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Shade/packages/shade-sdk/src/backup.ts
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release(v4.0.0): Shade GA — V3.x consolidation + audit prep
V3.1 → V3.12 consolidated and tagged for the first GA release. Wire
format unchanged from 0.4.x — 4.0 peers interoperate with 0.4.x peers
byte-for-byte. The version bump is semantic: audit-cycle complete,
opt-in surface fully exposed, threat model refreshed for every new
surface.

Highlights:
- All 24 @shade/* packages bumped to 4.0.0 in lockstep.
- CHANGELOG 4.0.0 section is the canonical manifest of what landed.
- THREAT-MODEL extended (§10 fingerprint gates, §11 WebRTC P2P, §12
  Web-Worker boundary) + residual-risks table refreshed.
- OpenAPI now covers all 27 routes: prekey, transfer, KT, inbox,
  bridge, observer, /metrics, /healthz, /ready.
- MIGRATION 0.3.x → 4.0 documented + smoke-tested against
  shade migrate-storage on a real SQLite DB.
- docs/audit/REVIEW-BUNDLE.md + SCOPE.md ready for external reviewer.
- scripts/soak.ts harness for the GA-stable 2-week soak window.
- All V*.md plans archived under docs/archive/ with Status: Done.
- Voice/Video carved out into V5.0; 4.0 audit focuses on the frozen
  non-realtime stack.

Tests: TS 1000/1000 + Kotlin 11/11 cross-platform vectors green.
Docker: gt.zyon.no/stian/shade-prekey:4.0.0 builds and reports
  version 4.0.0 on /health.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-03 18:35:35 +02:00

235 lines
7.2 KiB
TypeScript

import type { CryptoProvider, StorageProvider } from '@shade/core';
import {
toBase64,
fromBase64,
serializeIdentityKeyPair,
deserializeIdentityKeyPair,
serializeSignedPreKey,
deserializeSignedPreKey,
serializeOneTimePreKey,
deserializeOneTimePreKey,
serializeSessionState,
deserializeSessionState,
} from '@shade/core';
/**
* Shade backup format v1.
*
* A passphrase-encrypted blob containing the entire local Shade state:
* identity, signed prekeys, one-time prekeys, sessions, trusted identities.
*
* Encryption: AES-256-GCM. Key derivation from passphrase:
* HKDF-SHA256(passphrase, randomSalt, "ShadeBackupKey", 32)
*
* Note: HKDF is NOT a proper password KDF. For a real password-based backup
* you should use Argon2id. This implementation uses HKDF as a simple
* placeholder because CryptoProvider doesn't expose Argon2. Upgrade path
* is to add `argon2id` to CryptoProvider and swap it in here. For now,
* DOCUMENT THIS and require the user to choose a high-entropy passphrase.
*/
const BACKUP_VERSION = 1;
const BACKUP_INFO = new TextEncoder().encode('ShadeBackupKey');
const SALT_SIZE = 32;
export interface BackupPayload {
version: number;
identity: string | null;
registrationId: number;
signedPreKeys: Array<{ keyId: number; data: string }>;
oneTimePreKeys: Array<{ keyId: number; data: string }>;
sessions: Array<{ address: string; state: string }>;
trustedIdentities: Array<{ address: string; key: string }>;
}
export interface BackupBlob {
version: number;
salt: string; // base64
nonce: string; // base64
ciphertext: string; // base64
}
/**
* Export the entire Shade state as an encrypted backup blob.
*
* @param crypto CryptoProvider instance
* @param storage Storage to read from
* @param passphrase User-chosen passphrase (HIGH ENTROPY REQUIRED)
* @param knownAddresses Addresses whose sessions should be included.
* Pass an empty list to back up identity + prekeys only (no sessions).
*/
export async function exportBackup(
crypto: CryptoProvider,
storage: StorageProvider,
passphrase: string,
knownAddresses: string[] = [],
): Promise<BackupBlob> {
if (passphrase.length < 12) {
throw new Error('Passphrase must be at least 12 characters');
}
// Gather state
const identity = await storage.getIdentityKeyPair();
const registrationId = await storage.getLocalRegistrationId();
const signedPreKeys: Array<{ keyId: number; data: string }> = [];
// SignedPreKeys: we can't enumerate them from the interface; try IDs 1-100
for (let i = 1; i <= 100; i++) {
const spk = await storage.getSignedPreKey(i);
if (spk) signedPreKeys.push({ keyId: i, data: serializeSignedPreKey(spk) });
}
const oneTimePreKeys: Array<{ keyId: number; data: string }> = [];
const otpkCount = await storage.getOneTimePreKeyCount();
// Try a reasonable ID range
for (let i = 1; i <= otpkCount + 1000; i++) {
const otpk = await storage.getOneTimePreKey(i);
if (otpk) oneTimePreKeys.push({ keyId: i, data: serializeOneTimePreKey(otpk) });
if (oneTimePreKeys.length >= otpkCount) break;
}
const sessions: Array<{ address: string; state: string }> = [];
for (const address of knownAddresses) {
const state = await storage.getSession(address);
if (state) sessions.push({ address, state: serializeSessionState(state) });
}
// Trusted identities: can't enumerate; caller must provide addresses
const trustedIdentities: Array<{ address: string; key: string }> = [];
const payload: BackupPayload = {
version: BACKUP_VERSION,
identity: identity ? serializeIdentityKeyPair(identity) : null,
registrationId,
signedPreKeys,
oneTimePreKeys,
sessions,
trustedIdentities,
};
const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(payload));
// Derive encryption key from passphrase via HKDF
const salt = crypto.randomBytes(SALT_SIZE);
const key = await crypto.hkdf(
new TextEncoder().encode(passphrase),
salt,
BACKUP_INFO,
32,
);
const { ciphertext, nonce } = await crypto.aesGcmEncrypt(key, plaintext);
// Zero the derived key after use
crypto.zeroize(key);
return {
version: BACKUP_VERSION,
salt: toBase64(salt),
nonce: toBase64(nonce),
ciphertext: toBase64(ciphertext),
};
}
/**
* Decrypt a backup blob and return its payload without touching storage.
* Useful for peeking at the embedded identity (e.g. to fingerprint it for
* a verification gate) before any state is overwritten.
*/
export async function decryptBackup(
crypto: CryptoProvider,
blob: BackupBlob,
passphrase: string,
): Promise<BackupPayload> {
if (blob.version !== BACKUP_VERSION) {
throw new Error(`Unsupported backup version: ${blob.version}`);
}
const salt = fromBase64(blob.salt);
const nonce = fromBase64(blob.nonce);
const ciphertext = fromBase64(blob.ciphertext);
const key = await crypto.hkdf(
new TextEncoder().encode(passphrase),
salt,
BACKUP_INFO,
32,
);
let plaintext: Uint8Array;
try {
plaintext = await crypto.aesGcmDecrypt(key, ciphertext, nonce);
} catch {
crypto.zeroize(key);
throw new Error('Wrong passphrase or corrupted backup');
}
crypto.zeroize(key);
return JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext)) as BackupPayload;
}
/**
* Write a previously-decrypted backup payload to storage. Splitting this
* from `decryptBackup` lets callers run an interstitial verification gate
* (V3.3) before any pinned-trust entries are overwritten.
*/
export async function applyBackupPayload(
storage: StorageProvider,
payload: BackupPayload,
): Promise<void> {
if (payload.identity) {
await storage.saveIdentityKeyPair(deserializeIdentityKeyPair(payload.identity));
}
await storage.saveLocalRegistrationId(payload.registrationId);
for (const spk of payload.signedPreKeys) {
await storage.saveSignedPreKey(deserializeSignedPreKey(spk.data));
}
for (const otpk of payload.oneTimePreKeys) {
await storage.saveOneTimePreKey(deserializeOneTimePreKey(otpk.data));
}
for (const s of payload.sessions) {
await storage.saveSession(s.address, deserializeSessionState(s.state));
}
for (const t of payload.trustedIdentities) {
await storage.saveTrustedIdentity(t.address, fromBase64(t.key));
}
}
/**
* Import a backup blob, decrypt with the passphrase, and write all state
* to the given storage (overwriting existing state).
*/
export async function importBackup(
crypto: CryptoProvider,
storage: StorageProvider,
blob: BackupBlob,
passphrase: string,
): Promise<void> {
const payload = await decryptBackup(crypto, blob, passphrase);
await applyBackupPayload(storage, payload);
}
/** Serialize a backup blob to a compact single-string form (for copy/paste or QR). */
export function backupToString(blob: BackupBlob): string {
return `shade-backup:v${blob.version}:${blob.salt}:${blob.nonce}:${blob.ciphertext}`;
}
/** Parse a backup string back into a BackupBlob. */
export function backupFromString(str: string): BackupBlob {
const parts = str.split(':');
if (parts.length !== 5 || parts[0] !== 'shade-backup') {
throw new Error('Invalid backup string format');
}
const version = parseInt(parts[1]!.replace('v', ''), 10);
return {
version,
salt: parts[2]!,
nonce: parts[3]!,
ciphertext: parts[4]!,
};
}