2026-04-10 00:19:54 +02:00
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import { Database } from 'bun:sqlite';
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feat(files): @shade/files 0.3.0 — E2EE filesystem RPC primitive
M-Files-1..6 land the full files-RPC layer + everything 0.3.0 needs to
ship. Apps keep their own UI; this layer ships the typed RPC, the
streams bridge for content I/O, and production hooks (rate limit,
retention, fingerprint gate, metrics).
@shade/files (NEW)
- Standard ops: list/stat/mkdir/delete/move/read/write/getThumbnail with
Zod-validated wire schemas + clean user-handler types.
- Custom ops: typed via TypeScript declaration merging on CustomOpsMap
+ per-op Zod schemas; client.custom('app.foo', {...}) is fully typed.
- Content I/O: inline (≤ 256 KiB plaintext) base64-in-RPC; streams
(> 256 KiB) ride @shade/transfer via userMetadata.shadeFilesWriteId
/ shadeFilesReadStreamId correlation. Server-side TransformStream
bridges accept inbound transfers immediately (engine rejects chunks
that arrive before accept) and park the readable for the matching
RPC.
- Directory ops: walk(path, opts) async-iterable depth-first walker;
uploadDirectory()/downloadDirectory() with bounded concurrency pool
(default 4, cap 16), aggregated progress, abort.
- Production hooks (callback-based, vendor-neutral): rate-limit (op +
byte), idempotency cache (LRU + TTL + in-flight de-dupe), path
policy (traversal + percent-decode hardening), fingerprint gate
(required/optional/reject), pluggable Ed25519 sig verification with
±5 min replay window, onMetric sink (standard names).
- React hooks (subpath @shade/files/react): ShadeFilesProvider,
useShadeFiles, useFileList, useFileTransfer/Upload/Download.
- Shade.files.serve(handler) + Shade.files.client(peer) high-level
entrypoint in @shade/sdk; lazy + memoized; one handler per Shade.
Wire format bump
- @shade/proto wire VERSION 0x01 → 0x02. Length prefixes changed from
u16 to u32. The previous u16 silently truncated payloads above
64 KiB — a hard correctness ceiling that blocked inline file ops
up to 256 KiB. Wire-incompatible with 0.2.x peers; new sessions
only. Cross-platform Kotlin port (android/shade-android) updated to
match; test-vectors/wire-format.json regenerated.
Concurrency safety
- ShadeSessionManager.encrypt/.decrypt now run under per-peer mutex.
Concurrent decryptions of the same peer raced ratchet state
(manifested as sporadic "Failed to decrypt — wrong key or tampered
data" under load — surfaced once concurrent uploadDirectory pumped
many writes in flight). Encrypt was already serialized via
Shade.send's encryptChains; decrypt is now serialized at the
manager layer too.
@shade/streams extension
- StreamMetadata.userMetadata?: Record<string, string> for
application-level key/value pairs that round-trip verbatim through
stream-init plaintext. Used by @shade/files for write/read
correlation; available to any consumer.
@shade/sdk extension
- Shade.files getter (lazy + memoized).
- BackgroundHooks.onPruneFiles + periodic timer (default 5 min) +
BackgroundTasks.setHook(name, fn) for runtime hook registration.
Bundles in-flight 0.2.0 work
- packages/shade-streams/, packages/shade-transfer/, related
shade-sdk streams-bridge + shade-widgets transfer hooks were
uncommitted prior to this session. Including them keeps the
workspace consistent at 0.3.0 since @shade/files depends on them.
Tests
- 74 new tests in @shade/files (572 → 646 workspace pass; 0 fail;
3× stable). Coverage spans unit (inline-threshold + concurrency),
integration (read-write inline + streams up to 1 MiB, walk +
upload/download directory, custom-op, metrics, SDK namespace
end-to-end), and security (tampered-envelope sig verification,
replay window, fingerprint gate, rate-limit + quota).
Release artifacts
- All packages bumped to 0.3.0 via scripts/bump-version.ts.
- scripts/publish-all.ts PACKAGES updated with shade-files in
topological order (after shade-transfer, before shade-sdk).
- bun run publish:dry clean (14 packed, 0 failed).
- examples/08-files-browser/ — three-process CLI demo (prekey + Bob
server + Alice CLI) covering list/stat/mkdir/delete/upload/download.
- docs/files.md — full API + design doc.
- CHANGELOG.md 0.3.0 entry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-02 14:00:01 +02:00
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import type { StorageProvider, IdentityKeyPair, SignedPreKey, OneTimePreKey, SessionState, RetiredIdentity, PersistedStreamState } from '@shade/core';
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2026-04-10 00:19:54 +02:00
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import {
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toBase64, fromBase64,
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feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation
M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening
- constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider
- Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId
- Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts
- Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage
- Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions
M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server
- Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes
- signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window
- Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.)
- Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping
- ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided
- Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only)
M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection
- Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store
- Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id
- 64KB body size limit on POST
- Retry-After header on 429 responses
M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset
- Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style)
- ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange
- verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison
M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period
- rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey
- RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired
- 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions
- pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup
M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy
- New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit,
Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation
- All errors have stable SHADE_* codes
- errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping
- toJSON() for network serialization
188 tests passing, zero failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 17:45:34 +02:00
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constantTimeEqual,
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2026-04-10 00:19:54 +02:00
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serializeSessionState, deserializeSessionState,
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serializeSignedPreKey, deserializeSignedPreKey,
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serializeOneTimePreKey, deserializeOneTimePreKey,
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feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation
M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening
- constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider
- Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId
- Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts
- Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage
- Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions
M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server
- Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes
- signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window
- Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.)
- Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping
- ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided
- Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only)
M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection
- Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store
- Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id
- 64KB body size limit on POST
- Retry-After header on 429 responses
M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset
- Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style)
- ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange
- verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison
M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period
- rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey
- RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired
- 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions
- pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup
M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy
- New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit,
Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation
- All errors have stable SHADE_* codes
- errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping
- toJSON() for network serialization
188 tests passing, zero failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 17:45:34 +02:00
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serializeIdentityKeyPair, deserializeIdentityKeyPair,
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2026-04-10 00:19:54 +02:00
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} from '@shade/core';
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/**
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* SQLite-backed StorageProvider for Shade client-side key/session storage.
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*
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* Uses bun:sqlite (built-in, zero deps). Stores private keys — for trusted environments only.
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* WAL mode enabled for crash safety. Auto-creates tables on first use.
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*
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* Docker usage:
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* Volume mount /data, set SHADE_DB_PATH=/data/shade-client.db
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*/
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export class SQLiteStorage implements StorageProvider {
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private db: Database;
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// Prepared statements
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private stmts!: {
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getIdentity: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
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saveIdentity: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
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getConfig: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
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saveConfig: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
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getSignedPreKey: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
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saveSignedPreKey: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
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removeSignedPreKey: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
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getOneTimePreKey: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
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saveOneTimePreKey: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
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removeOneTimePreKey: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
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countOneTimePreKeys: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
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getSession: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
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saveSession: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
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removeSession: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
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getTrust: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
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saveTrust: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
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feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation
M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening
- constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider
- Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId
- Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts
- Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage
- Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions
M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server
- Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes
- signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window
- Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.)
- Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping
- ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided
- Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only)
M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection
- Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store
- Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id
- 64KB body size limit on POST
- Retry-After header on 429 responses
M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset
- Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style)
- ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange
- verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison
M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period
- rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey
- RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired
- 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions
- pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup
M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy
- New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit,
Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation
- All errors have stable SHADE_* codes
- errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping
- toJSON() for network serialization
188 tests passing, zero failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 17:45:34 +02:00
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addRetired: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
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listRetired: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
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pruneRetired: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
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feat(files): @shade/files 0.3.0 — E2EE filesystem RPC primitive
M-Files-1..6 land the full files-RPC layer + everything 0.3.0 needs to
ship. Apps keep their own UI; this layer ships the typed RPC, the
streams bridge for content I/O, and production hooks (rate limit,
retention, fingerprint gate, metrics).
@shade/files (NEW)
- Standard ops: list/stat/mkdir/delete/move/read/write/getThumbnail with
Zod-validated wire schemas + clean user-handler types.
- Custom ops: typed via TypeScript declaration merging on CustomOpsMap
+ per-op Zod schemas; client.custom('app.foo', {...}) is fully typed.
- Content I/O: inline (≤ 256 KiB plaintext) base64-in-RPC; streams
(> 256 KiB) ride @shade/transfer via userMetadata.shadeFilesWriteId
/ shadeFilesReadStreamId correlation. Server-side TransformStream
bridges accept inbound transfers immediately (engine rejects chunks
that arrive before accept) and park the readable for the matching
RPC.
- Directory ops: walk(path, opts) async-iterable depth-first walker;
uploadDirectory()/downloadDirectory() with bounded concurrency pool
(default 4, cap 16), aggregated progress, abort.
- Production hooks (callback-based, vendor-neutral): rate-limit (op +
byte), idempotency cache (LRU + TTL + in-flight de-dupe), path
policy (traversal + percent-decode hardening), fingerprint gate
(required/optional/reject), pluggable Ed25519 sig verification with
±5 min replay window, onMetric sink (standard names).
- React hooks (subpath @shade/files/react): ShadeFilesProvider,
useShadeFiles, useFileList, useFileTransfer/Upload/Download.
- Shade.files.serve(handler) + Shade.files.client(peer) high-level
entrypoint in @shade/sdk; lazy + memoized; one handler per Shade.
Wire format bump
- @shade/proto wire VERSION 0x01 → 0x02. Length prefixes changed from
u16 to u32. The previous u16 silently truncated payloads above
64 KiB — a hard correctness ceiling that blocked inline file ops
up to 256 KiB. Wire-incompatible with 0.2.x peers; new sessions
only. Cross-platform Kotlin port (android/shade-android) updated to
match; test-vectors/wire-format.json regenerated.
Concurrency safety
- ShadeSessionManager.encrypt/.decrypt now run under per-peer mutex.
Concurrent decryptions of the same peer raced ratchet state
(manifested as sporadic "Failed to decrypt — wrong key or tampered
data" under load — surfaced once concurrent uploadDirectory pumped
many writes in flight). Encrypt was already serialized via
Shade.send's encryptChains; decrypt is now serialized at the
manager layer too.
@shade/streams extension
- StreamMetadata.userMetadata?: Record<string, string> for
application-level key/value pairs that round-trip verbatim through
stream-init plaintext. Used by @shade/files for write/read
correlation; available to any consumer.
@shade/sdk extension
- Shade.files getter (lazy + memoized).
- BackgroundHooks.onPruneFiles + periodic timer (default 5 min) +
BackgroundTasks.setHook(name, fn) for runtime hook registration.
Bundles in-flight 0.2.0 work
- packages/shade-streams/, packages/shade-transfer/, related
shade-sdk streams-bridge + shade-widgets transfer hooks were
uncommitted prior to this session. Including them keeps the
workspace consistent at 0.3.0 since @shade/files depends on them.
Tests
- 74 new tests in @shade/files (572 → 646 workspace pass; 0 fail;
3× stable). Coverage spans unit (inline-threshold + concurrency),
integration (read-write inline + streams up to 1 MiB, walk +
upload/download directory, custom-op, metrics, SDK namespace
end-to-end), and security (tampered-envelope sig verification,
replay window, fingerprint gate, rate-limit + quota).
Release artifacts
- All packages bumped to 0.3.0 via scripts/bump-version.ts.
- scripts/publish-all.ts PACKAGES updated with shade-files in
topological order (after shade-transfer, before shade-sdk).
- bun run publish:dry clean (14 packed, 0 failed).
- examples/08-files-browser/ — three-process CLI demo (prekey + Bob
server + Alice CLI) covering list/stat/mkdir/delete/upload/download.
- docs/files.md — full API + design doc.
- CHANGELOG.md 0.3.0 entry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-02 14:00:01 +02:00
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saveStreamState: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
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getStreamState: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
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removeStreamState: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
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listActiveStreamStates: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
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listActiveStreamStatesByDirection: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
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pruneStreamStates: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
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2026-04-10 00:19:54 +02:00
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};
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constructor(dbPath?: string) {
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const path = dbPath ?? process.env.SHADE_DB_PATH ?? '/data/shade-client.db';
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this.db = new Database(path, { create: true });
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this.db.exec('PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL');
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this.ensureTables();
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this.prepareStatements();
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}
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private ensureTables() {
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this.db.exec(`
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS identity (
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id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1),
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signing_public_key TEXT NOT NULL,
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signing_private_key TEXT NOT NULL,
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dh_public_key TEXT NOT NULL,
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dh_private_key TEXT NOT NULL
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);
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS config (
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key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
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value TEXT NOT NULL
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);
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS signed_prekeys (
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key_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
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data_json TEXT NOT NULL
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);
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS one_time_prekeys (
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key_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
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data_json TEXT NOT NULL
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);
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS sessions (
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address TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
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state_json TEXT NOT NULL
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);
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS trusted_identities (
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address TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
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identity_key TEXT NOT NULL
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);
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feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation
M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening
- constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider
- Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId
- Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts
- Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage
- Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions
M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server
- Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes
- signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window
- Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.)
- Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping
- ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided
- Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only)
M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection
- Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store
- Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id
- 64KB body size limit on POST
- Retry-After header on 429 responses
M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset
- Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style)
- ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange
- verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison
M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period
- rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey
- RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired
- 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions
- pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup
M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy
- New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit,
Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation
- All errors have stable SHADE_* codes
- errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping
- toJSON() for network serialization
188 tests passing, zero failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 17:45:34 +02:00
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS retired_identities (
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id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
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data_json TEXT NOT NULL,
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retired_at INTEGER NOT NULL
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);
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CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_retired_at ON retired_identities(retired_at);
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feat(files): @shade/files 0.3.0 — E2EE filesystem RPC primitive
M-Files-1..6 land the full files-RPC layer + everything 0.3.0 needs to
ship. Apps keep their own UI; this layer ships the typed RPC, the
streams bridge for content I/O, and production hooks (rate limit,
retention, fingerprint gate, metrics).
@shade/files (NEW)
- Standard ops: list/stat/mkdir/delete/move/read/write/getThumbnail with
Zod-validated wire schemas + clean user-handler types.
- Custom ops: typed via TypeScript declaration merging on CustomOpsMap
+ per-op Zod schemas; client.custom('app.foo', {...}) is fully typed.
- Content I/O: inline (≤ 256 KiB plaintext) base64-in-RPC; streams
(> 256 KiB) ride @shade/transfer via userMetadata.shadeFilesWriteId
/ shadeFilesReadStreamId correlation. Server-side TransformStream
bridges accept inbound transfers immediately (engine rejects chunks
that arrive before accept) and park the readable for the matching
RPC.
- Directory ops: walk(path, opts) async-iterable depth-first walker;
uploadDirectory()/downloadDirectory() with bounded concurrency pool
(default 4, cap 16), aggregated progress, abort.
- Production hooks (callback-based, vendor-neutral): rate-limit (op +
byte), idempotency cache (LRU + TTL + in-flight de-dupe), path
policy (traversal + percent-decode hardening), fingerprint gate
(required/optional/reject), pluggable Ed25519 sig verification with
±5 min replay window, onMetric sink (standard names).
- React hooks (subpath @shade/files/react): ShadeFilesProvider,
useShadeFiles, useFileList, useFileTransfer/Upload/Download.
- Shade.files.serve(handler) + Shade.files.client(peer) high-level
entrypoint in @shade/sdk; lazy + memoized; one handler per Shade.
Wire format bump
- @shade/proto wire VERSION 0x01 → 0x02. Length prefixes changed from
u16 to u32. The previous u16 silently truncated payloads above
64 KiB — a hard correctness ceiling that blocked inline file ops
up to 256 KiB. Wire-incompatible with 0.2.x peers; new sessions
only. Cross-platform Kotlin port (android/shade-android) updated to
match; test-vectors/wire-format.json regenerated.
Concurrency safety
- ShadeSessionManager.encrypt/.decrypt now run under per-peer mutex.
Concurrent decryptions of the same peer raced ratchet state
(manifested as sporadic "Failed to decrypt — wrong key or tampered
data" under load — surfaced once concurrent uploadDirectory pumped
many writes in flight). Encrypt was already serialized via
Shade.send's encryptChains; decrypt is now serialized at the
manager layer too.
@shade/streams extension
- StreamMetadata.userMetadata?: Record<string, string> for
application-level key/value pairs that round-trip verbatim through
stream-init plaintext. Used by @shade/files for write/read
correlation; available to any consumer.
@shade/sdk extension
- Shade.files getter (lazy + memoized).
- BackgroundHooks.onPruneFiles + periodic timer (default 5 min) +
BackgroundTasks.setHook(name, fn) for runtime hook registration.
Bundles in-flight 0.2.0 work
- packages/shade-streams/, packages/shade-transfer/, related
shade-sdk streams-bridge + shade-widgets transfer hooks were
uncommitted prior to this session. Including them keeps the
workspace consistent at 0.3.0 since @shade/files depends on them.
Tests
- 74 new tests in @shade/files (572 → 646 workspace pass; 0 fail;
3× stable). Coverage spans unit (inline-threshold + concurrency),
integration (read-write inline + streams up to 1 MiB, walk +
upload/download directory, custom-op, metrics, SDK namespace
end-to-end), and security (tampered-envelope sig verification,
replay window, fingerprint gate, rate-limit + quota).
Release artifacts
- All packages bumped to 0.3.0 via scripts/bump-version.ts.
- scripts/publish-all.ts PACKAGES updated with shade-files in
topological order (after shade-transfer, before shade-sdk).
- bun run publish:dry clean (14 packed, 0 failed).
- examples/08-files-browser/ — three-process CLI demo (prekey + Bob
server + Alice CLI) covering list/stat/mkdir/delete/upload/download.
- docs/files.md — full API + design doc.
- CHANGELOG.md 0.3.0 entry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-02 14:00:01 +02:00
|
|
|
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS stream_state (
|
|
|
|
|
stream_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
|
|
|
|
|
direction TEXT NOT NULL,
|
|
|
|
|
peer_address TEXT NOT NULL,
|
|
|
|
|
status TEXT NOT NULL,
|
|
|
|
|
metadata_json TEXT NOT NULL,
|
|
|
|
|
partition_json TEXT NOT NULL,
|
|
|
|
|
lane_state_json TEXT NOT NULL,
|
|
|
|
|
io_descriptor_json TEXT NOT NULL,
|
|
|
|
|
secret_enc BLOB NOT NULL,
|
|
|
|
|
secret_nonce BLOB NOT NULL,
|
|
|
|
|
overall_hash_state TEXT,
|
|
|
|
|
created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
|
|
|
|
|
updated_at INTEGER NOT NULL
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_stream_state_peer ON stream_state(peer_address);
|
|
|
|
|
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_stream_state_updated ON stream_state(updated_at);
|
|
|
|
|
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_stream_state_status ON stream_state(status, direction);
|
2026-04-10 00:19:54 +02:00
|
|
|
`);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
private prepareStatements() {
|
|
|
|
|
this.stmts = {
|
|
|
|
|
getIdentity: this.db.prepare('SELECT * FROM identity WHERE id = 1'),
|
|
|
|
|
saveIdentity: this.db.prepare('INSERT OR REPLACE INTO identity (id, signing_public_key, signing_private_key, dh_public_key, dh_private_key) VALUES (1, ?, ?, ?, ?)'),
|
|
|
|
|
getConfig: this.db.prepare('SELECT value FROM config WHERE key = ?'),
|
|
|
|
|
saveConfig: this.db.prepare('INSERT OR REPLACE INTO config (key, value) VALUES (?, ?)'),
|
|
|
|
|
getSignedPreKey: this.db.prepare('SELECT data_json FROM signed_prekeys WHERE key_id = ?'),
|
|
|
|
|
saveSignedPreKey: this.db.prepare('INSERT OR REPLACE INTO signed_prekeys (key_id, data_json) VALUES (?, ?)'),
|
|
|
|
|
removeSignedPreKey: this.db.prepare('DELETE FROM signed_prekeys WHERE key_id = ?'),
|
|
|
|
|
getOneTimePreKey: this.db.prepare('SELECT data_json FROM one_time_prekeys WHERE key_id = ?'),
|
|
|
|
|
saveOneTimePreKey: this.db.prepare('INSERT OR REPLACE INTO one_time_prekeys (key_id, data_json) VALUES (?, ?)'),
|
|
|
|
|
removeOneTimePreKey: this.db.prepare('DELETE FROM one_time_prekeys WHERE key_id = ?'),
|
|
|
|
|
countOneTimePreKeys: this.db.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) as count FROM one_time_prekeys'),
|
|
|
|
|
getSession: this.db.prepare('SELECT state_json FROM sessions WHERE address = ?'),
|
|
|
|
|
saveSession: this.db.prepare('INSERT OR REPLACE INTO sessions (address, state_json) VALUES (?, ?)'),
|
|
|
|
|
removeSession: this.db.prepare('DELETE FROM sessions WHERE address = ?'),
|
|
|
|
|
getTrust: this.db.prepare('SELECT identity_key FROM trusted_identities WHERE address = ?'),
|
|
|
|
|
saveTrust: this.db.prepare('INSERT OR REPLACE INTO trusted_identities (address, identity_key) VALUES (?, ?)'),
|
feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation
M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening
- constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider
- Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId
- Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts
- Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage
- Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions
M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server
- Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes
- signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window
- Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.)
- Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping
- ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided
- Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only)
M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection
- Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store
- Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id
- 64KB body size limit on POST
- Retry-After header on 429 responses
M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset
- Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style)
- ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange
- verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison
M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period
- rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey
- RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired
- 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions
- pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup
M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy
- New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit,
Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation
- All errors have stable SHADE_* codes
- errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping
- toJSON() for network serialization
188 tests passing, zero failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 17:45:34 +02:00
|
|
|
addRetired: this.db.prepare('INSERT INTO retired_identities (data_json, retired_at) VALUES (?, ?)'),
|
|
|
|
|
listRetired: this.db.prepare('SELECT data_json, retired_at FROM retired_identities ORDER BY retired_at DESC'),
|
|
|
|
|
pruneRetired: this.db.prepare('DELETE FROM retired_identities WHERE retired_at < ?'),
|
feat(files): @shade/files 0.3.0 — E2EE filesystem RPC primitive
M-Files-1..6 land the full files-RPC layer + everything 0.3.0 needs to
ship. Apps keep their own UI; this layer ships the typed RPC, the
streams bridge for content I/O, and production hooks (rate limit,
retention, fingerprint gate, metrics).
@shade/files (NEW)
- Standard ops: list/stat/mkdir/delete/move/read/write/getThumbnail with
Zod-validated wire schemas + clean user-handler types.
- Custom ops: typed via TypeScript declaration merging on CustomOpsMap
+ per-op Zod schemas; client.custom('app.foo', {...}) is fully typed.
- Content I/O: inline (≤ 256 KiB plaintext) base64-in-RPC; streams
(> 256 KiB) ride @shade/transfer via userMetadata.shadeFilesWriteId
/ shadeFilesReadStreamId correlation. Server-side TransformStream
bridges accept inbound transfers immediately (engine rejects chunks
that arrive before accept) and park the readable for the matching
RPC.
- Directory ops: walk(path, opts) async-iterable depth-first walker;
uploadDirectory()/downloadDirectory() with bounded concurrency pool
(default 4, cap 16), aggregated progress, abort.
- Production hooks (callback-based, vendor-neutral): rate-limit (op +
byte), idempotency cache (LRU + TTL + in-flight de-dupe), path
policy (traversal + percent-decode hardening), fingerprint gate
(required/optional/reject), pluggable Ed25519 sig verification with
±5 min replay window, onMetric sink (standard names).
- React hooks (subpath @shade/files/react): ShadeFilesProvider,
useShadeFiles, useFileList, useFileTransfer/Upload/Download.
- Shade.files.serve(handler) + Shade.files.client(peer) high-level
entrypoint in @shade/sdk; lazy + memoized; one handler per Shade.
Wire format bump
- @shade/proto wire VERSION 0x01 → 0x02. Length prefixes changed from
u16 to u32. The previous u16 silently truncated payloads above
64 KiB — a hard correctness ceiling that blocked inline file ops
up to 256 KiB. Wire-incompatible with 0.2.x peers; new sessions
only. Cross-platform Kotlin port (android/shade-android) updated to
match; test-vectors/wire-format.json regenerated.
Concurrency safety
- ShadeSessionManager.encrypt/.decrypt now run under per-peer mutex.
Concurrent decryptions of the same peer raced ratchet state
(manifested as sporadic "Failed to decrypt — wrong key or tampered
data" under load — surfaced once concurrent uploadDirectory pumped
many writes in flight). Encrypt was already serialized via
Shade.send's encryptChains; decrypt is now serialized at the
manager layer too.
@shade/streams extension
- StreamMetadata.userMetadata?: Record<string, string> for
application-level key/value pairs that round-trip verbatim through
stream-init plaintext. Used by @shade/files for write/read
correlation; available to any consumer.
@shade/sdk extension
- Shade.files getter (lazy + memoized).
- BackgroundHooks.onPruneFiles + periodic timer (default 5 min) +
BackgroundTasks.setHook(name, fn) for runtime hook registration.
Bundles in-flight 0.2.0 work
- packages/shade-streams/, packages/shade-transfer/, related
shade-sdk streams-bridge + shade-widgets transfer hooks were
uncommitted prior to this session. Including them keeps the
workspace consistent at 0.3.0 since @shade/files depends on them.
Tests
- 74 new tests in @shade/files (572 → 646 workspace pass; 0 fail;
3× stable). Coverage spans unit (inline-threshold + concurrency),
integration (read-write inline + streams up to 1 MiB, walk +
upload/download directory, custom-op, metrics, SDK namespace
end-to-end), and security (tampered-envelope sig verification,
replay window, fingerprint gate, rate-limit + quota).
Release artifacts
- All packages bumped to 0.3.0 via scripts/bump-version.ts.
- scripts/publish-all.ts PACKAGES updated with shade-files in
topological order (after shade-transfer, before shade-sdk).
- bun run publish:dry clean (14 packed, 0 failed).
- examples/08-files-browser/ — three-process CLI demo (prekey + Bob
server + Alice CLI) covering list/stat/mkdir/delete/upload/download.
- docs/files.md — full API + design doc.
- CHANGELOG.md 0.3.0 entry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-02 14:00:01 +02:00
|
|
|
saveStreamState: this.db.prepare(
|
|
|
|
|
`INSERT OR REPLACE INTO stream_state (
|
|
|
|
|
stream_id, direction, peer_address, status,
|
|
|
|
|
metadata_json, partition_json, lane_state_json, io_descriptor_json,
|
|
|
|
|
secret_enc, secret_nonce, overall_hash_state, created_at, updated_at
|
|
|
|
|
) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
getStreamState: this.db.prepare('SELECT * FROM stream_state WHERE stream_id = ?'),
|
|
|
|
|
removeStreamState: this.db.prepare('DELETE FROM stream_state WHERE stream_id = ?'),
|
|
|
|
|
listActiveStreamStates: this.db.prepare(
|
|
|
|
|
"SELECT * FROM stream_state WHERE status IN ('active', 'paused') ORDER BY updated_at DESC",
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
listActiveStreamStatesByDirection: this.db.prepare(
|
|
|
|
|
"SELECT * FROM stream_state WHERE status IN ('active', 'paused') AND direction = ? ORDER BY updated_at DESC",
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
pruneStreamStates: this.db.prepare(
|
|
|
|
|
"DELETE FROM stream_state WHERE status IN ('finished', 'aborted') AND updated_at < ?",
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
2026-04-10 00:19:54 +02:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
close() {
|
|
|
|
|
this.db.close();
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// ─── Identity ──────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async getIdentityKeyPair(): Promise<IdentityKeyPair | null> {
|
|
|
|
|
const row = this.stmts.getIdentity.get() as any;
|
|
|
|
|
if (!row) return null;
|
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
|
|
|
signingPublicKey: fromBase64(row.signing_public_key),
|
|
|
|
|
signingPrivateKey: fromBase64(row.signing_private_key),
|
|
|
|
|
dhPublicKey: fromBase64(row.dh_public_key),
|
|
|
|
|
dhPrivateKey: fromBase64(row.dh_private_key),
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async saveIdentityKeyPair(kp: IdentityKeyPair): Promise<void> {
|
|
|
|
|
this.stmts.saveIdentity.run(
|
|
|
|
|
toBase64(kp.signingPublicKey),
|
|
|
|
|
toBase64(kp.signingPrivateKey),
|
|
|
|
|
toBase64(kp.dhPublicKey),
|
|
|
|
|
toBase64(kp.dhPrivateKey),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async getLocalRegistrationId(): Promise<number> {
|
|
|
|
|
const row = this.stmts.getConfig.get('registrationId') as any;
|
|
|
|
|
return row ? parseInt(row.value, 10) : 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async saveLocalRegistrationId(id: number): Promise<void> {
|
|
|
|
|
this.stmts.saveConfig.run('registrationId', String(id));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// ─── Signed PreKeys ───────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async getSignedPreKey(keyId: number): Promise<SignedPreKey | null> {
|
|
|
|
|
const row = this.stmts.getSignedPreKey.get(keyId) as any;
|
|
|
|
|
if (!row) return null;
|
|
|
|
|
return deserializeSignedPreKey(row.data_json);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async saveSignedPreKey(key: SignedPreKey): Promise<void> {
|
|
|
|
|
this.stmts.saveSignedPreKey.run(key.keyId, serializeSignedPreKey(key));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async removeSignedPreKey(keyId: number): Promise<void> {
|
|
|
|
|
this.stmts.removeSignedPreKey.run(keyId);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// ─── One-Time PreKeys ─────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async getOneTimePreKey(keyId: number): Promise<OneTimePreKey | null> {
|
|
|
|
|
const row = this.stmts.getOneTimePreKey.get(keyId) as any;
|
|
|
|
|
if (!row) return null;
|
|
|
|
|
return deserializeOneTimePreKey(row.data_json);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async saveOneTimePreKey(key: OneTimePreKey): Promise<void> {
|
|
|
|
|
this.stmts.saveOneTimePreKey.run(key.keyId, serializeOneTimePreKey(key));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async removeOneTimePreKey(keyId: number): Promise<void> {
|
|
|
|
|
this.stmts.removeOneTimePreKey.run(keyId);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async getOneTimePreKeyCount(): Promise<number> {
|
|
|
|
|
const row = this.stmts.countOneTimePreKeys.get() as any;
|
|
|
|
|
return row.count;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// ─── Sessions ─────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async getSession(address: string): Promise<SessionState | null> {
|
|
|
|
|
const row = this.stmts.getSession.get(address) as any;
|
|
|
|
|
if (!row) return null;
|
|
|
|
|
return deserializeSessionState(row.state_json);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async saveSession(address: string, state: SessionState): Promise<void> {
|
|
|
|
|
this.stmts.saveSession.run(address, serializeSessionState(state));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async removeSession(address: string): Promise<void> {
|
|
|
|
|
this.stmts.removeSession.run(address);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// ─── Trust ────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async isTrustedIdentity(address: string, identityKey: Uint8Array): Promise<boolean> {
|
|
|
|
|
const row = this.stmts.getTrust.get(address) as any;
|
|
|
|
|
if (!row) return true; // TOFU
|
feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation
M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening
- constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider
- Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId
- Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts
- Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage
- Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions
M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server
- Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes
- signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window
- Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.)
- Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping
- ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided
- Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only)
M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection
- Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store
- Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id
- 64KB body size limit on POST
- Retry-After header on 429 responses
M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset
- Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style)
- ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange
- verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison
M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period
- rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey
- RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired
- 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions
- pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup
M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy
- New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit,
Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation
- All errors have stable SHADE_* codes
- errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping
- toJSON() for network serialization
188 tests passing, zero failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 17:45:34 +02:00
|
|
|
const storedBytes = fromBase64(row.identity_key);
|
|
|
|
|
return constantTimeEqual(storedBytes, identityKey);
|
2026-04-10 00:19:54 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async saveTrustedIdentity(address: string, identityKey: Uint8Array): Promise<void> {
|
|
|
|
|
this.stmts.saveTrust.run(address, toBase64(identityKey));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation
M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening
- constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider
- Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId
- Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts
- Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage
- Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions
M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server
- Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes
- signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window
- Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.)
- Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping
- ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided
- Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only)
M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection
- Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store
- Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id
- 64KB body size limit on POST
- Retry-After header on 429 responses
M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset
- Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style)
- ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange
- verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison
M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period
- rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey
- RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired
- 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions
- pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup
M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy
- New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit,
Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation
- All errors have stable SHADE_* codes
- errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping
- toJSON() for network serialization
188 tests passing, zero failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 17:45:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// ─── Identity History ─────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async addRetiredIdentity(identity: RetiredIdentity): Promise<void> {
|
|
|
|
|
this.stmts.addRetired.run(
|
|
|
|
|
serializeIdentityKeyPair(identity.keyPair),
|
|
|
|
|
identity.retiredAt,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async getRetiredIdentities(): Promise<RetiredIdentity[]> {
|
|
|
|
|
const rows = this.stmts.listRetired.all() as any[];
|
|
|
|
|
return rows.map((r) => ({
|
|
|
|
|
keyPair: deserializeIdentityKeyPair(r.data_json),
|
|
|
|
|
retiredAt: r.retired_at,
|
|
|
|
|
}));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async pruneRetiredIdentities(olderThan: number): Promise<void> {
|
|
|
|
|
this.stmts.pruneRetired.run(olderThan);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
feat(files): @shade/files 0.3.0 — E2EE filesystem RPC primitive
M-Files-1..6 land the full files-RPC layer + everything 0.3.0 needs to
ship. Apps keep their own UI; this layer ships the typed RPC, the
streams bridge for content I/O, and production hooks (rate limit,
retention, fingerprint gate, metrics).
@shade/files (NEW)
- Standard ops: list/stat/mkdir/delete/move/read/write/getThumbnail with
Zod-validated wire schemas + clean user-handler types.
- Custom ops: typed via TypeScript declaration merging on CustomOpsMap
+ per-op Zod schemas; client.custom('app.foo', {...}) is fully typed.
- Content I/O: inline (≤ 256 KiB plaintext) base64-in-RPC; streams
(> 256 KiB) ride @shade/transfer via userMetadata.shadeFilesWriteId
/ shadeFilesReadStreamId correlation. Server-side TransformStream
bridges accept inbound transfers immediately (engine rejects chunks
that arrive before accept) and park the readable for the matching
RPC.
- Directory ops: walk(path, opts) async-iterable depth-first walker;
uploadDirectory()/downloadDirectory() with bounded concurrency pool
(default 4, cap 16), aggregated progress, abort.
- Production hooks (callback-based, vendor-neutral): rate-limit (op +
byte), idempotency cache (LRU + TTL + in-flight de-dupe), path
policy (traversal + percent-decode hardening), fingerprint gate
(required/optional/reject), pluggable Ed25519 sig verification with
±5 min replay window, onMetric sink (standard names).
- React hooks (subpath @shade/files/react): ShadeFilesProvider,
useShadeFiles, useFileList, useFileTransfer/Upload/Download.
- Shade.files.serve(handler) + Shade.files.client(peer) high-level
entrypoint in @shade/sdk; lazy + memoized; one handler per Shade.
Wire format bump
- @shade/proto wire VERSION 0x01 → 0x02. Length prefixes changed from
u16 to u32. The previous u16 silently truncated payloads above
64 KiB — a hard correctness ceiling that blocked inline file ops
up to 256 KiB. Wire-incompatible with 0.2.x peers; new sessions
only. Cross-platform Kotlin port (android/shade-android) updated to
match; test-vectors/wire-format.json regenerated.
Concurrency safety
- ShadeSessionManager.encrypt/.decrypt now run under per-peer mutex.
Concurrent decryptions of the same peer raced ratchet state
(manifested as sporadic "Failed to decrypt — wrong key or tampered
data" under load — surfaced once concurrent uploadDirectory pumped
many writes in flight). Encrypt was already serialized via
Shade.send's encryptChains; decrypt is now serialized at the
manager layer too.
@shade/streams extension
- StreamMetadata.userMetadata?: Record<string, string> for
application-level key/value pairs that round-trip verbatim through
stream-init plaintext. Used by @shade/files for write/read
correlation; available to any consumer.
@shade/sdk extension
- Shade.files getter (lazy + memoized).
- BackgroundHooks.onPruneFiles + periodic timer (default 5 min) +
BackgroundTasks.setHook(name, fn) for runtime hook registration.
Bundles in-flight 0.2.0 work
- packages/shade-streams/, packages/shade-transfer/, related
shade-sdk streams-bridge + shade-widgets transfer hooks were
uncommitted prior to this session. Including them keeps the
workspace consistent at 0.3.0 since @shade/files depends on them.
Tests
- 74 new tests in @shade/files (572 → 646 workspace pass; 0 fail;
3× stable). Coverage spans unit (inline-threshold + concurrency),
integration (read-write inline + streams up to 1 MiB, walk +
upload/download directory, custom-op, metrics, SDK namespace
end-to-end), and security (tampered-envelope sig verification,
replay window, fingerprint gate, rate-limit + quota).
Release artifacts
- All packages bumped to 0.3.0 via scripts/bump-version.ts.
- scripts/publish-all.ts PACKAGES updated with shade-files in
topological order (after shade-transfer, before shade-sdk).
- bun run publish:dry clean (14 packed, 0 failed).
- examples/08-files-browser/ — three-process CLI demo (prekey + Bob
server + Alice CLI) covering list/stat/mkdir/delete/upload/download.
- docs/files.md — full API + design doc.
- CHANGELOG.md 0.3.0 entry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-02 14:00:01 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// ─── Stream-transfer resume state (v0.2.0) ────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async saveStreamState(state: PersistedStreamState): Promise<void> {
|
|
|
|
|
this.stmts.saveStreamState.run(
|
|
|
|
|
state.streamId,
|
|
|
|
|
state.direction,
|
|
|
|
|
state.peerAddress,
|
|
|
|
|
state.status,
|
|
|
|
|
state.metadataJson,
|
|
|
|
|
state.partitionJson,
|
|
|
|
|
state.laneStateJson,
|
|
|
|
|
state.ioDescriptorJson,
|
|
|
|
|
state.secretEnc,
|
|
|
|
|
state.secretNonce,
|
|
|
|
|
state.overallHashState ?? null,
|
|
|
|
|
state.createdAt,
|
|
|
|
|
state.updatedAt,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async getStreamState(streamId: string): Promise<PersistedStreamState | null> {
|
|
|
|
|
const row = this.stmts.getStreamState.get(streamId) as any;
|
|
|
|
|
if (!row) return null;
|
|
|
|
|
return rowToStreamState(row);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async removeStreamState(streamId: string): Promise<void> {
|
|
|
|
|
this.stmts.removeStreamState.run(streamId);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async listActiveStreamStates(direction?: 'send' | 'receive'): Promise<PersistedStreamState[]> {
|
|
|
|
|
const rows = (
|
|
|
|
|
direction === undefined
|
|
|
|
|
? (this.stmts.listActiveStreamStates.all() as any[])
|
|
|
|
|
: (this.stmts.listActiveStreamStatesByDirection.all(direction) as any[])
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
return rows.map(rowToStreamState);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async pruneStreamStates(olderThan: number): Promise<void> {
|
|
|
|
|
this.stmts.pruneStreamStates.run(olderThan);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
function rowToStreamState(row: any): PersistedStreamState {
|
|
|
|
|
const out: PersistedStreamState = {
|
|
|
|
|
streamId: row.stream_id,
|
|
|
|
|
direction: row.direction,
|
|
|
|
|
peerAddress: row.peer_address,
|
|
|
|
|
status: row.status,
|
|
|
|
|
metadataJson: row.metadata_json,
|
|
|
|
|
partitionJson: row.partition_json,
|
|
|
|
|
laneStateJson: row.lane_state_json,
|
|
|
|
|
ioDescriptorJson: row.io_descriptor_json,
|
|
|
|
|
secretEnc: toBytes(row.secret_enc),
|
|
|
|
|
secretNonce: toBytes(row.secret_nonce),
|
|
|
|
|
createdAt: Number(row.created_at),
|
|
|
|
|
updatedAt: Number(row.updated_at),
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
if (row.overall_hash_state !== null && row.overall_hash_state !== undefined) {
|
|
|
|
|
out.overallHashState = row.overall_hash_state;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
return out;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
function toBytes(value: unknown): Uint8Array {
|
|
|
|
|
if (value instanceof Uint8Array) return value;
|
|
|
|
|
if (value instanceof ArrayBuffer) return new Uint8Array(value);
|
|
|
|
|
if (Array.isArray(value)) return new Uint8Array(value);
|
|
|
|
|
if (typeof value === 'string') {
|
|
|
|
|
return new Uint8Array(value.split('').map((c) => c.charCodeAt(0)));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
throw new Error(`Unsupported BLOB representation: ${typeof value}`);
|
2026-04-10 00:19:54 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|