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Shade/packages/shade-storage-encrypted/src/crypto/kdf.ts
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release(v4.9.0): relay-side encrypted blob primitive + SDK Profile namespace
Ships the Prism FR (encrypted-profile-storage-v4.9.md) as a generic
relay-side encrypted blob primitive: deterministically-located,
AEAD-sealed blobs keyed by a 32-byte slotId derived client-side via
HKDF from the user's master key. Unlocks credential-only bootstrap
of new devices into existing E2EE state — no QR, no physical access.

Server: BlobStore interface + Memory/Sqlite/Postgres impls,
createBlobRoutes for GET/PUT/DELETE /v1/blob/:slotId with TOFU pubkey
auth and If-Match CAS (409/412 semantics). Mounted on the same Hono
app as the inbox; SHADE_BLOB_PG_URL / SHADE_BLOB_DB_PATH /
SHADE_DISABLE_BLOB env-var plumbing in standalone.

SDK: createProfileNamespace high-level wrapper (HKDF derivation,
random-nonce AEAD seal, slotId-bound AAD) + low-level BlobClient.
Cross-platform test vectors in test-vectors/blob-storage.json.

New errors: ConflictError (409), PreconditionFailedError (412).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-09 02:44:42 +02:00

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/**
* Key derivation primitives for at-rest storage encryption.
*
* Hierarchy:
* masterKey (from passphrase / keychain / app-injected)
* │
* ├─ HKDF("shade-storage-v1") → storageKey (32 bytes)
* │ └─ HKDF(storageKey, table || ":" || column) → fieldKey (32 bytes)
* │
* └─ HKDF("shade-storage-version-v1") → versionKey (used during rotation)
*/
import { scryptAsync } from '@noble/hashes/scrypt.js';
import { argon2idAsync } from '@noble/hashes/argon2.js';
import { hkdf } from '@noble/hashes/hkdf.js';
import { sha256 } from '@noble/hashes/sha2.js';
const TEXT = new TextEncoder();
/** scrypt parameters — interactive; sized for sub-second derivation on commodity HW */
export interface ScryptParams {
N: number;
r: number;
p: number;
dkLen: number;
}
/** Default: N=2^17, r=8, p=1, 32-byte output. ~250ms on a modern laptop. */
export const DEFAULT_SCRYPT: ScryptParams = { N: 1 << 17, r: 8, p: 1, dkLen: 32 };
/**
* Derive a 32-byte master key from a passphrase + salt using scrypt.
* The salt MUST be persisted alongside the encrypted database (16-byte random).
*/
export async function deriveMasterKey(
passphrase: string,
salt: Uint8Array,
params: ScryptParams = DEFAULT_SCRYPT,
): Promise<Uint8Array> {
if (passphrase.length === 0) {
throw new Error('passphrase must be non-empty');
}
if (salt.length < 16) {
throw new Error('salt must be at least 16 bytes');
}
return scryptAsync(TEXT.encode(passphrase.normalize('NFKC')), salt, params);
}
/** Argon2id parameters — memory-hard KDF preferred for low-entropy secrets (PINs). */
export interface Argon2idParams {
/** Memory cost in KiB. */
m: number;
/** Time cost (iterations). */
t: number;
/** Parallelism. */
p: number;
/** Output length in bytes. */
dkLen: number;
}
/**
* Default: m=64 MiB, t=3, p=1, 32-byte output. Tuned for ~250400 ms on a
* modern Chromium / Firefox / Safari laptop. RFC 9106 "second recommended"
* profile shrunk to a browser-friendly memory footprint — strong enough for
* 46 digit PINs as a defense-in-depth factor on top of a passphrase.
*/
export const DEFAULT_ARGON2ID: Argon2idParams = { m: 64 * 1024, t: 3, p: 1, dkLen: 32 };
/**
* Derive a 32-byte master key from a low-entropy secret + salt using
* argon2id. Salt MUST be persisted alongside the DB (16-byte random).
*/
export async function deriveMasterKeyArgon2id(
secret: string | Uint8Array,
salt: Uint8Array,
params: Argon2idParams = DEFAULT_ARGON2ID,
): Promise<Uint8Array> {
if (typeof secret === 'string' ? secret.length === 0 : secret.length === 0) {
throw new Error('argon2id secret must be non-empty');
}
if (salt.length < 16) {
throw new Error('salt must be at least 16 bytes');
}
const password = typeof secret === 'string' ? TEXT.encode(secret.normalize('NFKC')) : secret;
return argon2idAsync(password, salt, {
m: params.m,
t: params.t,
p: params.p,
dkLen: params.dkLen,
});
}
/** HKDF-SHA-256 with explicit info string. */
export function hkdfDerive(ikm: Uint8Array, info: string, length = 32, salt?: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
return hkdf(sha256, ikm, salt, TEXT.encode(info), length);
}
/** Derive the storageKey from masterKey. Stable, deterministic. */
export function deriveStorageKey(masterKey: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
return hkdfDerive(masterKey, 'shade-storage-v1', 32);
}
/** Derive the per-(table, column) field key. Stable, deterministic. */
export function deriveFieldKey(storageKey: Uint8Array, table: string, column: string): Uint8Array {
return hkdfDerive(storageKey, `shade-field-v1:${table}:${column}`, 32);
}
/**
* Derive a deterministic 12-byte AEAD nonce from a row key (typically the
* field key) plus (table, pk) binding. With per-field keys, deterministic
* nonces are safe because each (key, plaintext) pair appears at most once
* — re-saving the same row reuses the (nonce, key) pair only because the
* plaintext also changes (chain ratchet, prekey state, etc.). The AAD
* also binds (table, column, pk) so swapping is rejected on decrypt.
*/
export function deriveNonce(rowKey: Uint8Array, table: string, pk: string): Uint8Array {
const out = hkdfDerive(rowKey, `shade-row-nonce-v1:${table}:${pk}`, 12);
return out;
}
/** Build the AAD that binds (table, column, pk) to a ciphertext. */
export function buildAad(table: string, column: string, pk: string): Uint8Array {
return TEXT.encode(`shade-aad-v1|${table}|${column}|${pk}`);
}
// ─── V4.9 — relay-side encrypted blob primitive ──────────────
//
// Three deterministic 32-byte derivations rooted at the user's master
// key, used by `@shade/sdk`'s `Profile` namespace to bootstrap a brand
// new device into existing E2EE state from credentials alone:
//
// slotId = HKDF(masterKey, info=`shade-blob-slot-v1:${app}`)
// blobKey = HKDF(masterKey, info=`shade-blob-key-v1:${app}`)
// sigSeed = HKDF(masterKey, info=`shade-blob-sig-v1:${app}`)
//
// `app` is a caller-supplied namespace (e.g. `"prism-profile"`) so two
// Shade apps with the same user/master never collide on the same slot.
//
// The slot identifier and the AEAD key are *both* derived from the
// master — the relay sees opaque slotIds and AEAD-sealed blobs and
// cannot decrypt or correlate slots to users. The signing seed is the
// raw 32-byte Ed25519 private key (matches @noble/curves' API: pubkey
// = ed25519.getPublicKey(seed)).
/** Lower-hex 64-char slotId derived from the master key. */
export function deriveBlobSlotId(masterKey: Uint8Array, app: string): Uint8Array {
return hkdfDerive(masterKey, `shade-blob-slot-v1:${app}`, 32);
}
/** AEAD key for sealing/opening the blob. Use AAD = slotId. */
export function deriveBlobKey(masterKey: Uint8Array, app: string): Uint8Array {
return hkdfDerive(masterKey, `shade-blob-key-v1:${app}`, 32);
}
/**
* 32-byte Ed25519 signing seed (== the private key in the @noble/curves
* convention). The pubkey, derived deterministically from the seed, is
* what the relay TOFU-stores on the first PUT and verifies subsequent
* writes against.
*/
export function deriveBlobSigningSeed(masterKey: Uint8Array, app: string): Uint8Array {
return hkdfDerive(masterKey, `shade-blob-sig-v1:${app}`, 32);
}