Sterister
70e319fef8
4.0.0 shipped TypeScript source as published main/types, but several
files only compiled inside the monorepo. Consumer projects (Dispatch,
etc.) running their own strict tsc against our published source hit:
- @shade/key-transparency: 4 noUnusedLocals violations
(IndexAbsenceProof, IndexInclusionProof, IndexProofWire, nodeHash)
- @shade/sdk: KT verifier callbacks returned Promise<unknown> instead
of Promise<STHWire> / Promise<{ proof: string[] }>
- @shade/sdk: thumbnail.ts globalThis cast collided with consumer's
lib.dom-supplied createImageBitmap signature
- @shade/files: cycle with @shade/sdk produced "this is not assignable
to type 'Shade'" because hoisted node_modules layouts duplicated the
Shade class. Broken by replacing `import type { Shade }` with a
local structural ShadeBridge interface.
- @shade/storage-encrypted: KeyUsage (lib.dom) used under
lib: ["ES2022"]
- @shade/transport-bridge: ReadableStreamDefaultReader<any> ↔
<Uint8Array> mismatch
- @shade/keychain / @shade/dashboard / @shade/storage-encrypted
tsconfig rootDir / include hygiene
Tooling: scripts/typecheck-all.ts runs `bunx tsc --noEmit` against
every workspace package's tsconfig and fails on any error. Wired into
publish:dry / publish:all and publish-shade.sh as a hard gate so this
class of bug cannot recur.
All 24 packages bumped to 4.0.1 in lockstep.
Migration: <ShadeFilesProvider> now requires an explicit `files` prop
(pass `shade.files`). Wire format unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@shade/recovery
Social key recovery for Shade — V3.10.
Shamir Secret Sharing over GF(2^8) splits the user's identity backup
key into n shares; any threshold-many k together reconstruct the
identity onto a new device. Distribution and reconstruction ride
existing 1:1 Shade sessions — no centralized recovery agent.
Install
bun add @shade/recovery
Quick wire-up
import {
setupRecovery,
attachGuardian,
requestRecovery,
MemoryRecoveryStore,
} from '@shade/recovery';
// Primary (Alice's existing device)
await setupRecovery({
shade,
guardians: ['bob', 'carol', 'dan', 'eve', 'faythe'],
threshold: 3,
deliver: async (to, envelope) => myOutbox.send(to, envelope),
});
// Each guardian
attachGuardian({
shade,
store: new MemoryRecoveryStore(), // swap for persistent store in prod
approve: async (ctx) => askUser(ctx),
deliver: async (to, envelope) => myOutbox.send(to, envelope),
});
// New device (Alice on a fresh phone)
await requestRecovery({
shade: tempShade,
originalAddress: 'alice',
setupId: '<from recovery card>',
threshold: 3,
guardians: ['bob', 'carol', 'dan', 'eve', 'faythe'],
deliver: async (to, envelope) => myOutbox.send(to, envelope),
});
See docs/recovery.md for the full
threat model, persistence recommendations, and guardian-UX guidance.
Tests
bun test # all
bun test tests/shamir # Shamir primitives
bun test tests/integration # 3-of-5 end-to-end
bun test tests/adversarial # k-1 collusion + forged shares + OOB-gate