Sterister
96c20cb4b2
aliasSession knew that two labels name the same peer, then threw that knowledge away. The binding lived only in the caller's memory, so a restart lost it — and the peer could not repair it from its side. First contact forces the receiver to label a session by the only sender hint a relay surfaces, an 8-byte signing-key fingerprint (`fp:<hex>`). Once the peer announces its canonical address, aliasSession moves the session there. But the peer keeps sending under `fp:<hex>`, because its transport derives the same label from the same hint every time. After a restart the session sat under the canonical address, inbound frames resolved to `fp:<hex>`, and nothing matched. The peer held a valid session so it never re-ran X3DH: the failure was permanent, and only a manual re-link cleared it. Observed in Prism as `No session for address: fp:579c3b335d66e2c0` on every receive for three days, with a phone whose every RPC timed out. StorageProvider gains saveSessionAlias / getSessionAlias / removeSessionAliasesFor, optional so third-party implementations keep compiling, and implemented across all seven backends. Lookups resolve through resolveLabel(), which runs BEFORE the peer mutex — locking the alias while mutating the canonical session would let an aliased and a canonical caller ratchet the same state concurrently. A live session under a label always wins over an alias, and prekey envelopes never resolve: both keep a re-link establishing a fresh session instead of being redirected into the stale one. Aliases are dropped in resetSession and acceptIdentityChange, and memoized so the hot path costs no extra read. The sdk.test.ts case that asserted a dead fp-label encoded the old behaviour; it now pins the new contract. Verified: 1166 tests pass (from 1160). With alias persistence disabled as a negative control, 5 of the 6 new tests fail, including both restart cases. Also drops `baseUrl` from the consumer-strict tsconfig — removed in TS 6.0, and it was failing the typecheck that gates publishing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@shade/transport-bridge
Transport-agnostic delivery for Shade: WS → SSE → long-poll, in priority
order, behind a single IncomingMessage interface.
import {
FallbackBridgeTransport,
WsBridge,
SseBridge,
LongPollBridge,
} from '@shade/transport-bridge';
const auth = { crypto, signingPrivateKey, address: 'bob' };
const bridge = new FallbackBridgeTransport([
new WsBridge({ baseUrl, auth }),
new SseBridge({ baseUrl, auth }),
new LongPollBridge({ baseUrl, auth }),
]);
await bridge.connect({
onMessage: (msg) => {
// msg: { from: string; bytes: Uint8Array; receivedAt: number; msgId?: string }
},
});
console.log(bridge.activeKind); // "ws" | "sse" | "long-poll"
Pair with createBridgeRoutes in @shade/inbox-server to expose the
matching /v1/bridge/{stream,poll,ws} endpoints. Full design + threat
model in docs/transport.md.
What it solves
Browser extensions, strict corporate proxies, and edge runtimes routinely block long-lived WebSockets. Apps that already use the Shade inbox shouldn't have to write three custom delivery paths to handle the realistic mix of hostile networks they ship into. This package is the canonical answer.
Status
V3.7. Stable wire format, additive change to @shade/inbox-server. See
CHANGELOG.