Files
Shade/packages/shade-transport-bridge
Sterister 2b1b4d6630 release(v4.5.0): browser-side encrypted storage + multi-factor unlock
Adds the foundations Prism's web client (and any future browser-based
Shade app) needs: at-rest-encrypted IndexedDB storage that mirrors the
SQLite backend byte-for-byte at the AAD/nonce level, browser-safe
subpath imports so Vite/webpack/esbuild stop hitting bun:sqlite, and
KeyManager support for argon2id and N-factor composite unlock.

@shade/storage-encrypted
- EncryptedIndexedDBStorage (subpath: /idb) — full StorageProvider
  using one object store per _enc table; reuses aeadSeal/aeadOpen +
  row-codec sealers so a row sealed under the SQLite or Postgres
  backend decrypts under IDB given the same KeyManager.
  bumpPeerIdentityVersion is atomic under one IDB transaction.
- KeyManager argon2id source — memory-hard KDF for low-entropy
  secrets (PINs). Backed by @noble/hashes/argon2 (already a transitive
  dep). DEFAULT_ARGON2ID exported (m=64 MiB, t=3, p=1).
- KeyManager composite source — HKDF-combine N sub-sources into one
  master. Every source mandatory; order significant by design;
  composite-of-composite rejected; optional info string for app-level
  domain separation.
- Subpath exports (/crypto, /sqlite, /postgres, /idb) plus a `browser`
  condition on the default import that resolves to a barrel
  excluding the Bun- and Postgres-specific entries. Browser bundles
  no longer pull bun:sqlite transitively.

Tests
- 73 tests in shade-storage-encrypted (was 31). New coverage:
  argon2id determinism + reject paths, composite same-factors → same
  master, wrong-PIN/passphrase/order-swap → different master, info
  domain separation, all 28 StorageProvider methods on
  EncryptedIndexedDBStorage, fingerprint-mismatch rejection, and
  cross-impl roundtrip with EncryptedSQLiteStorage proving the AAD/
  nonce derivation is implementation-agnostic.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-07 10:58:49 +02:00
..

@shade/transport-bridge

Transport-agnostic delivery for Shade: WS → SSE → long-poll, in priority order, behind a single IncomingMessage interface.

import {
  FallbackBridgeTransport,
  WsBridge,
  SseBridge,
  LongPollBridge,
} from '@shade/transport-bridge';

const auth = { crypto, signingPrivateKey, address: 'bob' };

const bridge = new FallbackBridgeTransport([
  new WsBridge({       baseUrl, auth }),
  new SseBridge({      baseUrl, auth }),
  new LongPollBridge({ baseUrl, auth }),
]);

await bridge.connect({
  onMessage: (msg) => {
    // msg: { from: string; bytes: Uint8Array; receivedAt: number; msgId?: string }
  },
});

console.log(bridge.activeKind); // "ws" | "sse" | "long-poll"

Pair with createBridgeRoutes in @shade/inbox-server to expose the matching /v1/bridge/{stream,poll,ws} endpoints. Full design + threat model in docs/transport.md.

What it solves

Browser extensions, strict corporate proxies, and edge runtimes routinely block long-lived WebSockets. Apps that already use the Shade inbox shouldn't have to write three custom delivery paths to handle the realistic mix of hostile networks they ship into. This package is the canonical answer.

Status

V3.7. Stable wire format, additive change to @shade/inbox-server. See CHANGELOG.