Files
Shade/packages/shade-inbox-server/src/store.ts
Sterister 1fb59a7076 release(v4.8.0): sender-fingerprint attribution + Inbox.start race fix
Two unblocking changes for first-contact flows.

Sender attribution: relay captures shortHash(senderSigningKey) at
PUT time (after signature verification, no new trust surface) and
surfaces it on bridge push (IncomingMessage.from) + inbox-fetch
(FetchedBlob.from) + DecryptHandler raw arg. Apps receiving a prekey
envelope from a never-before-seen peer can now bootstrap X3DH via
shade.receive('fp:<hex>', env) — pre-4.8 the wire envelope didn't
authenticate the sender and there was no out-of-band hint to use.
Idempotent ALTER TABLE migrations for SQLite + Postgres add a
sender_fp TEXT column; legacy rows surface as from=undefined
(inter-version compat).

Inbox.start() race: pre-4.8 start() called register() fire-and-forget
AND schedulePoll(0) synchronously, so the first poll on a fresh
address often beat the register HTTP RTT and got SHADE_NOT_FOUND.
start() now defers; register() success kicks schedulePoll(0). Manual
tick() is unaffected (deliberate user action, no gating).

Both reported by Prism. Tests cover all five acceptance criteria
from the sender-attribution request (PUT capture, bridge surface,
fetch surface, inter-version compat, end-to-end pair smoke) plus
the three from the race-fix request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-08 00:11:59 +02:00

109 lines
4.0 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* InboxStore — server-side storage interface for the async store-and-forward
* relay (V3.6).
*
* The relay stores ciphertext blobs only. It never sees plaintext, never
* holds private keys, and never decrypts anything. The address-owner table
* binds an address to a recipient signing key (Ed25519) so GET/DELETE
* authentication can verify that the caller actually owns the address.
*
* Per-blob row layout (mandated by V3.6 spec):
* address || msgId || ciphertext-bytes || expires_at
*
* `received_at` is also stored per blob to support cursor-based GET. The
* cursor is opaque to the caller — it is just the highest `received_at`
* the client has seen, encoded as a string.
*/
export interface InboxStore {
// ─── Address ownership (TOFU on first register) ───────────
/**
* Register or update the signing key that owns `address`. First call
* "claims" the address (TOFU). Subsequent calls with the same key are
* no-ops. A different key trying to claim the same address is rejected
* by the route layer (the store itself just upserts).
*/
saveAddressOwner(address: string, signingKey: Uint8Array): Promise<void>;
/** Look up the owner signing key for `address`, or null if unregistered. */
getAddressOwner(address: string): Promise<Uint8Array | null>;
// ─── Blob CRUD ───────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Store an inbox blob.
*
* **Idempotent**: if a row already exists for `(address, msgId)` the
* implementation MUST return `{ created: false }` and leave the existing
* row untouched. A fresh insert returns `{ created: true, receivedAt }`.
*
* `senderFp` (V4.8+) is the 8-byte hex of SHA-256(senderSigningKey)
* — captured at PUT time when the relay verified the sender's
* signature. Optional so legacy 4.7 callers compile, but populated by
* `createInboxRoutes` from 4.8 onward and surfaced on bridge push +
* inbox-fetch responses to bootstrap unknown-sender first-contact
* (X3DH pair handshake).
*/
putBlob(args: {
address: string;
msgId: string;
ciphertext: Uint8Array;
expiresAt: number;
senderFp?: string;
}): Promise<{ created: boolean; receivedAt: number }>;
/**
* Fetch all non-expired blobs for `address` whose `received_at > sinceCursor`,
* ordered ascending by `received_at`. The caller passes 0 (or `null`-equiv
* "") to fetch from the beginning.
*
* Implementations must filter out expired rows so a slow consumer never
* sees a payload past TTL. Pruning of expired rows happens out-of-band.
*/
fetchBlobs(args: {
address: string;
sinceCursor: number;
now: number;
limit: number;
}): Promise<
Array<{
msgId: string;
ciphertext: Uint8Array;
receivedAt: number;
expiresAt: number;
/**
* Sender fingerprint — 8-byte hex of SHA-256(senderSigningKey)
* captured at PUT time. Empty/undefined for blobs persisted by a
* pre-4.8 relay that didn't track sender provenance.
*/
senderFp?: string;
}>
>;
/**
* Delete a single blob by `(address, msgId)`. Returns true if a row was
* removed. Used by clients to ack a fetched message for early prune.
*/
deleteBlob(address: string, msgId: string): Promise<boolean>;
/**
* Count non-expired blobs for `address`. Used by quota enforcement and
* the inbox-fanout fingerprint gate.
*/
countBlobs(address: string, now: number): Promise<number>;
// ─── Maintenance ─────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Purge every blob whose `expires_at <= now`. Returns count removed.
* Called periodically by a cron task.
*/
purgeExpired(now: number): Promise<number>;
/**
* Drop the address owner record and any remaining blobs for `address`.
* Used by the unregister route.
*/
deleteAddress(address: string): Promise<void>;
}