ask for independent review and a traceable test matrix.
Goal: Plan for independent crypto review (timing, scope, deliverables) and a published test / threat matrix linking THREAT-MODEL.md to concrete automated tests (replay, tamper, out-of-order, resume, etc.).
Deliverables:
- Internal checklist “preparing for external review” (which files, assumptions, known limits).
- Short section in
SECURITY.mdon review status and how to report findings.
Acceptance criteria: One authoritative source for “what is tested automatically” vs “what needs manual/MITM/out-of-band process”.
Dependencies and order (proposal)
| Priority | Topic | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Low friction | §1, §4 | Documentation and checklists only |
| Medium | §5 | Design + docs + possibly small API helpers |
| High effort | §2, §3 | Platform work and long-term maintenance |
| Coordinated | §6 | Parallel with maturity in §2–§5 |
Document versioning
- V2.1 — first consolidated plan for the six improvement areas above. Update with dates and short per-section status lines as work starts and completes.
Gitt der du er nå (post-streams 0.2.0), ville jeg prioritert:
1. Sosial nøkkel-recovery — løser "hva skjer hvis jeg mister telefonen?" som er det store hullet i alle
E2EE-systemer
2. P2P WebRTC transport — naturlig kompletterende til streams; gir massiv throughput-gevinst gratis
3. E2EE Pub/Sub — lavt scope, høy nytte, og passer perfekt med din "magic drop-in"-filosofi
Disse tre har alle samme egenskap: de er infrastruktur-features som hver app du bygger fremover vil dra nytte av,
ikke bare Dispatch. Helt i tråd med "Shade som komponent som dras inn i hvilket som helst prosjekt".
/btw Hva med Shade videostreaming, VOIP streaming, og lignende?
Magic drop-in-tilnærming (din filosofi)
Tenk deg at i en Dispatch-app kan du bare gjøre:
<ShadeVideoCall to="device:server-admin" />
<ShadeVoiceButton to={peerAddress} />
<ShadeBroadcaster streamKey="game-stream-1" />
<ShadeViewer streamKey="game-stream-1" />
…og det bare fungerer, E2EE, P2P når mulig, fallback til relay automatisk. Det er det samme mønsteret som streams
0.2.0, bare for sanntid.
Realisme-sjekk
Video/VOIP er det vanskeligste i hele E2EE-verdenen. Signal brukte år på å få det riktig. Du bør:
1. Ferdigstille streams 0.2.0 først (verifiserer crypto-fundamentet)
2. Bygge P2P WebRTC-transport som separat milestone
3. Da har du alle byggeklossene og Voice 0.4.0 blir 70% gjenbruk
Men ja — dette hører absolutt hjemme i Shade. Shade som "alt-i-ett E2EE-platform" er en mye sterkere posisjon enn
"bare messaging + filer". Du kan bli til E2EE hva Twilio er til vanlig kommunikasjon.