Ships the Prism FR (encrypted-profile-storage-v4.9.md) as a generic relay-side encrypted blob primitive: deterministically-located, AEAD-sealed blobs keyed by a 32-byte slotId derived client-side via HKDF from the user's master key. Unlocks credential-only bootstrap of new devices into existing E2EE state — no QR, no physical access. Server: BlobStore interface + Memory/Sqlite/Postgres impls, createBlobRoutes for GET/PUT/DELETE /v1/blob/:slotId with TOFU pubkey auth and If-Match CAS (409/412 semantics). Mounted on the same Hono app as the inbox; SHADE_BLOB_PG_URL / SHADE_BLOB_DB_PATH / SHADE_DISABLE_BLOB env-var plumbing in standalone. SDK: createProfileNamespace high-level wrapper (HKDF derivation, random-nonce AEAD seal, slotId-bound AAD) + low-level BlobClient. Cross-platform test vectors in test-vectors/blob-storage.json. New errors: ConflictError (409), PreconditionFailedError (412). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
164 lines
6.2 KiB
TypeScript
164 lines
6.2 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Key derivation primitives for at-rest storage encryption.
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*
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* Hierarchy:
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* masterKey (from passphrase / keychain / app-injected)
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* │
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* ├─ HKDF("shade-storage-v1") → storageKey (32 bytes)
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* │ └─ HKDF(storageKey, table || ":" || column) → fieldKey (32 bytes)
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* │
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* └─ HKDF("shade-storage-version-v1") → versionKey (used during rotation)
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*/
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import { scryptAsync } from '@noble/hashes/scrypt.js';
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import { argon2idAsync } from '@noble/hashes/argon2.js';
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import { hkdf } from '@noble/hashes/hkdf.js';
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import { sha256 } from '@noble/hashes/sha2.js';
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const TEXT = new TextEncoder();
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/** scrypt parameters — interactive; sized for sub-second derivation on commodity HW */
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export interface ScryptParams {
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N: number;
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r: number;
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p: number;
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dkLen: number;
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}
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/** Default: N=2^17, r=8, p=1, 32-byte output. ~250ms on a modern laptop. */
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export const DEFAULT_SCRYPT: ScryptParams = { N: 1 << 17, r: 8, p: 1, dkLen: 32 };
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/**
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* Derive a 32-byte master key from a passphrase + salt using scrypt.
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* The salt MUST be persisted alongside the encrypted database (16-byte random).
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*/
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export async function deriveMasterKey(
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passphrase: string,
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salt: Uint8Array,
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params: ScryptParams = DEFAULT_SCRYPT,
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): Promise<Uint8Array> {
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if (passphrase.length === 0) {
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throw new Error('passphrase must be non-empty');
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}
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if (salt.length < 16) {
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throw new Error('salt must be at least 16 bytes');
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}
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return scryptAsync(TEXT.encode(passphrase.normalize('NFKC')), salt, params);
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}
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/** Argon2id parameters — memory-hard KDF preferred for low-entropy secrets (PINs). */
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export interface Argon2idParams {
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/** Memory cost in KiB. */
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m: number;
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/** Time cost (iterations). */
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t: number;
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/** Parallelism. */
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p: number;
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/** Output length in bytes. */
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dkLen: number;
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}
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/**
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* Default: m=64 MiB, t=3, p=1, 32-byte output. Tuned for ~250–400 ms on a
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* modern Chromium / Firefox / Safari laptop. RFC 9106 "second recommended"
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* profile shrunk to a browser-friendly memory footprint — strong enough for
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* 4–6 digit PINs as a defense-in-depth factor on top of a passphrase.
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*/
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export const DEFAULT_ARGON2ID: Argon2idParams = { m: 64 * 1024, t: 3, p: 1, dkLen: 32 };
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/**
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* Derive a 32-byte master key from a low-entropy secret + salt using
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* argon2id. Salt MUST be persisted alongside the DB (16-byte random).
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*/
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export async function deriveMasterKeyArgon2id(
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secret: string | Uint8Array,
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salt: Uint8Array,
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params: Argon2idParams = DEFAULT_ARGON2ID,
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): Promise<Uint8Array> {
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if (typeof secret === 'string' ? secret.length === 0 : secret.length === 0) {
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throw new Error('argon2id secret must be non-empty');
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}
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if (salt.length < 16) {
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throw new Error('salt must be at least 16 bytes');
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}
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const password = typeof secret === 'string' ? TEXT.encode(secret.normalize('NFKC')) : secret;
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return argon2idAsync(password, salt, {
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m: params.m,
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t: params.t,
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p: params.p,
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dkLen: params.dkLen,
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});
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}
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/** HKDF-SHA-256 with explicit info string. */
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export function hkdfDerive(ikm: Uint8Array, info: string, length = 32, salt?: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
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return hkdf(sha256, ikm, salt, TEXT.encode(info), length);
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}
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/** Derive the storageKey from masterKey. Stable, deterministic. */
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export function deriveStorageKey(masterKey: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
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return hkdfDerive(masterKey, 'shade-storage-v1', 32);
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}
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/** Derive the per-(table, column) field key. Stable, deterministic. */
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export function deriveFieldKey(storageKey: Uint8Array, table: string, column: string): Uint8Array {
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return hkdfDerive(storageKey, `shade-field-v1:${table}:${column}`, 32);
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}
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/**
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* Derive a deterministic 12-byte AEAD nonce from a row key (typically the
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* field key) plus (table, pk) binding. With per-field keys, deterministic
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* nonces are safe because each (key, plaintext) pair appears at most once
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* — re-saving the same row reuses the (nonce, key) pair only because the
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* plaintext also changes (chain ratchet, prekey state, etc.). The AAD
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* also binds (table, column, pk) so swapping is rejected on decrypt.
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*/
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export function deriveNonce(rowKey: Uint8Array, table: string, pk: string): Uint8Array {
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const out = hkdfDerive(rowKey, `shade-row-nonce-v1:${table}:${pk}`, 12);
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return out;
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}
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/** Build the AAD that binds (table, column, pk) to a ciphertext. */
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export function buildAad(table: string, column: string, pk: string): Uint8Array {
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return TEXT.encode(`shade-aad-v1|${table}|${column}|${pk}`);
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}
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// ─── V4.9 — relay-side encrypted blob primitive ──────────────
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//
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// Three deterministic 32-byte derivations rooted at the user's master
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// key, used by `@shade/sdk`'s `Profile` namespace to bootstrap a brand
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// new device into existing E2EE state from credentials alone:
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//
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// slotId = HKDF(masterKey, info=`shade-blob-slot-v1:${app}`)
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// blobKey = HKDF(masterKey, info=`shade-blob-key-v1:${app}`)
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// sigSeed = HKDF(masterKey, info=`shade-blob-sig-v1:${app}`)
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//
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// `app` is a caller-supplied namespace (e.g. `"prism-profile"`) so two
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// Shade apps with the same user/master never collide on the same slot.
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//
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// The slot identifier and the AEAD key are *both* derived from the
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// master — the relay sees opaque slotIds and AEAD-sealed blobs and
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// cannot decrypt or correlate slots to users. The signing seed is the
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// raw 32-byte Ed25519 private key (matches @noble/curves' API: pubkey
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// = ed25519.getPublicKey(seed)).
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/** Lower-hex 64-char slotId derived from the master key. */
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export function deriveBlobSlotId(masterKey: Uint8Array, app: string): Uint8Array {
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return hkdfDerive(masterKey, `shade-blob-slot-v1:${app}`, 32);
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}
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/** AEAD key for sealing/opening the blob. Use AAD = slotId. */
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export function deriveBlobKey(masterKey: Uint8Array, app: string): Uint8Array {
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return hkdfDerive(masterKey, `shade-blob-key-v1:${app}`, 32);
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}
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/**
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* 32-byte Ed25519 signing seed (== the private key in the @noble/curves
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* convention). The pubkey, derived deterministically from the seed, is
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* what the relay TOFU-stores on the first PUT and verifies subsequent
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* writes against.
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*/
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export function deriveBlobSigningSeed(masterKey: Uint8Array, app: string): Uint8Array {
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return hkdfDerive(masterKey, `shade-blob-sig-v1:${app}`, 32);
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}
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