release(v4.0.0): Shade GA — V3.x consolidation + audit prep
V3.1 → V3.12 consolidated and tagged for the first GA release. Wire
format unchanged from 0.4.x — 4.0 peers interoperate with 0.4.x peers
byte-for-byte. The version bump is semantic: audit-cycle complete,
opt-in surface fully exposed, threat model refreshed for every new
surface.
Highlights:
- All 24 @shade/* packages bumped to 4.0.0 in lockstep.
- CHANGELOG 4.0.0 section is the canonical manifest of what landed.
- THREAT-MODEL extended (§10 fingerprint gates, §11 WebRTC P2P, §12
Web-Worker boundary) + residual-risks table refreshed.
- OpenAPI now covers all 27 routes: prekey, transfer, KT, inbox,
bridge, observer, /metrics, /healthz, /ready.
- MIGRATION 0.3.x → 4.0 documented + smoke-tested against
shade migrate-storage on a real SQLite DB.
- docs/audit/REVIEW-BUNDLE.md + SCOPE.md ready for external reviewer.
- scripts/soak.ts harness for the GA-stable 2-week soak window.
- All V*.md plans archived under docs/archive/ with Status: Done.
- Voice/Video carved out into V5.0; 4.0 audit focuses on the frozen
non-realtime stack.
Tests: TS 1000/1000 + Kotlin 11/11 cross-platform vectors green.
Docker: gt.zyon.no/stian/shade-prekey:4.0.0 builds and reports
version 4.0.0 on /health.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-03 18:35:35 +02:00
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import type { StorageProvider, IdentityKeyPair, SignedPreKey, OneTimePreKey, SessionState, RetiredIdentity, PersistedStreamState, PeerVerification } from '@shade/core';
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feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation
M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening
- constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider
- Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId
- Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts
- Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage
- Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions
M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server
- Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes
- signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window
- Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.)
- Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping
- ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided
- Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only)
M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection
- Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store
- Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id
- 64KB body size limit on POST
- Retry-After header on 429 responses
M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset
- Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style)
- ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange
- verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison
M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period
- rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey
- RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired
- 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions
- pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup
M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy
- New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit,
Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation
- All errors have stable SHADE_* codes
- errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping
- toJSON() for network serialization
188 tests passing, zero failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 17:45:34 +02:00
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import { constantTimeEqual } from '@shade/core';
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feat: Shade E2EE library — M1-M3 complete
Signal Protocol implementation with full X3DH + Double Ratchet:
- M1: Core types, CryptoProvider interface, KDF chain functions,
SubtleCrypto+noble/curves provider, MemoryStorage
- M2: X3DH key agreement (identity keys, signed prekeys, one-time
prekeys, bundle processing for both initiator and responder)
- M3: Double Ratchet (symmetric-key ratchet, DH ratchet, skipped
message key cache, out-of-order delivery, AAD-bound headers)
68 tests, 0 failures — including full integration test of
X3DH handshake → Double Ratchet conversation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-09 20:08:19 +02:00
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/**
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* In-memory StorageProvider for testing and embedded use.
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* All data is lost when the instance is garbage collected.
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*/
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export class MemoryStorage implements StorageProvider {
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private identityKeyPair: IdentityKeyPair | null = null;
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private registrationId: number = 0;
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private signedPreKeys = new Map<number, SignedPreKey>();
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private oneTimePreKeys = new Map<number, OneTimePreKey>();
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private sessions = new Map<string, SessionState>();
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private trustedIdentities = new Map<string, Uint8Array>();
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feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation
M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening
- constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider
- Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId
- Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts
- Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage
- Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions
M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server
- Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes
- signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window
- Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.)
- Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping
- ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided
- Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only)
M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection
- Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store
- Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id
- 64KB body size limit on POST
- Retry-After header on 429 responses
M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset
- Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style)
- ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange
- verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison
M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period
- rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey
- RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired
- 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions
- pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup
M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy
- New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit,
Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation
- All errors have stable SHADE_* codes
- errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping
- toJSON() for network serialization
188 tests passing, zero failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 17:45:34 +02:00
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private retiredIdentities: RetiredIdentity[] = [];
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feat: Shade E2EE library — M1-M3 complete
Signal Protocol implementation with full X3DH + Double Ratchet:
- M1: Core types, CryptoProvider interface, KDF chain functions,
SubtleCrypto+noble/curves provider, MemoryStorage
- M2: X3DH key agreement (identity keys, signed prekeys, one-time
prekeys, bundle processing for both initiator and responder)
- M3: Double Ratchet (symmetric-key ratchet, DH ratchet, skipped
message key cache, out-of-order delivery, AAD-bound headers)
68 tests, 0 failures — including full integration test of
X3DH handshake → Double Ratchet conversation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-09 20:08:19 +02:00
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// ─── Identity ──────────────────────────────────────────────
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async getIdentityKeyPair(): Promise<IdentityKeyPair | null> {
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return this.identityKeyPair;
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}
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async saveIdentityKeyPair(keyPair: IdentityKeyPair): Promise<void> {
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this.identityKeyPair = keyPair;
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}
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async getLocalRegistrationId(): Promise<number> {
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return this.registrationId;
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}
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async saveLocalRegistrationId(id: number): Promise<void> {
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this.registrationId = id;
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}
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// ─── Signed Pre-Keys ──────────────────────────────────────
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async getSignedPreKey(keyId: number): Promise<SignedPreKey | null> {
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return this.signedPreKeys.get(keyId) ?? null;
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}
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async saveSignedPreKey(key: SignedPreKey): Promise<void> {
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this.signedPreKeys.set(key.keyId, key);
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}
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async removeSignedPreKey(keyId: number): Promise<void> {
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this.signedPreKeys.delete(keyId);
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}
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// ─── One-Time Pre-Keys ────────────────────────────────────
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async getOneTimePreKey(keyId: number): Promise<OneTimePreKey | null> {
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return this.oneTimePreKeys.get(keyId) ?? null;
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}
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async saveOneTimePreKey(key: OneTimePreKey): Promise<void> {
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this.oneTimePreKeys.set(key.keyId, key);
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}
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async removeOneTimePreKey(keyId: number): Promise<void> {
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this.oneTimePreKeys.delete(keyId);
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}
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async getOneTimePreKeyCount(): Promise<number> {
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return this.oneTimePreKeys.size;
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}
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// ─── Sessions ─────────────────────────────────────────────
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async getSession(address: string): Promise<SessionState | null> {
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return this.sessions.get(address) ?? null;
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}
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async saveSession(address: string, state: SessionState): Promise<void> {
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this.sessions.set(address, state);
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}
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async removeSession(address: string): Promise<void> {
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this.sessions.delete(address);
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}
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// ─── Trust ────────────────────────────────────────────────
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async isTrustedIdentity(address: string, identityKey: Uint8Array): Promise<boolean> {
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const stored = this.trustedIdentities.get(address);
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if (!stored) return true; // TOFU: trust on first use
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feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation
M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening
- constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider
- Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId
- Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts
- Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage
- Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions
M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server
- Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes
- signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window
- Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.)
- Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping
- ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided
- Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only)
M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection
- Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store
- Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id
- 64KB body size limit on POST
- Retry-After header on 429 responses
M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset
- Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style)
- ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange
- verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison
M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period
- rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey
- RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired
- 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions
- pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup
M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy
- New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit,
Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation
- All errors have stable SHADE_* codes
- errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping
- toJSON() for network serialization
188 tests passing, zero failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 17:45:34 +02:00
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return constantTimeEqual(stored, identityKey);
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feat: Shade E2EE library — M1-M3 complete
Signal Protocol implementation with full X3DH + Double Ratchet:
- M1: Core types, CryptoProvider interface, KDF chain functions,
SubtleCrypto+noble/curves provider, MemoryStorage
- M2: X3DH key agreement (identity keys, signed prekeys, one-time
prekeys, bundle processing for both initiator and responder)
- M3: Double Ratchet (symmetric-key ratchet, DH ratchet, skipped
message key cache, out-of-order delivery, AAD-bound headers)
68 tests, 0 failures — including full integration test of
X3DH handshake → Double Ratchet conversation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-09 20:08:19 +02:00
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}
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async saveTrustedIdentity(address: string, identityKey: Uint8Array): Promise<void> {
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this.trustedIdentities.set(address, identityKey);
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}
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feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation
M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening
- constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider
- Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId
- Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts
- Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage
- Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions
M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server
- Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes
- signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window
- Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.)
- Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping
- ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided
- Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only)
M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection
- Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store
- Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id
- 64KB body size limit on POST
- Retry-After header on 429 responses
M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset
- Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style)
- ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange
- verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison
M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period
- rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey
- RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired
- 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions
- pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup
M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy
- New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit,
Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation
- All errors have stable SHADE_* codes
- errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping
- toJSON() for network serialization
188 tests passing, zero failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 17:45:34 +02:00
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// ─── Identity History ─────────────────────────────────────
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async addRetiredIdentity(identity: RetiredIdentity): Promise<void> {
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this.retiredIdentities.push(identity);
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}
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async getRetiredIdentities(): Promise<RetiredIdentity[]> {
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return [...this.retiredIdentities];
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}
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async pruneRetiredIdentities(olderThan: number): Promise<void> {
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this.retiredIdentities = this.retiredIdentities.filter((r) => r.retiredAt >= olderThan);
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feat: Shade E2EE library — M1-M3 complete
Signal Protocol implementation with full X3DH + Double Ratchet:
- M1: Core types, CryptoProvider interface, KDF chain functions,
SubtleCrypto+noble/curves provider, MemoryStorage
- M2: X3DH key agreement (identity keys, signed prekeys, one-time
prekeys, bundle processing for both initiator and responder)
- M3: Double Ratchet (symmetric-key ratchet, DH ratchet, skipped
message key cache, out-of-order delivery, AAD-bound headers)
68 tests, 0 failures — including full integration test of
X3DH handshake → Double Ratchet conversation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-09 20:08:19 +02:00
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}
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feat(files): @shade/files 0.3.0 — E2EE filesystem RPC primitive
M-Files-1..6 land the full files-RPC layer + everything 0.3.0 needs to
ship. Apps keep their own UI; this layer ships the typed RPC, the
streams bridge for content I/O, and production hooks (rate limit,
retention, fingerprint gate, metrics).
@shade/files (NEW)
- Standard ops: list/stat/mkdir/delete/move/read/write/getThumbnail with
Zod-validated wire schemas + clean user-handler types.
- Custom ops: typed via TypeScript declaration merging on CustomOpsMap
+ per-op Zod schemas; client.custom('app.foo', {...}) is fully typed.
- Content I/O: inline (≤ 256 KiB plaintext) base64-in-RPC; streams
(> 256 KiB) ride @shade/transfer via userMetadata.shadeFilesWriteId
/ shadeFilesReadStreamId correlation. Server-side TransformStream
bridges accept inbound transfers immediately (engine rejects chunks
that arrive before accept) and park the readable for the matching
RPC.
- Directory ops: walk(path, opts) async-iterable depth-first walker;
uploadDirectory()/downloadDirectory() with bounded concurrency pool
(default 4, cap 16), aggregated progress, abort.
- Production hooks (callback-based, vendor-neutral): rate-limit (op +
byte), idempotency cache (LRU + TTL + in-flight de-dupe), path
policy (traversal + percent-decode hardening), fingerprint gate
(required/optional/reject), pluggable Ed25519 sig verification with
±5 min replay window, onMetric sink (standard names).
- React hooks (subpath @shade/files/react): ShadeFilesProvider,
useShadeFiles, useFileList, useFileTransfer/Upload/Download.
- Shade.files.serve(handler) + Shade.files.client(peer) high-level
entrypoint in @shade/sdk; lazy + memoized; one handler per Shade.
Wire format bump
- @shade/proto wire VERSION 0x01 → 0x02. Length prefixes changed from
u16 to u32. The previous u16 silently truncated payloads above
64 KiB — a hard correctness ceiling that blocked inline file ops
up to 256 KiB. Wire-incompatible with 0.2.x peers; new sessions
only. Cross-platform Kotlin port (android/shade-android) updated to
match; test-vectors/wire-format.json regenerated.
Concurrency safety
- ShadeSessionManager.encrypt/.decrypt now run under per-peer mutex.
Concurrent decryptions of the same peer raced ratchet state
(manifested as sporadic "Failed to decrypt — wrong key or tampered
data" under load — surfaced once concurrent uploadDirectory pumped
many writes in flight). Encrypt was already serialized via
Shade.send's encryptChains; decrypt is now serialized at the
manager layer too.
@shade/streams extension
- StreamMetadata.userMetadata?: Record<string, string> for
application-level key/value pairs that round-trip verbatim through
stream-init plaintext. Used by @shade/files for write/read
correlation; available to any consumer.
@shade/sdk extension
- Shade.files getter (lazy + memoized).
- BackgroundHooks.onPruneFiles + periodic timer (default 5 min) +
BackgroundTasks.setHook(name, fn) for runtime hook registration.
Bundles in-flight 0.2.0 work
- packages/shade-streams/, packages/shade-transfer/, related
shade-sdk streams-bridge + shade-widgets transfer hooks were
uncommitted prior to this session. Including them keeps the
workspace consistent at 0.3.0 since @shade/files depends on them.
Tests
- 74 new tests in @shade/files (572 → 646 workspace pass; 0 fail;
3× stable). Coverage spans unit (inline-threshold + concurrency),
integration (read-write inline + streams up to 1 MiB, walk +
upload/download directory, custom-op, metrics, SDK namespace
end-to-end), and security (tampered-envelope sig verification,
replay window, fingerprint gate, rate-limit + quota).
Release artifacts
- All packages bumped to 0.3.0 via scripts/bump-version.ts.
- scripts/publish-all.ts PACKAGES updated with shade-files in
topological order (after shade-transfer, before shade-sdk).
- bun run publish:dry clean (14 packed, 0 failed).
- examples/08-files-browser/ — three-process CLI demo (prekey + Bob
server + Alice CLI) covering list/stat/mkdir/delete/upload/download.
- docs/files.md — full API + design doc.
- CHANGELOG.md 0.3.0 entry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-02 14:00:01 +02:00
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release(v4.0.0): Shade GA — V3.x consolidation + audit prep
V3.1 → V3.12 consolidated and tagged for the first GA release. Wire
format unchanged from 0.4.x — 4.0 peers interoperate with 0.4.x peers
byte-for-byte. The version bump is semantic: audit-cycle complete,
opt-in surface fully exposed, threat model refreshed for every new
surface.
Highlights:
- All 24 @shade/* packages bumped to 4.0.0 in lockstep.
- CHANGELOG 4.0.0 section is the canonical manifest of what landed.
- THREAT-MODEL extended (§10 fingerprint gates, §11 WebRTC P2P, §12
Web-Worker boundary) + residual-risks table refreshed.
- OpenAPI now covers all 27 routes: prekey, transfer, KT, inbox,
bridge, observer, /metrics, /healthz, /ready.
- MIGRATION 0.3.x → 4.0 documented + smoke-tested against
shade migrate-storage on a real SQLite DB.
- docs/audit/REVIEW-BUNDLE.md + SCOPE.md ready for external reviewer.
- scripts/soak.ts harness for the GA-stable 2-week soak window.
- All V*.md plans archived under docs/archive/ with Status: Done.
- Voice/Video carved out into V5.0; 4.0 audit focuses on the frozen
non-realtime stack.
Tests: TS 1000/1000 + Kotlin 11/11 cross-platform vectors green.
Docker: gt.zyon.no/stian/shade-prekey:4.0.0 builds and reports
version 4.0.0 on /health.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-03 18:35:35 +02:00
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// ─── Peer verifications (V3.3) ────────────────────────────
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private peerVerifications = new Map<string, PeerVerification>();
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private peerIdentityVersions = new Map<string, number>();
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async savePeerVerification(v: PeerVerification): Promise<void> {
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this.peerVerifications.set(v.peerAddress, { ...v });
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}
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async getPeerVerification(address: string): Promise<PeerVerification | null> {
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const v = this.peerVerifications.get(address);
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return v ? { ...v } : null;
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}
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async removePeerVerification(address: string): Promise<void> {
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this.peerVerifications.delete(address);
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}
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async getPeerIdentityVersion(address: string): Promise<number> {
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return this.peerIdentityVersions.get(address) ?? 1;
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}
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async bumpPeerIdentityVersion(address: string): Promise<number> {
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const next = (this.peerIdentityVersions.get(address) ?? 1) + 1;
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this.peerIdentityVersions.set(address, next);
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return next;
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}
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feat(files): @shade/files 0.3.0 — E2EE filesystem RPC primitive
M-Files-1..6 land the full files-RPC layer + everything 0.3.0 needs to
ship. Apps keep their own UI; this layer ships the typed RPC, the
streams bridge for content I/O, and production hooks (rate limit,
retention, fingerprint gate, metrics).
@shade/files (NEW)
- Standard ops: list/stat/mkdir/delete/move/read/write/getThumbnail with
Zod-validated wire schemas + clean user-handler types.
- Custom ops: typed via TypeScript declaration merging on CustomOpsMap
+ per-op Zod schemas; client.custom('app.foo', {...}) is fully typed.
- Content I/O: inline (≤ 256 KiB plaintext) base64-in-RPC; streams
(> 256 KiB) ride @shade/transfer via userMetadata.shadeFilesWriteId
/ shadeFilesReadStreamId correlation. Server-side TransformStream
bridges accept inbound transfers immediately (engine rejects chunks
that arrive before accept) and park the readable for the matching
RPC.
- Directory ops: walk(path, opts) async-iterable depth-first walker;
uploadDirectory()/downloadDirectory() with bounded concurrency pool
(default 4, cap 16), aggregated progress, abort.
- Production hooks (callback-based, vendor-neutral): rate-limit (op +
byte), idempotency cache (LRU + TTL + in-flight de-dupe), path
policy (traversal + percent-decode hardening), fingerprint gate
(required/optional/reject), pluggable Ed25519 sig verification with
±5 min replay window, onMetric sink (standard names).
- React hooks (subpath @shade/files/react): ShadeFilesProvider,
useShadeFiles, useFileList, useFileTransfer/Upload/Download.
- Shade.files.serve(handler) + Shade.files.client(peer) high-level
entrypoint in @shade/sdk; lazy + memoized; one handler per Shade.
Wire format bump
- @shade/proto wire VERSION 0x01 → 0x02. Length prefixes changed from
u16 to u32. The previous u16 silently truncated payloads above
64 KiB — a hard correctness ceiling that blocked inline file ops
up to 256 KiB. Wire-incompatible with 0.2.x peers; new sessions
only. Cross-platform Kotlin port (android/shade-android) updated to
match; test-vectors/wire-format.json regenerated.
Concurrency safety
- ShadeSessionManager.encrypt/.decrypt now run under per-peer mutex.
Concurrent decryptions of the same peer raced ratchet state
(manifested as sporadic "Failed to decrypt — wrong key or tampered
data" under load — surfaced once concurrent uploadDirectory pumped
many writes in flight). Encrypt was already serialized via
Shade.send's encryptChains; decrypt is now serialized at the
manager layer too.
@shade/streams extension
- StreamMetadata.userMetadata?: Record<string, string> for
application-level key/value pairs that round-trip verbatim through
stream-init plaintext. Used by @shade/files for write/read
correlation; available to any consumer.
@shade/sdk extension
- Shade.files getter (lazy + memoized).
- BackgroundHooks.onPruneFiles + periodic timer (default 5 min) +
BackgroundTasks.setHook(name, fn) for runtime hook registration.
Bundles in-flight 0.2.0 work
- packages/shade-streams/, packages/shade-transfer/, related
shade-sdk streams-bridge + shade-widgets transfer hooks were
uncommitted prior to this session. Including them keeps the
workspace consistent at 0.3.0 since @shade/files depends on them.
Tests
- 74 new tests in @shade/files (572 → 646 workspace pass; 0 fail;
3× stable). Coverage spans unit (inline-threshold + concurrency),
integration (read-write inline + streams up to 1 MiB, walk +
upload/download directory, custom-op, metrics, SDK namespace
end-to-end), and security (tampered-envelope sig verification,
replay window, fingerprint gate, rate-limit + quota).
Release artifacts
- All packages bumped to 0.3.0 via scripts/bump-version.ts.
- scripts/publish-all.ts PACKAGES updated with shade-files in
topological order (after shade-transfer, before shade-sdk).
- bun run publish:dry clean (14 packed, 0 failed).
- examples/08-files-browser/ — three-process CLI demo (prekey + Bob
server + Alice CLI) covering list/stat/mkdir/delete/upload/download.
- docs/files.md — full API + design doc.
- CHANGELOG.md 0.3.0 entry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-02 14:00:01 +02:00
|
|
|
// ─── Stream-transfer resume state (v0.2.0) ────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
private streamStates = new Map<string, PersistedStreamState>();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async saveStreamState(state: PersistedStreamState): Promise<void> {
|
|
|
|
|
this.streamStates.set(state.streamId, { ...state });
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async getStreamState(streamId: string): Promise<PersistedStreamState | null> {
|
|
|
|
|
const v = this.streamStates.get(streamId);
|
|
|
|
|
return v ? { ...v } : null;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async removeStreamState(streamId: string): Promise<void> {
|
|
|
|
|
this.streamStates.delete(streamId);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async listActiveStreamStates(direction?: 'send' | 'receive'): Promise<PersistedStreamState[]> {
|
|
|
|
|
const out: PersistedStreamState[] = [];
|
|
|
|
|
for (const s of this.streamStates.values()) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (s.status !== 'active' && s.status !== 'paused') continue;
|
|
|
|
|
if (direction !== undefined && s.direction !== direction) continue;
|
|
|
|
|
out.push({ ...s });
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
out.sort((a, b) => b.updatedAt - a.updatedAt);
|
|
|
|
|
return out;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async pruneStreamStates(olderThan: number): Promise<void> {
|
|
|
|
|
for (const [id, s] of this.streamStates) {
|
|
|
|
|
if ((s.status === 'finished' || s.status === 'aborted') && s.updatedAt < olderThan) {
|
|
|
|
|
this.streamStates.delete(id);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
feat: Shade E2EE library — M1-M3 complete
Signal Protocol implementation with full X3DH + Double Ratchet:
- M1: Core types, CryptoProvider interface, KDF chain functions,
SubtleCrypto+noble/curves provider, MemoryStorage
- M2: X3DH key agreement (identity keys, signed prekeys, one-time
prekeys, bundle processing for both initiator and responder)
- M3: Double Ratchet (symmetric-key ratchet, DH ratchet, skipped
message key cache, out-of-order delivery, AAD-bound headers)
68 tests, 0 failures — including full integration test of
X3DH handshake → Double Ratchet conversation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-09 20:08:19 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|