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release(v4.0.0): Shade GA — V3.x consolidation + audit prep
V3.1 → V3.12 consolidated and tagged for the first GA release. Wire
format unchanged from 0.4.x — 4.0 peers interoperate with 0.4.x peers
byte-for-byte. The version bump is semantic: audit-cycle complete,
opt-in surface fully exposed, threat model refreshed for every new
surface.

Highlights:
- All 24 @shade/* packages bumped to 4.0.0 in lockstep.
- CHANGELOG 4.0.0 section is the canonical manifest of what landed.
- THREAT-MODEL extended (§10 fingerprint gates, §11 WebRTC P2P, §12
  Web-Worker boundary) + residual-risks table refreshed.
- OpenAPI now covers all 27 routes: prekey, transfer, KT, inbox,
  bridge, observer, /metrics, /healthz, /ready.
- MIGRATION 0.3.x → 4.0 documented + smoke-tested against
  shade migrate-storage on a real SQLite DB.
- docs/audit/REVIEW-BUNDLE.md + SCOPE.md ready for external reviewer.
- scripts/soak.ts harness for the GA-stable 2-week soak window.
- All V*.md plans archived under docs/archive/ with Status: Done.
- Voice/Video carved out into V5.0; 4.0 audit focuses on the frozen
  non-realtime stack.

Tests: TS 1000/1000 + Kotlin 11/11 cross-platform vectors green.
Docker: gt.zyon.no/stian/shade-prekey:4.0.0 builds and reports
  version 4.0.0 on /health.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-03 18:35:35 +02:00

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Shade V2.1 — Improvements (infrastructure, storage, operations, security)

This document describes improvements agreed for next-generation work on Shade: clearer product story, stronger storage, mobile parity, operational hardening, transfer abuse, and a formal security narrative.

Audience: Maintainers and contributors implementing the changes. Add status fields as items land in code/docs.


1. Clear “who is the server?” and data flow

Problem: New users may think the prekey server is a message hub or that all E2EE traffic goes through the Shade container.

Goal: One consistent explanation across the root README, package READMEs, and optional onboarding: the prekey server distributes public keys and bundles; actual messages and (typically) file chunks go through your apps own channel (your transport, your backend, your URLs).

Deliverables (proposal):

  • Diagram + short “keys vs payloads” text in the root README and in @shade/server README.
  • Link to THREAT-MODEL.md from the same section (MITM on first contact ↔ safety numbers).
  • Optionally one “concept page” (or extend MIGRATION.md) with typical architecture: A ↔ B via app; both talk to the prekey host for X3DH material.

Acceptance criteria: A new developer without domain background understands in one reading what goes to the Shade server and what does not.


2. Optional encryption of storage (at-rest)

Problem: THREAT-MODEL.md states that a stolen DB + filesystem can expose private keys because Shade does not encrypt the storage layer by default.

Goal: Opt-in protection for sensitive state (identity, session, optional stream resume secrets) with keys that do not live in plaintext in the DB — e.g. OS keychain/Keystore, passphrase + KDF, or an explicit device key injected by the app.

Design principles:

  • Default developer experience (dev, simple demos) stays unchanged or includes a clear “insecure mode” warning in docs.
  • APIs implementable per platform (Bun/SQLite, Postgres, web/IndexedDB, Android).
  • Document limitations: what remains uncovered (e.g. active memory compromise).

Acceptance criteria: Threat model updated for “when encrypted storage is enabled”; at least one reference implementation + migration note.


3. Android parity and a published roadmap

Problem: shade-android is under development; drift from the TS SDK undermines the “byte-compatible” promise.

Goal: A published roadmap (milestones + what counts as parity vs TS-only) and CI running shared test vectors as a merge gate before release.

Deliverables:

  • Roadmap section in android/shade-android/README.md or dedicated ROADMAP-ANDROID.md with explicit cross-checkpoints: wire format, fingerprints, rotations, streams (0x11) where applicable, resume semantics.
  • CI job that fails on Kotlin vs TS vector mismatch.

Acceptance criteria: Parity coverage is visible and enforceable; the first critical cross-surface (e.g. core ratchet + proto) is green before a “production” label.


4. Operational hardening — prekey container and production

Problem: Many teams deploy the Docker image quickly; mistakes around TLS, backups, and secrets add avoidable risk.

Goal: A production checklist: TLS termination, volume backup (/data), rotation of SHADE_OBSERVER_TOKEN, use of SHADE_PREKEY_PG_URL vs SQLite, observability hooks, logging levels, meaning of stale cleanup parameters.

Deliverables:

  • Extend docs/DEPLOYMENT.md or add short docs/PRODUCTION-CHECKLIST.md with bullet defaults.
  • Link from the main README under “Deployment”.

Acceptance criteria: A checklist operators can follow without reading the whole codebase first.


5. Abuse and resource limits on the transfer plane

Problem: Parallel lanes and large uploads can be abused for resource or storage if consumer mounts of createTransferRoutes() share no coherent policy.

Goal: Documented limits and patterns: authentication (already an active SDK topic), max stream size, TTL for temporary chunk storage, quotas per identity or IP where sensible.

Deliverables:

  • Guidelines in docs/streams.md or a dedicated “Transfer hardening” section.
  • Optional helpers or middleware examples in @shade/transfer / server routes for common limits (without forcing every deployment into one DB model).

Acceptance criteria: A clear “recommended minimum” for production that teams can copy.


6. Security review and formal test / narrative

Problem: Enterprises and security-conscious users often ask for independent review and a traceable test matrix.

Goal: Plan for independent crypto review (timing, scope, deliverables) and a published test / threat matrix linking THREAT-MODEL.md to concrete automated tests (replay, tamper, out-of-order, resume, etc.).

Deliverables:

  • Internal checklist “preparing for external review” (which files, assumptions, known limits).
  • Short section in SECURITY.md on review status and how to report findings.

Acceptance criteria: One authoritative source for “what is tested automatically” vs “what needs manual/MITM/out-of-band process”.


Dependencies and order (proposal)

Priority Topic Note
Low friction §1, §4 Documentation and checklists only
Medium §5 Design + docs + possibly small API helpers
High effort §2, §3 Platform work and long-term maintenance
Coordinated §6 Parallel with maturity in §2§5

Document versioning

  • V2.1 — first consolidated plan for the six improvement areas above. Update with dates and short per-section status lines as work starts and completes.

Gitt der du er nå (post-streams 0.2.0), ville jeg prioritert:

1. Sosial nøkkel-recovery — løser "hva skjer hvis jeg mister telefonen?" som er det store hullet i alle
E2EE-systemer
2. P2P WebRTC transport — naturlig kompletterende til streams; gir massiv throughput-gevinst gratis
3. E2EE Pub/Sub — lavt scope, høy nytte, og passer perfekt med din "magic drop-in"-filosofi

Disse tre har alle samme egenskap: de er infrastruktur-features som hver app du bygger fremover vil dra nytte av,
 ikke bare Dispatch. Helt i tråd med "Shade som komponent som dras inn i hvilket som helst prosjekt".

/btw Hva med Shade videostreaming, VOIP streaming, og lignende?

Magic drop-in-tilnærming (din filosofi)                                                                          
                                                                                                                 
Tenk deg at i en Dispatch-app kan du bare gjøre:                                                                 
                                                                                                                 
<ShadeVideoCall to="device:server-admin" />                                                                      
<ShadeVoiceButton to={peerAddress} />                                                                            
<ShadeBroadcaster streamKey="game-stream-1" />                                                                   
<ShadeViewer streamKey="game-stream-1" />                                                                        
                                                                                                                 
…og det bare fungerer, E2EE, P2P når mulig, fallback til relay automatisk. Det er det samme mønsteret som streams
 0.2.0, bare for sanntid.                                                                                        
                                                                                                                 
Realisme-sjekk                                                                                                   
                                                                                                                 
Video/VOIP er det vanskeligste i hele E2EE-verdenen. Signal brukte år på å få det riktig. Du bør:                
1. Ferdigstille streams 0.2.0 først (verifiserer crypto-fundamentet)                                             
2. Bygge P2P WebRTC-transport som separat milestone                                                              
3. Da har du alle byggeklossene og Voice 0.4.0 blir 70% gjenbruk                                                 
                                                                                                                 
Men ja — dette hører absolutt hjemme i Shade. Shade som "alt-i-ett E2EE-platform" er en mye sterkere posisjon enn
 "bare messaging + filer". Du kan bli til E2EE hva Twilio er til vanlig kommunikasjon.