Files
Shade/packages/shade-crypto-web/src/memory-storage.ts

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feat(files): @shade/files 0.3.0 — E2EE filesystem RPC primitive M-Files-1..6 land the full files-RPC layer + everything 0.3.0 needs to ship. Apps keep their own UI; this layer ships the typed RPC, the streams bridge for content I/O, and production hooks (rate limit, retention, fingerprint gate, metrics). @shade/files (NEW) - Standard ops: list/stat/mkdir/delete/move/read/write/getThumbnail with Zod-validated wire schemas + clean user-handler types. - Custom ops: typed via TypeScript declaration merging on CustomOpsMap + per-op Zod schemas; client.custom('app.foo', {...}) is fully typed. - Content I/O: inline (≤ 256 KiB plaintext) base64-in-RPC; streams (> 256 KiB) ride @shade/transfer via userMetadata.shadeFilesWriteId / shadeFilesReadStreamId correlation. Server-side TransformStream bridges accept inbound transfers immediately (engine rejects chunks that arrive before accept) and park the readable for the matching RPC. - Directory ops: walk(path, opts) async-iterable depth-first walker; uploadDirectory()/downloadDirectory() with bounded concurrency pool (default 4, cap 16), aggregated progress, abort. - Production hooks (callback-based, vendor-neutral): rate-limit (op + byte), idempotency cache (LRU + TTL + in-flight de-dupe), path policy (traversal + percent-decode hardening), fingerprint gate (required/optional/reject), pluggable Ed25519 sig verification with ±5 min replay window, onMetric sink (standard names). - React hooks (subpath @shade/files/react): ShadeFilesProvider, useShadeFiles, useFileList, useFileTransfer/Upload/Download. - Shade.files.serve(handler) + Shade.files.client(peer) high-level entrypoint in @shade/sdk; lazy + memoized; one handler per Shade. Wire format bump - @shade/proto wire VERSION 0x01 → 0x02. Length prefixes changed from u16 to u32. The previous u16 silently truncated payloads above 64 KiB — a hard correctness ceiling that blocked inline file ops up to 256 KiB. Wire-incompatible with 0.2.x peers; new sessions only. Cross-platform Kotlin port (android/shade-android) updated to match; test-vectors/wire-format.json regenerated. Concurrency safety - ShadeSessionManager.encrypt/.decrypt now run under per-peer mutex. Concurrent decryptions of the same peer raced ratchet state (manifested as sporadic "Failed to decrypt — wrong key or tampered data" under load — surfaced once concurrent uploadDirectory pumped many writes in flight). Encrypt was already serialized via Shade.send's encryptChains; decrypt is now serialized at the manager layer too. @shade/streams extension - StreamMetadata.userMetadata?: Record<string, string> for application-level key/value pairs that round-trip verbatim through stream-init plaintext. Used by @shade/files for write/read correlation; available to any consumer. @shade/sdk extension - Shade.files getter (lazy + memoized). - BackgroundHooks.onPruneFiles + periodic timer (default 5 min) + BackgroundTasks.setHook(name, fn) for runtime hook registration. Bundles in-flight 0.2.0 work - packages/shade-streams/, packages/shade-transfer/, related shade-sdk streams-bridge + shade-widgets transfer hooks were uncommitted prior to this session. Including them keeps the workspace consistent at 0.3.0 since @shade/files depends on them. Tests - 74 new tests in @shade/files (572 → 646 workspace pass; 0 fail; 3× stable). Coverage spans unit (inline-threshold + concurrency), integration (read-write inline + streams up to 1 MiB, walk + upload/download directory, custom-op, metrics, SDK namespace end-to-end), and security (tampered-envelope sig verification, replay window, fingerprint gate, rate-limit + quota). Release artifacts - All packages bumped to 0.3.0 via scripts/bump-version.ts. - scripts/publish-all.ts PACKAGES updated with shade-files in topological order (after shade-transfer, before shade-sdk). - bun run publish:dry clean (14 packed, 0 failed). - examples/08-files-browser/ — three-process CLI demo (prekey + Bob server + Alice CLI) covering list/stat/mkdir/delete/upload/download. - docs/files.md — full API + design doc. - CHANGELOG.md 0.3.0 entry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-02 14:00:01 +02:00
import type { StorageProvider, IdentityKeyPair, SignedPreKey, OneTimePreKey, SessionState, RetiredIdentity, PersistedStreamState } from '@shade/core';
feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening - constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider - Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId - Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts - Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage - Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server - Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes - signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window - Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.) - Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping - ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided - Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only) M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection - Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store - Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id - 64KB body size limit on POST - Retry-After header on 429 responses M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset - Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style) - ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange - verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period - rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey - RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired - 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions - pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy - New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit, Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation - All errors have stable SHADE_* codes - errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping - toJSON() for network serialization 188 tests passing, zero failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 17:45:34 +02:00
import { constantTimeEqual } from '@shade/core';
/**
* In-memory StorageProvider for testing and embedded use.
* All data is lost when the instance is garbage collected.
*/
export class MemoryStorage implements StorageProvider {
private identityKeyPair: IdentityKeyPair | null = null;
private registrationId: number = 0;
private signedPreKeys = new Map<number, SignedPreKey>();
private oneTimePreKeys = new Map<number, OneTimePreKey>();
private sessions = new Map<string, SessionState>();
private trustedIdentities = new Map<string, Uint8Array>();
feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening - constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider - Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId - Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts - Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage - Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server - Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes - signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window - Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.) - Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping - ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided - Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only) M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection - Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store - Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id - 64KB body size limit on POST - Retry-After header on 429 responses M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset - Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style) - ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange - verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period - rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey - RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired - 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions - pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy - New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit, Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation - All errors have stable SHADE_* codes - errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping - toJSON() for network serialization 188 tests passing, zero failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 17:45:34 +02:00
private retiredIdentities: RetiredIdentity[] = [];
// ─── Identity ──────────────────────────────────────────────
async getIdentityKeyPair(): Promise<IdentityKeyPair | null> {
return this.identityKeyPair;
}
async saveIdentityKeyPair(keyPair: IdentityKeyPair): Promise<void> {
this.identityKeyPair = keyPair;
}
async getLocalRegistrationId(): Promise<number> {
return this.registrationId;
}
async saveLocalRegistrationId(id: number): Promise<void> {
this.registrationId = id;
}
// ─── Signed Pre-Keys ──────────────────────────────────────
async getSignedPreKey(keyId: number): Promise<SignedPreKey | null> {
return this.signedPreKeys.get(keyId) ?? null;
}
async saveSignedPreKey(key: SignedPreKey): Promise<void> {
this.signedPreKeys.set(key.keyId, key);
}
async removeSignedPreKey(keyId: number): Promise<void> {
this.signedPreKeys.delete(keyId);
}
// ─── One-Time Pre-Keys ────────────────────────────────────
async getOneTimePreKey(keyId: number): Promise<OneTimePreKey | null> {
return this.oneTimePreKeys.get(keyId) ?? null;
}
async saveOneTimePreKey(key: OneTimePreKey): Promise<void> {
this.oneTimePreKeys.set(key.keyId, key);
}
async removeOneTimePreKey(keyId: number): Promise<void> {
this.oneTimePreKeys.delete(keyId);
}
async getOneTimePreKeyCount(): Promise<number> {
return this.oneTimePreKeys.size;
}
// ─── Sessions ─────────────────────────────────────────────
async getSession(address: string): Promise<SessionState | null> {
return this.sessions.get(address) ?? null;
}
async saveSession(address: string, state: SessionState): Promise<void> {
this.sessions.set(address, state);
}
async removeSession(address: string): Promise<void> {
this.sessions.delete(address);
}
// ─── Trust ────────────────────────────────────────────────
async isTrustedIdentity(address: string, identityKey: Uint8Array): Promise<boolean> {
const stored = this.trustedIdentities.get(address);
if (!stored) return true; // TOFU: trust on first use
feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening - constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider - Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId - Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts - Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage - Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server - Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes - signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window - Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.) - Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping - ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided - Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only) M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection - Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store - Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id - 64KB body size limit on POST - Retry-After header on 429 responses M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset - Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style) - ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange - verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period - rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey - RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired - 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions - pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy - New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit, Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation - All errors have stable SHADE_* codes - errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping - toJSON() for network serialization 188 tests passing, zero failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 17:45:34 +02:00
return constantTimeEqual(stored, identityKey);
}
async saveTrustedIdentity(address: string, identityKey: Uint8Array): Promise<void> {
this.trustedIdentities.set(address, identityKey);
}
feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening - constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider - Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId - Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts - Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage - Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server - Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes - signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window - Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.) - Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping - ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided - Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only) M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection - Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store - Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id - 64KB body size limit on POST - Retry-After header on 429 responses M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset - Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style) - ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange - verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period - rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey - RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired - 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions - pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy - New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit, Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation - All errors have stable SHADE_* codes - errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping - toJSON() for network serialization 188 tests passing, zero failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 17:45:34 +02:00
// ─── Identity History ─────────────────────────────────────
async addRetiredIdentity(identity: RetiredIdentity): Promise<void> {
this.retiredIdentities.push(identity);
}
async getRetiredIdentities(): Promise<RetiredIdentity[]> {
return [...this.retiredIdentities];
}
async pruneRetiredIdentities(olderThan: number): Promise<void> {
this.retiredIdentities = this.retiredIdentities.filter((r) => r.retiredAt >= olderThan);
}
feat(files): @shade/files 0.3.0 — E2EE filesystem RPC primitive M-Files-1..6 land the full files-RPC layer + everything 0.3.0 needs to ship. Apps keep their own UI; this layer ships the typed RPC, the streams bridge for content I/O, and production hooks (rate limit, retention, fingerprint gate, metrics). @shade/files (NEW) - Standard ops: list/stat/mkdir/delete/move/read/write/getThumbnail with Zod-validated wire schemas + clean user-handler types. - Custom ops: typed via TypeScript declaration merging on CustomOpsMap + per-op Zod schemas; client.custom('app.foo', {...}) is fully typed. - Content I/O: inline (≤ 256 KiB plaintext) base64-in-RPC; streams (> 256 KiB) ride @shade/transfer via userMetadata.shadeFilesWriteId / shadeFilesReadStreamId correlation. Server-side TransformStream bridges accept inbound transfers immediately (engine rejects chunks that arrive before accept) and park the readable for the matching RPC. - Directory ops: walk(path, opts) async-iterable depth-first walker; uploadDirectory()/downloadDirectory() with bounded concurrency pool (default 4, cap 16), aggregated progress, abort. - Production hooks (callback-based, vendor-neutral): rate-limit (op + byte), idempotency cache (LRU + TTL + in-flight de-dupe), path policy (traversal + percent-decode hardening), fingerprint gate (required/optional/reject), pluggable Ed25519 sig verification with ±5 min replay window, onMetric sink (standard names). - React hooks (subpath @shade/files/react): ShadeFilesProvider, useShadeFiles, useFileList, useFileTransfer/Upload/Download. - Shade.files.serve(handler) + Shade.files.client(peer) high-level entrypoint in @shade/sdk; lazy + memoized; one handler per Shade. Wire format bump - @shade/proto wire VERSION 0x01 → 0x02. Length prefixes changed from u16 to u32. The previous u16 silently truncated payloads above 64 KiB — a hard correctness ceiling that blocked inline file ops up to 256 KiB. Wire-incompatible with 0.2.x peers; new sessions only. Cross-platform Kotlin port (android/shade-android) updated to match; test-vectors/wire-format.json regenerated. Concurrency safety - ShadeSessionManager.encrypt/.decrypt now run under per-peer mutex. Concurrent decryptions of the same peer raced ratchet state (manifested as sporadic "Failed to decrypt — wrong key or tampered data" under load — surfaced once concurrent uploadDirectory pumped many writes in flight). Encrypt was already serialized via Shade.send's encryptChains; decrypt is now serialized at the manager layer too. @shade/streams extension - StreamMetadata.userMetadata?: Record<string, string> for application-level key/value pairs that round-trip verbatim through stream-init plaintext. Used by @shade/files for write/read correlation; available to any consumer. @shade/sdk extension - Shade.files getter (lazy + memoized). - BackgroundHooks.onPruneFiles + periodic timer (default 5 min) + BackgroundTasks.setHook(name, fn) for runtime hook registration. Bundles in-flight 0.2.0 work - packages/shade-streams/, packages/shade-transfer/, related shade-sdk streams-bridge + shade-widgets transfer hooks were uncommitted prior to this session. Including them keeps the workspace consistent at 0.3.0 since @shade/files depends on them. Tests - 74 new tests in @shade/files (572 → 646 workspace pass; 0 fail; 3× stable). Coverage spans unit (inline-threshold + concurrency), integration (read-write inline + streams up to 1 MiB, walk + upload/download directory, custom-op, metrics, SDK namespace end-to-end), and security (tampered-envelope sig verification, replay window, fingerprint gate, rate-limit + quota). Release artifacts - All packages bumped to 0.3.0 via scripts/bump-version.ts. - scripts/publish-all.ts PACKAGES updated with shade-files in topological order (after shade-transfer, before shade-sdk). - bun run publish:dry clean (14 packed, 0 failed). - examples/08-files-browser/ — three-process CLI demo (prekey + Bob server + Alice CLI) covering list/stat/mkdir/delete/upload/download. - docs/files.md — full API + design doc. - CHANGELOG.md 0.3.0 entry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-02 14:00:01 +02:00
// ─── Stream-transfer resume state (v0.2.0) ────────────────
private streamStates = new Map<string, PersistedStreamState>();
async saveStreamState(state: PersistedStreamState): Promise<void> {
this.streamStates.set(state.streamId, { ...state });
}
async getStreamState(streamId: string): Promise<PersistedStreamState | null> {
const v = this.streamStates.get(streamId);
return v ? { ...v } : null;
}
async removeStreamState(streamId: string): Promise<void> {
this.streamStates.delete(streamId);
}
async listActiveStreamStates(direction?: 'send' | 'receive'): Promise<PersistedStreamState[]> {
const out: PersistedStreamState[] = [];
for (const s of this.streamStates.values()) {
if (s.status !== 'active' && s.status !== 'paused') continue;
if (direction !== undefined && s.direction !== direction) continue;
out.push({ ...s });
}
out.sort((a, b) => b.updatedAt - a.updatedAt);
return out;
}
async pruneStreamStates(olderThan: number): Promise<void> {
for (const [id, s] of this.streamStates) {
if ((s.status === 'finished' || s.status === 'aborted') && s.updatedAt < olderThan) {
this.streamStates.delete(id);
}
}
}
}