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Shade/packages/shade-storage-sqlite/src/sqlite-storage.ts

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import { Database } from 'bun:sqlite';
feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening - constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider - Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId - Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts - Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage - Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server - Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes - signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window - Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.) - Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping - ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided - Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only) M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection - Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store - Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id - 64KB body size limit on POST - Retry-After header on 429 responses M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset - Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style) - ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange - verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period - rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey - RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired - 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions - pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy - New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit, Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation - All errors have stable SHADE_* codes - errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping - toJSON() for network serialization 188 tests passing, zero failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 17:45:34 +02:00
import type { StorageProvider, IdentityKeyPair, SignedPreKey, OneTimePreKey, SessionState, RetiredIdentity } from '@shade/core';
import {
toBase64, fromBase64,
feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening - constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider - Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId - Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts - Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage - Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server - Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes - signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window - Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.) - Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping - ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided - Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only) M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection - Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store - Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id - 64KB body size limit on POST - Retry-After header on 429 responses M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset - Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style) - ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange - verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period - rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey - RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired - 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions - pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy - New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit, Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation - All errors have stable SHADE_* codes - errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping - toJSON() for network serialization 188 tests passing, zero failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 17:45:34 +02:00
constantTimeEqual,
serializeSessionState, deserializeSessionState,
serializeSignedPreKey, deserializeSignedPreKey,
serializeOneTimePreKey, deserializeOneTimePreKey,
feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening - constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider - Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId - Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts - Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage - Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server - Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes - signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window - Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.) - Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping - ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided - Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only) M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection - Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store - Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id - 64KB body size limit on POST - Retry-After header on 429 responses M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset - Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style) - ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange - verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period - rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey - RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired - 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions - pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy - New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit, Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation - All errors have stable SHADE_* codes - errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping - toJSON() for network serialization 188 tests passing, zero failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 17:45:34 +02:00
serializeIdentityKeyPair, deserializeIdentityKeyPair,
} from '@shade/core';
/**
* SQLite-backed StorageProvider for Shade client-side key/session storage.
*
* Uses bun:sqlite (built-in, zero deps). Stores private keys — for trusted environments only.
* WAL mode enabled for crash safety. Auto-creates tables on first use.
*
* Docker usage:
* Volume mount /data, set SHADE_DB_PATH=/data/shade-client.db
*/
export class SQLiteStorage implements StorageProvider {
private db: Database;
// Prepared statements
private stmts!: {
getIdentity: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
saveIdentity: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
getConfig: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
saveConfig: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
getSignedPreKey: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
saveSignedPreKey: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
removeSignedPreKey: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
getOneTimePreKey: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
saveOneTimePreKey: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
removeOneTimePreKey: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
countOneTimePreKeys: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
getSession: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
saveSession: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
removeSession: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
getTrust: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
saveTrust: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening - constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider - Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId - Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts - Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage - Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server - Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes - signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window - Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.) - Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping - ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided - Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only) M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection - Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store - Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id - 64KB body size limit on POST - Retry-After header on 429 responses M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset - Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style) - ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange - verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period - rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey - RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired - 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions - pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy - New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit, Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation - All errors have stable SHADE_* codes - errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping - toJSON() for network serialization 188 tests passing, zero failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 17:45:34 +02:00
addRetired: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
listRetired: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
pruneRetired: ReturnType<Database['prepare']>;
};
constructor(dbPath?: string) {
const path = dbPath ?? process.env.SHADE_DB_PATH ?? '/data/shade-client.db';
this.db = new Database(path, { create: true });
this.db.exec('PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL');
this.ensureTables();
this.prepareStatements();
}
private ensureTables() {
this.db.exec(`
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS identity (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1),
signing_public_key TEXT NOT NULL,
signing_private_key TEXT NOT NULL,
dh_public_key TEXT NOT NULL,
dh_private_key TEXT NOT NULL
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS config (
key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
value TEXT NOT NULL
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS signed_prekeys (
key_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
data_json TEXT NOT NULL
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS one_time_prekeys (
key_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
data_json TEXT NOT NULL
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS sessions (
address TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
state_json TEXT NOT NULL
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS trusted_identities (
address TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
identity_key TEXT NOT NULL
);
feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening - constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider - Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId - Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts - Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage - Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server - Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes - signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window - Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.) - Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping - ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided - Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only) M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection - Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store - Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id - 64KB body size limit on POST - Retry-After header on 429 responses M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset - Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style) - ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange - verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period - rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey - RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired - 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions - pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy - New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit, Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation - All errors have stable SHADE_* codes - errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping - toJSON() for network serialization 188 tests passing, zero failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 17:45:34 +02:00
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS retired_identities (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
data_json TEXT NOT NULL,
retired_at INTEGER NOT NULL
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_retired_at ON retired_identities(retired_at);
`);
}
private prepareStatements() {
this.stmts = {
getIdentity: this.db.prepare('SELECT * FROM identity WHERE id = 1'),
saveIdentity: this.db.prepare('INSERT OR REPLACE INTO identity (id, signing_public_key, signing_private_key, dh_public_key, dh_private_key) VALUES (1, ?, ?, ?, ?)'),
getConfig: this.db.prepare('SELECT value FROM config WHERE key = ?'),
saveConfig: this.db.prepare('INSERT OR REPLACE INTO config (key, value) VALUES (?, ?)'),
getSignedPreKey: this.db.prepare('SELECT data_json FROM signed_prekeys WHERE key_id = ?'),
saveSignedPreKey: this.db.prepare('INSERT OR REPLACE INTO signed_prekeys (key_id, data_json) VALUES (?, ?)'),
removeSignedPreKey: this.db.prepare('DELETE FROM signed_prekeys WHERE key_id = ?'),
getOneTimePreKey: this.db.prepare('SELECT data_json FROM one_time_prekeys WHERE key_id = ?'),
saveOneTimePreKey: this.db.prepare('INSERT OR REPLACE INTO one_time_prekeys (key_id, data_json) VALUES (?, ?)'),
removeOneTimePreKey: this.db.prepare('DELETE FROM one_time_prekeys WHERE key_id = ?'),
countOneTimePreKeys: this.db.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) as count FROM one_time_prekeys'),
getSession: this.db.prepare('SELECT state_json FROM sessions WHERE address = ?'),
saveSession: this.db.prepare('INSERT OR REPLACE INTO sessions (address, state_json) VALUES (?, ?)'),
removeSession: this.db.prepare('DELETE FROM sessions WHERE address = ?'),
getTrust: this.db.prepare('SELECT identity_key FROM trusted_identities WHERE address = ?'),
saveTrust: this.db.prepare('INSERT OR REPLACE INTO trusted_identities (address, identity_key) VALUES (?, ?)'),
feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening - constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider - Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId - Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts - Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage - Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server - Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes - signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window - Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.) - Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping - ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided - Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only) M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection - Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store - Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id - 64KB body size limit on POST - Retry-After header on 429 responses M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset - Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style) - ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange - verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period - rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey - RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired - 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions - pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy - New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit, Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation - All errors have stable SHADE_* codes - errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping - toJSON() for network serialization 188 tests passing, zero failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 17:45:34 +02:00
addRetired: this.db.prepare('INSERT INTO retired_identities (data_json, retired_at) VALUES (?, ?)'),
listRetired: this.db.prepare('SELECT data_json, retired_at FROM retired_identities ORDER BY retired_at DESC'),
pruneRetired: this.db.prepare('DELETE FROM retired_identities WHERE retired_at < ?'),
};
}
close() {
this.db.close();
}
// ─── Identity ──────────────────────────────────────────────
async getIdentityKeyPair(): Promise<IdentityKeyPair | null> {
const row = this.stmts.getIdentity.get() as any;
if (!row) return null;
return {
signingPublicKey: fromBase64(row.signing_public_key),
signingPrivateKey: fromBase64(row.signing_private_key),
dhPublicKey: fromBase64(row.dh_public_key),
dhPrivateKey: fromBase64(row.dh_private_key),
};
}
async saveIdentityKeyPair(kp: IdentityKeyPair): Promise<void> {
this.stmts.saveIdentity.run(
toBase64(kp.signingPublicKey),
toBase64(kp.signingPrivateKey),
toBase64(kp.dhPublicKey),
toBase64(kp.dhPrivateKey),
);
}
async getLocalRegistrationId(): Promise<number> {
const row = this.stmts.getConfig.get('registrationId') as any;
return row ? parseInt(row.value, 10) : 0;
}
async saveLocalRegistrationId(id: number): Promise<void> {
this.stmts.saveConfig.run('registrationId', String(id));
}
// ─── Signed PreKeys ───────────────────────────────────────
async getSignedPreKey(keyId: number): Promise<SignedPreKey | null> {
const row = this.stmts.getSignedPreKey.get(keyId) as any;
if (!row) return null;
return deserializeSignedPreKey(row.data_json);
}
async saveSignedPreKey(key: SignedPreKey): Promise<void> {
this.stmts.saveSignedPreKey.run(key.keyId, serializeSignedPreKey(key));
}
async removeSignedPreKey(keyId: number): Promise<void> {
this.stmts.removeSignedPreKey.run(keyId);
}
// ─── One-Time PreKeys ─────────────────────────────────────
async getOneTimePreKey(keyId: number): Promise<OneTimePreKey | null> {
const row = this.stmts.getOneTimePreKey.get(keyId) as any;
if (!row) return null;
return deserializeOneTimePreKey(row.data_json);
}
async saveOneTimePreKey(key: OneTimePreKey): Promise<void> {
this.stmts.saveOneTimePreKey.run(key.keyId, serializeOneTimePreKey(key));
}
async removeOneTimePreKey(keyId: number): Promise<void> {
this.stmts.removeOneTimePreKey.run(keyId);
}
async getOneTimePreKeyCount(): Promise<number> {
const row = this.stmts.countOneTimePreKeys.get() as any;
return row.count;
}
// ─── Sessions ─────────────────────────────────────────────
async getSession(address: string): Promise<SessionState | null> {
const row = this.stmts.getSession.get(address) as any;
if (!row) return null;
return deserializeSessionState(row.state_json);
}
async saveSession(address: string, state: SessionState): Promise<void> {
this.stmts.saveSession.run(address, serializeSessionState(state));
}
async removeSession(address: string): Promise<void> {
this.stmts.removeSession.run(address);
}
// ─── Trust ────────────────────────────────────────────────
async isTrustedIdentity(address: string, identityKey: Uint8Array): Promise<boolean> {
const row = this.stmts.getTrust.get(address) as any;
if (!row) return true; // TOFU
feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening - constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider - Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId - Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts - Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage - Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server - Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes - signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window - Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.) - Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping - ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided - Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only) M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection - Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store - Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id - 64KB body size limit on POST - Retry-After header on 429 responses M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset - Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style) - ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange - verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period - rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey - RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired - 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions - pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy - New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit, Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation - All errors have stable SHADE_* codes - errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping - toJSON() for network serialization 188 tests passing, zero failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 17:45:34 +02:00
const storedBytes = fromBase64(row.identity_key);
return constantTimeEqual(storedBytes, identityKey);
}
async saveTrustedIdentity(address: string, identityKey: Uint8Array): Promise<void> {
this.stmts.saveTrust.run(address, toBase64(identityKey));
}
feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening - constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider - Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId - Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts - Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage - Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server - Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes - signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window - Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.) - Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping - ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided - Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only) M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection - Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store - Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id - 64KB body size limit on POST - Retry-After header on 429 responses M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset - Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style) - ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange - verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period - rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey - RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired - 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions - pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy - New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit, Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation - All errors have stable SHADE_* codes - errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping - toJSON() for network serialization 188 tests passing, zero failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 17:45:34 +02:00
// ─── Identity History ─────────────────────────────────────
async addRetiredIdentity(identity: RetiredIdentity): Promise<void> {
this.stmts.addRetired.run(
serializeIdentityKeyPair(identity.keyPair),
identity.retiredAt,
);
}
async getRetiredIdentities(): Promise<RetiredIdentity[]> {
const rows = this.stmts.listRetired.all() as any[];
return rows.map((r) => ({
keyPair: deserializeIdentityKeyPair(r.data_json),
retiredAt: r.retired_at,
}));
}
async pruneRetiredIdentities(olderThan: number): Promise<void> {
this.stmts.pruneRetired.run(olderThan);
}
}