3da977207cb9243660d4a8f390469b0bb7a3eace
10 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 84d3166ca1 |
feat(vault): server-side kryptert fillager (V4.13)
Shade kunne flytte filer mellom peers (@shade/files) og lagre én liten profil-blob per konto, men hadde ingen alltid-på lagring av krypterte filer. Uten den kan ingen Shade-app tilby backup, og ingen klient lese data mens peeren som eier dem er avslått. Objekter er innholdsadresserte på hashen av CHIFFERTEKSTEN, så relayen kan lagre, deduplisere og verifisere uten nøkkel — den regner om hashen ved opplasting og avviser feilnavngitte objekter. Stier bor inne i det krypterte manifestet, aldri i objektnavn: relayen skal ikke lære hva filene heter. Loggen er append-only, så historikk og rollback følger av modellen. SqliteVaultStore har med vilje INGEN minne-fallback, i motsetning til blob-storen. Den fallbacken slettet Prisms profil ved en rutine-redeploy 2026-08-12 fordi den fungerte helt til containeren ble recreated, uten en eneste feilmelding. En backup som glemmer er verre enn ingen backup, så uten SHADE_VAULT_DB_PATH mountes rutene ikke — med en logglinje som sier hvorfor. Én feil fanget av testene: pubkeyen ble først lagt på UTENFOR signaturen, som både brøt verifyPayload og ville latt hvem som helst bytte identitet i transit på den TOFU-pinnende førsteskrivingen. 16 vault- + 7 store-tester, alle mot de ekte rutehåndtererne gjennom Honos fetch. Kjeden er dessuten kjørt mot en ekte HTTP-server med et ekte workspace: 491 filer / 7,7 MB, alle bit-identiske etter gjenoppretting, og andre push etter én endring sendte 0 KB. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 96c20cb4b2 |
fix(session): remember where aliasSession moved a session
aliasSession knew that two labels name the same peer, then threw that knowledge away. The binding lived only in the caller's memory, so a restart lost it — and the peer could not repair it from its side. First contact forces the receiver to label a session by the only sender hint a relay surfaces, an 8-byte signing-key fingerprint (`fp:<hex>`). Once the peer announces its canonical address, aliasSession moves the session there. But the peer keeps sending under `fp:<hex>`, because its transport derives the same label from the same hint every time. After a restart the session sat under the canonical address, inbound frames resolved to `fp:<hex>`, and nothing matched. The peer held a valid session so it never re-ran X3DH: the failure was permanent, and only a manual re-link cleared it. Observed in Prism as `No session for address: fp:579c3b335d66e2c0` on every receive for three days, with a phone whose every RPC timed out. StorageProvider gains saveSessionAlias / getSessionAlias / removeSessionAliasesFor, optional so third-party implementations keep compiling, and implemented across all seven backends. Lookups resolve through resolveLabel(), which runs BEFORE the peer mutex — locking the alias while mutating the canonical session would let an aliased and a canonical caller ratchet the same state concurrently. A live session under a label always wins over an alias, and prekey envelopes never resolve: both keep a re-link establishing a fresh session instead of being redirected into the stale one. Aliases are dropped in resetSession and acceptIdentityChange, and memoized so the hot path costs no extra read. The sdk.test.ts case that asserted a dead fp-label encoded the old behaviour; it now pins the new contract. Verified: 1166 tests pass (from 1160). With alias persistence disabled as a negative control, 5 of the 6 new tests fail, including both restart cases. Also drops `baseUrl` from the consumer-strict tsconfig — removed in TS 6.0, and it was failing the typecheck that gates publishing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 80c410f518 |
release(v4.9.0): relay-side encrypted blob primitive + SDK Profile namespace
Ships the Prism FR (encrypted-profile-storage-v4.9.md) as a generic relay-side encrypted blob primitive: deterministically-located, AEAD-sealed blobs keyed by a 32-byte slotId derived client-side via HKDF from the user's master key. Unlocks credential-only bootstrap of new devices into existing E2EE state — no QR, no physical access. Server: BlobStore interface + Memory/Sqlite/Postgres impls, createBlobRoutes for GET/PUT/DELETE /v1/blob/:slotId with TOFU pubkey auth and If-Match CAS (409/412 semantics). Mounted on the same Hono app as the inbox; SHADE_BLOB_PG_URL / SHADE_BLOB_DB_PATH / SHADE_DISABLE_BLOB env-var plumbing in standalone. SDK: createProfileNamespace high-level wrapper (HKDF derivation, random-nonce AEAD seal, slotId-bound AAD) + low-level BlobClient. Cross-platform test vectors in test-vectors/blob-storage.json. New errors: ConflictError (409), PreconditionFailedError (412). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 1fb59a7076 |
release(v4.8.0): sender-fingerprint attribution + Inbox.start race fix
Two unblocking changes for first-contact flows.
Sender attribution: relay captures shortHash(senderSigningKey) at
PUT time (after signature verification, no new trust surface) and
surfaces it on bridge push (IncomingMessage.from) + inbox-fetch
(FetchedBlob.from) + DecryptHandler raw arg. Apps receiving a prekey
envelope from a never-before-seen peer can now bootstrap X3DH via
shade.receive('fp:<hex>', env) — pre-4.8 the wire envelope didn't
authenticate the sender and there was no out-of-band hint to use.
Idempotent ALTER TABLE migrations for SQLite + Postgres add a
sender_fp TEXT column; legacy rows surface as from=undefined
(inter-version compat).
Inbox.start() race: pre-4.8 start() called register() fire-and-forget
AND schedulePoll(0) synchronously, so the first poll on a fresh
address often beat the register HTTP RTT and got SHADE_NOT_FOUND.
start() now defers; register() success kicks schedulePoll(0). Manual
tick() is unaffected (deliberate user action, no gating).
Both reported by Prism. Tests cover all five acceptance criteria
from the sender-attribution request (PUT capture, bridge surface,
fetch surface, inter-version compat, end-to-end pair smoke) plus
the three from the race-fix request.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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| 2c400d7094 |
release(v4.6.0): broadcast channels — Signal sender-keys for one-to-many fan-out
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Lands the broadcast-channel primitive Prism asked for in Docs/shade-feature-request-sender-keys.md. The crypto in @shade/core/sender-keys.ts was already in place; this release wires it up as a first-class app-facing API, adds the persistence schema across all six storage backends (memory, sqlite, indexeddb + encrypted variants), introduces wire type 0x21 in @shade/proto, and ships Prism's three acceptance tests verbatim. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| e6fdf31b49 |
release(v4.0.0): Shade GA — V3.x consolidation + audit prep
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V3.1 → V3.12 consolidated and tagged for the first GA release. Wire format unchanged from 0.4.x — 4.0 peers interoperate with 0.4.x peers byte-for-byte. The version bump is semantic: audit-cycle complete, opt-in surface fully exposed, threat model refreshed for every new surface. Highlights: - All 24 @shade/* packages bumped to 4.0.0 in lockstep. - CHANGELOG 4.0.0 section is the canonical manifest of what landed. - THREAT-MODEL extended (§10 fingerprint gates, §11 WebRTC P2P, §12 Web-Worker boundary) + residual-risks table refreshed. - OpenAPI now covers all 27 routes: prekey, transfer, KT, inbox, bridge, observer, /metrics, /healthz, /ready. - MIGRATION 0.3.x → 4.0 documented + smoke-tested against shade migrate-storage on a real SQLite DB. - docs/audit/REVIEW-BUNDLE.md + SCOPE.md ready for external reviewer. - scripts/soak.ts harness for the GA-stable 2-week soak window. - All V*.md plans archived under docs/archive/ with Status: Done. - Voice/Video carved out into V5.0; 4.0 audit focuses on the frozen non-realtime stack. Tests: TS 1000/1000 + Kotlin 11/11 cross-platform vectors green. Docker: gt.zyon.no/stian/shade-prekey:4.0.0 builds and reports version 4.0.0 on /health. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| fa770d3063 |
feat(files): @shade/files 0.3.0 — E2EE filesystem RPC primitive
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M-Files-1..6 land the full files-RPC layer + everything 0.3.0 needs to
ship. Apps keep their own UI; this layer ships the typed RPC, the
streams bridge for content I/O, and production hooks (rate limit,
retention, fingerprint gate, metrics).
@shade/files (NEW)
- Standard ops: list/stat/mkdir/delete/move/read/write/getThumbnail with
Zod-validated wire schemas + clean user-handler types.
- Custom ops: typed via TypeScript declaration merging on CustomOpsMap
+ per-op Zod schemas; client.custom('app.foo', {...}) is fully typed.
- Content I/O: inline (≤ 256 KiB plaintext) base64-in-RPC; streams
(> 256 KiB) ride @shade/transfer via userMetadata.shadeFilesWriteId
/ shadeFilesReadStreamId correlation. Server-side TransformStream
bridges accept inbound transfers immediately (engine rejects chunks
that arrive before accept) and park the readable for the matching
RPC.
- Directory ops: walk(path, opts) async-iterable depth-first walker;
uploadDirectory()/downloadDirectory() with bounded concurrency pool
(default 4, cap 16), aggregated progress, abort.
- Production hooks (callback-based, vendor-neutral): rate-limit (op +
byte), idempotency cache (LRU + TTL + in-flight de-dupe), path
policy (traversal + percent-decode hardening), fingerprint gate
(required/optional/reject), pluggable Ed25519 sig verification with
±5 min replay window, onMetric sink (standard names).
- React hooks (subpath @shade/files/react): ShadeFilesProvider,
useShadeFiles, useFileList, useFileTransfer/Upload/Download.
- Shade.files.serve(handler) + Shade.files.client(peer) high-level
entrypoint in @shade/sdk; lazy + memoized; one handler per Shade.
Wire format bump
- @shade/proto wire VERSION 0x01 → 0x02. Length prefixes changed from
u16 to u32. The previous u16 silently truncated payloads above
64 KiB — a hard correctness ceiling that blocked inline file ops
up to 256 KiB. Wire-incompatible with 0.2.x peers; new sessions
only. Cross-platform Kotlin port (android/shade-android) updated to
match; test-vectors/wire-format.json regenerated.
Concurrency safety
- ShadeSessionManager.encrypt/.decrypt now run under per-peer mutex.
Concurrent decryptions of the same peer raced ratchet state
(manifested as sporadic "Failed to decrypt — wrong key or tampered
data" under load — surfaced once concurrent uploadDirectory pumped
many writes in flight). Encrypt was already serialized via
Shade.send's encryptChains; decrypt is now serialized at the
manager layer too.
@shade/streams extension
- StreamMetadata.userMetadata?: Record<string, string> for
application-level key/value pairs that round-trip verbatim through
stream-init plaintext. Used by @shade/files for write/read
correlation; available to any consumer.
@shade/sdk extension
- Shade.files getter (lazy + memoized).
- BackgroundHooks.onPruneFiles + periodic timer (default 5 min) +
BackgroundTasks.setHook(name, fn) for runtime hook registration.
Bundles in-flight 0.2.0 work
- packages/shade-streams/, packages/shade-transfer/, related
shade-sdk streams-bridge + shade-widgets transfer hooks were
uncommitted prior to this session. Including them keeps the
workspace consistent at 0.3.0 since @shade/files depends on them.
Tests
- 74 new tests in @shade/files (572 → 646 workspace pass; 0 fail;
3× stable). Coverage spans unit (inline-threshold + concurrency),
integration (read-write inline + streams up to 1 MiB, walk +
upload/download directory, custom-op, metrics, SDK namespace
end-to-end), and security (tampered-envelope sig verification,
replay window, fingerprint gate, rate-limit + quota).
Release artifacts
- All packages bumped to 0.3.0 via scripts/bump-version.ts.
- scripts/publish-all.ts PACKAGES updated with shade-files in
topological order (after shade-transfer, before shade-sdk).
- bun run publish:dry clean (14 packed, 0 failed).
- examples/08-files-browser/ — three-process CLI demo (prekey + Bob
server + Alice CLI) covering list/stat/mkdir/delete/upload/download.
- docs/files.md — full API + design doc.
- CHANGELOG.md 0.3.0 entry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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| 7e0f7320a9 |
feat(container): M-Box 1-8 — stack-agnostic standalone Docker container
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Shade now ships as a self-contained Docker image. Deploy one container per project, any stack (Bun, Python, Go, Rust, Kotlin) can talk to it via plain HTTP. Zero coupling to consumer codebases. M-Box 1: Stale identity cleanup API - touchIdentity + purgeStaleIdentities on PrekeyStore interface - Implemented for Memory, SQLite, and Postgres backends - SQLite adds last_activity_at column with migration ALTER for existing DBs - Postgres adds the same via raw SQL with IF NOT EXISTS guards - Routes call touchIdentity on register, bundle fetch, replenish - 4 new tests for the cleanup API M-Box 2: Stale cleanup background task - StaleCleanupTask runs purge on startup + every 24h (configurable) - Reads SHADE_STALE_DAYS (default 30) and SHADE_CLEANUP_INTERVAL_HOURS - Wired into standalone.ts, stopped on graceful shutdown - 5 new tests for the task M-Box 3: Observer baked into the container - standalone.ts conditionally mounts @shade/observer at /shade-observer when SHADE_OBSERVER_TOKEN is set (and >= 16 chars) - Shared PrekeyServerEvents emitter feeds both routes and observer - @shade/observer added as optional dependency of @shade/server M-Box 4: Dockerfile with dashboard build - Multi-stage build: oven/bun:1 builder → oven/bun:1-alpine runtime - COPY packages/ wholesale so workspace lockfile resolves cleanly - RUN bun run build inside shade-dashboard → dist/ → observer/dist/ - Non-root shade user, /data volume, healthcheck, env defaults - Final image: 260 MB M-Box 5: OpenAPI spec for stack-agnostic clients - packages/shade-server/openapi.yaml documents all 9 endpoints with request/response schemas, security (Ed25519 signatures + bearer token) - createOpenApiRoutes serves /openapi.yaml and /docs (Redoc viewer) - Any language can generate a client with openapi-generator M-Box 6: Docker CI pipeline - .gitea/workflows/docker.yml builds + pushes on git tag v* - scripts/build-docker.ts for local builds, supports --push with GITEA_TOKEN - Root package.json: build:docker, publish:docker scripts M-Box 7: Deployment documentation - packages/shade-server/README rewritten: 5-line quickstart with the image - docs/DEPLOYMENT.md: full reference, env vars, backup, Dokploy, PG setup - examples/05-dokploy-deployment/docker-compose.yml updated to pull published image (gt.zyon.no/stian/shade-prekey:latest) - Root README deployment section rewritten M-Box 8: End-to-end verification - Image builds locally (bun run build:docker) - /health, /openapi.yaml, /docs, /metrics, /shade-observer all respond - 401 without observer token, 200 with - Real SDK client round-trip: Alice → container → Bob → reply → Alice - Persistence: identity + prekeys survive container restart (count 20→18 as expected from two bundle fetches) 285 tests passing, 0 failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 96a8c210b2 |
feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation
M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening - constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider - Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId - Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts - Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage - Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server - Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes - signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window - Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.) - Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping - ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided - Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only) M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection - Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store - Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id - 64KB body size limit on POST - Retry-After header on 429 responses M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset - Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style) - ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange - verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period - rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey - RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired - 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions - pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy - New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit, Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation - All errors have stable SHADE_* codes - errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping - toJSON() for network serialization 188 tests passing, zero failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 7d214dc614 |
feat: persistent storage — SQLite backends for crash resilience
Shade sessions and keys now survive server crashes, container restarts, and power outages via SQLite with WAL mode. New packages: - @shade/storage-sqlite: SQLiteStorage (StorageProvider) + SqlitePrekeyStore (PrekeyStore), both using bun:sqlite with auto-created tables and WAL mode - Serialization layer in shade-core for SessionState/keys ↔ JSON/base64 Docker usage: mount volume at /data, set SHADE_DB_PATH=/data/shade-client.db Prekey server auto-detects SHADE_PREKEY_DB_PATH for SQLite persistence Includes crash recovery integration test: encrypt → close DB → reopen → conversation continues seamlessly. 129 tests, 0 failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
