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Shade/packages/shade-recovery
Sterister 3c0db14904
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release(v4.8.5): kill flushOnce 15s success-backoff + per-recipient parallel drain
Prism filed a per-recipient-flush-concurrency FR pointing at
serial-per-flush. Investigation surfaced the actual culprit:
`scheduleFlush` was using a 15 s backoff on **both** the success and
failure paths, so envelopes enqueued *during* an in-flight flush
sat ~15 s behind the next drain — visible as "10 s of silence then
25-frame burst" on the receiving side under sustained sender output.

Two fixes:

1. `scheduleFlush` now uses 0 ms delay when `flushOnce` delivered
   ≥1 envelope and more is queued (network healthy → drain
   remainder immediately). 15 s reserved for the actual failure
   case where every attempt this round failed. `flushOnce` returns
   `{ delivered, remaining } | null` so concurrent-flush early
   returns don't double-schedule.

2. `flushOnce` groups the outgoing queue by `recipientAddress` and
   drains buckets via `Promise.all`. Per-peer order preserved
   (sequential within a bucket); a slow POST to recipient A no
   longer head-of-line-blocks frames bound for B.

`Inbox.tick` public shape unchanged. `OutgoingQueueStore`
implementations see the same per-entry list/remove/bumpAttempts/
size contract; only cross-recipient interleaving changes.

Tests cover (1) 25-envelope burst behind a 100 ms slow PUT drains
within 1 s, and (2) carol's PUT lands within 150 ms even when bob's
PUT stalls 200 ms.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-08 22:56:27 +02:00
..

@shade/recovery

Social key recovery for Shade — V3.10.

Shamir Secret Sharing over GF(2^8) splits the user's identity backup key into n shares; any threshold-many k together reconstruct the identity onto a new device. Distribution and reconstruction ride existing 1:1 Shade sessions — no centralized recovery agent.

Install

bun add @shade/recovery

Quick wire-up

import {
  setupRecovery,
  attachGuardian,
  requestRecovery,
  MemoryRecoveryStore,
} from '@shade/recovery';

// Primary (Alice's existing device)
await setupRecovery({
  shade,
  guardians: ['bob', 'carol', 'dan', 'eve', 'faythe'],
  threshold: 3,
  deliver: async (to, envelope) => myOutbox.send(to, envelope),
});

// Each guardian
attachGuardian({
  shade,
  store: new MemoryRecoveryStore(),    // swap for persistent store in prod
  approve: async (ctx) => askUser(ctx),
  deliver: async (to, envelope) => myOutbox.send(to, envelope),
});

// New device (Alice on a fresh phone)
await requestRecovery({
  shade: tempShade,
  originalAddress: 'alice',
  setupId: '<from recovery card>',
  threshold: 3,
  guardians: ['bob', 'carol', 'dan', 'eve', 'faythe'],
  deliver: async (to, envelope) => myOutbox.send(to, envelope),
});

See docs/recovery.md for the full threat model, persistence recommendations, and guardian-UX guidance.

Tests

bun test                    # all
bun test tests/shamir       # Shamir primitives
bun test tests/integration  # 3-of-5 end-to-end
bun test tests/adversarial  # k-1 collusion + forged shares + OOB-gate