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Shade/docs/archive/V3.6.md
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release(v4.0.0): Shade GA — V3.x consolidation + audit prep 
V3.1 → V3.12 consolidated and tagged for the first GA release. Wire
format unchanged from 0.4.x — 4.0 peers interoperate with 0.4.x peers
byte-for-byte. The version bump is semantic: audit-cycle complete,
opt-in surface fully exposed, threat model refreshed for every new
surface.

Highlights:
- All 24 @shade/* packages bumped to 4.0.0 in lockstep.
- CHANGELOG 4.0.0 section is the canonical manifest of what landed.
- THREAT-MODEL extended (§10 fingerprint gates, §11 WebRTC P2P, §12
  Web-Worker boundary) + residual-risks table refreshed.
- OpenAPI now covers all 27 routes: prekey, transfer, KT, inbox,
  bridge, observer, /metrics, /healthz, /ready.
- MIGRATION 0.3.x → 4.0 documented + smoke-tested against
  shade migrate-storage on a real SQLite DB.
- docs/audit/REVIEW-BUNDLE.md + SCOPE.md ready for external reviewer.
- scripts/soak.ts harness for the GA-stable 2-week soak window.
- All V*.md plans archived under docs/archive/ with Status: Done.
- Voice/Video carved out into V5.0; 4.0 audit focuses on the frozen
  non-realtime stack.

Tests: TS 1000/1000 + Kotlin 11/11 cross-platform vectors green.
Docker: gt.zyon.no/stian/shade-prekey:4.0.0 builds and reports
  version 4.0.0 on /health.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-03 18:35:35 +02:00

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Shade V3.6 — Async Store-and-Forward (Inbox)

Status: Done Effort: L (4–8 uker) Forrige: V3.4 Adresserer: V2.2 §2 Implementert: se docs/inbox.md

Mål

Mottaker trenger ikke være online for å motta meldinger eller kontroll-signaler. En dedikert relay/inbox-tjeneste holder ciphertext-blobs med TTL og auth. Server ser aldri plaintext; prekey-server forblir public-keys-only.

Scope

Inn

  • Ny pakke: @shade/inbox (klient) + @shade/inbox-server (server).
  • HTTP API:
    • POST /v1/inbox/:address — signed PUT av blob (med TTL).
    • GET /v1/inbox/:address/since/:cursor — auth'd fetch.
    • DELETE /v1/inbox/:address/:msgId — leasing/ack.
  • Replay-beskyttelse på applikasjonslag (msgId = sha256(ciphertext)).
  • Push-hook (vendor-nøytral): inbox.onMessageQueued(handler)-callback.
  • Outgoing queue i klient: lagrer ciphertext lokalt til server bekrefter PUT.
  • Idempotent PUT (samme msgId returnerer 200, ikke 409).

Ut

  • Mobile push (FCM / APNs) — utenfor scope; vi eksponerer hook'en.
  • Federation mellom inbox-servere — egen sak senere.
  • Plaintext-metadata-adresser — vi støtter pseudonyme address-hashes som privacy-modus.

Design

Auth

  • PUT er signed med avsenders Ed25519 (samme som prekey).
  • GET krever signed challenge fra mottaker (pull, ikke push).
  • Replay-window ±5 min, samme som prekey.

Wire

  • Eksisterende @shade/proto-envelope, transportert som body.
  • Server lagrer kun: address || msgId || ciphertext-bytes || expires_at.

Lifecycle

  1. Avsender encrypter via Shade.send → får envelope.
  2. Avsender PUT'er envelope til mottaker-inbox med TTL (default 7 dager).
  3. Mottaker poller (eller får push-trigger) — fetcher alle siden cursor.
  4. Mottaker decrypter; ack'er via DELETE for tidlig prune.

Storage

  • SQLite + Postgres backends (samme mønster som prekey).
  • Indeks: (address, expires_at).
  • Cron prune.

Leveranser

Pakker

  • @shade/inbox — klient + queue.
  • @shade/inbox-server — Hono routes + storage adapter.

Tester

  • Unit: signed PUT/GET, replay-window, idempotency.
  • Integration: full lifecycle 100 msgs, restart server, msgs persisterer.
  • Tamper: bit-flip ciphertext → klient-side decrypt feiler (server vet ikke).

Dokumentasjon

  • docs/inbox.md — setup, threat model "what the relay sees", deploy-guide.
  • THREAT-MODEL.md — ny seksjon om relay.

Akseptansekriterier

  • Avsender → mottaker uten online overlap, payload < 1 MB, ferdig innen 5 min etter mottakers oppstart.
  • Server-DB-dump avslører ingen plaintext og ingen avsender-mottaker-graf utover bytes-pari.
  • Replay av PUT med samme msgId returnerer 200 uten å lagre dobbel.

Avhengigheter

  • V3.4 — observability hooks for å måle inbox-bruk uten lekkasje.

Risiko

  • Metadata-lekkasje. Server ser hvem snakker med hvem. Dokumenter klart; pek på adress-hash som mitigasjon.
  • Storage-DoS. Ondsinnet avsender fyller mottakers inbox. Mitiger med per-sender quota + per-address-quota.
  • Privacy-modell. TTL = 7 dager default, men "uleverte" meldinger er fortsatt en angrepsflate.

Migrasjon

Ny pakke; ingen breaking change i eksisterende.

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