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V3.1 → V3.12 consolidated and tagged for the first GA release. Wire format unchanged from 0.4.x — 4.0 peers interoperate with 0.4.x peers byte-for-byte. The version bump is semantic: audit-cycle complete, opt-in surface fully exposed, threat model refreshed for every new surface. Highlights: - All 24 @shade/* packages bumped to 4.0.0 in lockstep. - CHANGELOG 4.0.0 section is the canonical manifest of what landed. - THREAT-MODEL extended (§10 fingerprint gates, §11 WebRTC P2P, §12 Web-Worker boundary) + residual-risks table refreshed. - OpenAPI now covers all 27 routes: prekey, transfer, KT, inbox, bridge, observer, /metrics, /healthz, /ready. - MIGRATION 0.3.x → 4.0 documented + smoke-tested against shade migrate-storage on a real SQLite DB. - docs/audit/REVIEW-BUNDLE.md + SCOPE.md ready for external reviewer. - scripts/soak.ts harness for the GA-stable 2-week soak window. - All V*.md plans archived under docs/archive/ with Status: Done. - Voice/Video carved out into V5.0; 4.0 audit focuses on the frozen non-realtime stack. Tests: TS 1000/1000 + Kotlin 11/11 cross-platform vectors green. Docker: gt.zyon.no/stian/shade-prekey:4.0.0 builds and reports version 4.0.0 on /health. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
235 lines
7.2 KiB
TypeScript
235 lines
7.2 KiB
TypeScript
import type { CryptoProvider, StorageProvider } from '@shade/core';
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import {
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toBase64,
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fromBase64,
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serializeIdentityKeyPair,
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deserializeIdentityKeyPair,
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serializeSignedPreKey,
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deserializeSignedPreKey,
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serializeOneTimePreKey,
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deserializeOneTimePreKey,
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serializeSessionState,
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deserializeSessionState,
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} from '@shade/core';
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/**
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* Shade backup format v1.
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*
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* A passphrase-encrypted blob containing the entire local Shade state:
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* identity, signed prekeys, one-time prekeys, sessions, trusted identities.
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*
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* Encryption: AES-256-GCM. Key derivation from passphrase:
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* HKDF-SHA256(passphrase, randomSalt, "ShadeBackupKey", 32)
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*
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* Note: HKDF is NOT a proper password KDF. For a real password-based backup
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* you should use Argon2id. This implementation uses HKDF as a simple
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* placeholder because CryptoProvider doesn't expose Argon2. Upgrade path
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* is to add `argon2id` to CryptoProvider and swap it in here. For now,
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* DOCUMENT THIS and require the user to choose a high-entropy passphrase.
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*/
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const BACKUP_VERSION = 1;
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const BACKUP_INFO = new TextEncoder().encode('ShadeBackupKey');
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const SALT_SIZE = 32;
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export interface BackupPayload {
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version: number;
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identity: string | null;
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registrationId: number;
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signedPreKeys: Array<{ keyId: number; data: string }>;
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oneTimePreKeys: Array<{ keyId: number; data: string }>;
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sessions: Array<{ address: string; state: string }>;
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trustedIdentities: Array<{ address: string; key: string }>;
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}
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export interface BackupBlob {
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version: number;
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salt: string; // base64
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nonce: string; // base64
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ciphertext: string; // base64
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}
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/**
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* Export the entire Shade state as an encrypted backup blob.
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*
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* @param crypto CryptoProvider instance
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* @param storage Storage to read from
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* @param passphrase User-chosen passphrase (HIGH ENTROPY REQUIRED)
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* @param knownAddresses Addresses whose sessions should be included.
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* Pass an empty list to back up identity + prekeys only (no sessions).
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*/
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export async function exportBackup(
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crypto: CryptoProvider,
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storage: StorageProvider,
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passphrase: string,
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knownAddresses: string[] = [],
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): Promise<BackupBlob> {
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if (passphrase.length < 12) {
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throw new Error('Passphrase must be at least 12 characters');
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}
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// Gather state
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const identity = await storage.getIdentityKeyPair();
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const registrationId = await storage.getLocalRegistrationId();
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const signedPreKeys: Array<{ keyId: number; data: string }> = [];
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// SignedPreKeys: we can't enumerate them from the interface; try IDs 1-100
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for (let i = 1; i <= 100; i++) {
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const spk = await storage.getSignedPreKey(i);
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if (spk) signedPreKeys.push({ keyId: i, data: serializeSignedPreKey(spk) });
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}
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const oneTimePreKeys: Array<{ keyId: number; data: string }> = [];
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const otpkCount = await storage.getOneTimePreKeyCount();
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// Try a reasonable ID range
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for (let i = 1; i <= otpkCount + 1000; i++) {
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const otpk = await storage.getOneTimePreKey(i);
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if (otpk) oneTimePreKeys.push({ keyId: i, data: serializeOneTimePreKey(otpk) });
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if (oneTimePreKeys.length >= otpkCount) break;
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}
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const sessions: Array<{ address: string; state: string }> = [];
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for (const address of knownAddresses) {
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const state = await storage.getSession(address);
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if (state) sessions.push({ address, state: serializeSessionState(state) });
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}
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// Trusted identities: can't enumerate; caller must provide addresses
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const trustedIdentities: Array<{ address: string; key: string }> = [];
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const payload: BackupPayload = {
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version: BACKUP_VERSION,
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identity: identity ? serializeIdentityKeyPair(identity) : null,
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registrationId,
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signedPreKeys,
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oneTimePreKeys,
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sessions,
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trustedIdentities,
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};
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const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(payload));
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// Derive encryption key from passphrase via HKDF
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const salt = crypto.randomBytes(SALT_SIZE);
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const key = await crypto.hkdf(
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new TextEncoder().encode(passphrase),
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salt,
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BACKUP_INFO,
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32,
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);
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const { ciphertext, nonce } = await crypto.aesGcmEncrypt(key, plaintext);
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// Zero the derived key after use
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crypto.zeroize(key);
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return {
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version: BACKUP_VERSION,
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salt: toBase64(salt),
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nonce: toBase64(nonce),
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ciphertext: toBase64(ciphertext),
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};
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}
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/**
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* Decrypt a backup blob and return its payload without touching storage.
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* Useful for peeking at the embedded identity (e.g. to fingerprint it for
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* a verification gate) before any state is overwritten.
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*/
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export async function decryptBackup(
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crypto: CryptoProvider,
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blob: BackupBlob,
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passphrase: string,
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): Promise<BackupPayload> {
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if (blob.version !== BACKUP_VERSION) {
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throw new Error(`Unsupported backup version: ${blob.version}`);
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}
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const salt = fromBase64(blob.salt);
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const nonce = fromBase64(blob.nonce);
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const ciphertext = fromBase64(blob.ciphertext);
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const key = await crypto.hkdf(
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new TextEncoder().encode(passphrase),
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salt,
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BACKUP_INFO,
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32,
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);
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let plaintext: Uint8Array;
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try {
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plaintext = await crypto.aesGcmDecrypt(key, ciphertext, nonce);
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} catch {
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crypto.zeroize(key);
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throw new Error('Wrong passphrase or corrupted backup');
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}
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crypto.zeroize(key);
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return JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext)) as BackupPayload;
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}
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/**
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* Write a previously-decrypted backup payload to storage. Splitting this
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* from `decryptBackup` lets callers run an interstitial verification gate
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* (V3.3) before any pinned-trust entries are overwritten.
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*/
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export async function applyBackupPayload(
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storage: StorageProvider,
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payload: BackupPayload,
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): Promise<void> {
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if (payload.identity) {
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await storage.saveIdentityKeyPair(deserializeIdentityKeyPair(payload.identity));
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}
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await storage.saveLocalRegistrationId(payload.registrationId);
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for (const spk of payload.signedPreKeys) {
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await storage.saveSignedPreKey(deserializeSignedPreKey(spk.data));
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}
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for (const otpk of payload.oneTimePreKeys) {
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await storage.saveOneTimePreKey(deserializeOneTimePreKey(otpk.data));
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}
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for (const s of payload.sessions) {
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await storage.saveSession(s.address, deserializeSessionState(s.state));
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}
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for (const t of payload.trustedIdentities) {
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await storage.saveTrustedIdentity(t.address, fromBase64(t.key));
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}
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}
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/**
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* Import a backup blob, decrypt with the passphrase, and write all state
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* to the given storage (overwriting existing state).
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*/
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export async function importBackup(
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crypto: CryptoProvider,
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storage: StorageProvider,
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blob: BackupBlob,
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passphrase: string,
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): Promise<void> {
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const payload = await decryptBackup(crypto, blob, passphrase);
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await applyBackupPayload(storage, payload);
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}
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/** Serialize a backup blob to a compact single-string form (for copy/paste or QR). */
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export function backupToString(blob: BackupBlob): string {
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return `shade-backup:v${blob.version}:${blob.salt}:${blob.nonce}:${blob.ciphertext}`;
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}
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/** Parse a backup string back into a BackupBlob. */
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export function backupFromString(str: string): BackupBlob {
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const parts = str.split(':');
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if (parts.length !== 5 || parts[0] !== 'shade-backup') {
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throw new Error('Invalid backup string format');
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}
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const version = parseInt(parts[1]!.replace('v', ''), 10);
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return {
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version,
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salt: parts[2]!,
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nonce: parts[3]!,
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ciphertext: parts[4]!,
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};
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}
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