release(v4.0.0): Shade GA — V3.x consolidation + audit prep
Some checks failed
Test / test (push) Has been cancelled
Cross-platform vectors / TypeScript vectors (bun) (push) Has been cancelled
Cross-platform vectors / Kotlin vectors (gradle) (push) Has been cancelled
Docker build and publish / docker (push) Has been cancelled
Publish / publish (push) Has been cancelled

V3.1 → V3.12 consolidated and tagged for the first GA release. Wire
format unchanged from 0.4.x — 4.0 peers interoperate with 0.4.x peers
byte-for-byte. The version bump is semantic: audit-cycle complete,
opt-in surface fully exposed, threat model refreshed for every new
surface.

Highlights:
- All 24 @shade/* packages bumped to 4.0.0 in lockstep.
- CHANGELOG 4.0.0 section is the canonical manifest of what landed.
- THREAT-MODEL extended (§10 fingerprint gates, §11 WebRTC P2P, §12
  Web-Worker boundary) + residual-risks table refreshed.
- OpenAPI now covers all 27 routes: prekey, transfer, KT, inbox,
  bridge, observer, /metrics, /healthz, /ready.
- MIGRATION 0.3.x → 4.0 documented + smoke-tested against
  shade migrate-storage on a real SQLite DB.
- docs/audit/REVIEW-BUNDLE.md + SCOPE.md ready for external reviewer.
- scripts/soak.ts harness for the GA-stable 2-week soak window.
- All V*.md plans archived under docs/archive/ with Status: Done.
- Voice/Video carved out into V5.0; 4.0 audit focuses on the frozen
  non-realtime stack.

Tests: TS 1000/1000 + Kotlin 11/11 cross-platform vectors green.
Docker: gt.zyon.no/stian/shade-prekey:4.0.0 builds and reports
  version 4.0.0 on /health.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-05-03 18:35:35 +02:00
parent 8b055912b7
commit e6fdf31b49
298 changed files with 37909 additions and 256 deletions

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
/**
* Acceptance test for V3.12 §"End-to-end test: split-view detection".
*
* Scenario:
* - One legitimate STH-signing key (the operator's pinned key).
* - Two divergent log views A and B, both signed by the same key
* (simulating a malicious server that hands different responses to
* different clients).
* - Two clients (Bob, Charlie) each fetch alice's bundle, but each is
* served from a different view.
* - A `LightWitness` cross-pollinates the two clients' STHs.
* - The witness must reject the second STH at the same tree_size with
* a `KTSplitViewError`.
*
* Also asserts the *positive* path: when both clients see the same view,
* no error is raised.
*/
import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test';
import { SubtleCryptoProvider } from '@shade/crypto-web';
import {
KTLogManager,
KTSplitViewError,
LightWitness,
MemoryKTLogStore,
computeBundleHash,
computeLogId,
} from '@shade/key-transparency';
const crypto = new SubtleCryptoProvider();
function fakeBundle(seed: number) {
return {
identitySigningKey: new Uint8Array(32).fill(seed),
identityDHKey: new Uint8Array(32).fill(seed + 1),
signedPreKey: {
keyId: 1,
publicKey: new Uint8Array(32).fill(seed + 2),
signature: new Uint8Array(64).fill(seed + 3),
},
};
}
describe('Split-view E2E', () => {
test('two divergent views at the same tree_size are caught by witness', async () => {
const operator = await crypto.generateEd25519KeyPair();
// View A — alice has the *real* identity (seed 0x10)
const viewA = await KTLogManager.create({
crypto,
store: new MemoryKTLogStore(),
signingPrivateKey: operator.privateKey,
signingPublicKey: operator.publicKey,
});
await viewA.recordRegister('alice', computeBundleHash(fakeBundle(0x10)));
const sthA = await viewA.publishSTH();
// View B — alice has a *malicious* identity (seed 0xff)
const viewB = await KTLogManager.create({
crypto,
store: new MemoryKTLogStore(),
signingPrivateKey: operator.privateKey,
signingPublicKey: operator.publicKey,
});
await viewB.recordRegister('alice', computeBundleHash(fakeBundle(0xff)));
const sthB = await viewB.publishSTH();
// Both STHs claim tree_size = 1 with the same logId, but with
// different rootHash + indexRoot. This is what a split-view attack
// looks like on the wire.
expect(sthA.treeSize).toBe(sthB.treeSize);
expect(Buffer.from(sthA.logId).toString('hex')).toBe(
Buffer.from(sthB.logId).toString('hex'),
);
expect(Buffer.from(sthA.rootHash).toString('hex')).not.toBe(
Buffer.from(sthB.rootHash).toString('hex'),
);
// Bob has been served STH A; Charlie has been served STH B.
// They share a witness (gossip-style):
const witness = new LightWitness({
crypto,
logPublicKey: operator.publicKey,
fetcher: {
async fetchLatestSTH() {
throw new Error('not used in this test');
},
async fetchConsistencyProof() {
return { proof: [] };
},
},
});
await witness.observe(sthA);
expect(witness.compare(sthA)).toBe('agree');
expect(witness.compare(sthB)).toBe('split-view');
await expect(witness.observe(sthB)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(KTSplitViewError);
});
test('positive path: same view → no false alarm', async () => {
const operator = await crypto.generateEd25519KeyPair();
const view = await KTLogManager.create({
crypto,
store: new MemoryKTLogStore(),
signingPrivateKey: operator.privateKey,
signingPublicKey: operator.publicKey,
});
await view.recordRegister('alice', computeBundleHash(fakeBundle(0x10)));
const sth1 = await view.publishSTH();
await view.recordRegister('bob', computeBundleHash(fakeBundle(0x20)));
const sth2 = await view.publishSTH();
const witness = new LightWitness({
crypto,
logPublicKey: operator.publicKey,
fetcher: {
async fetchLatestSTH() {
throw new Error('not used');
},
async fetchConsistencyProof(from, to) {
const result = await view.buildHistoricalConsistencyProof(from, to);
return { proof: result.map((b) => Buffer.from(b).toString('base64')) };
},
},
});
await witness.observe(sth1);
await witness.observe(sth2);
expect(witness.compare(sth2)).toBe('agree');
});
test('rewriting history (forked log at tree_size 1) fails consistency from sth1 → sth2', async () => {
const operator = await crypto.generateEd25519KeyPair();
const real = await KTLogManager.create({
crypto,
store: new MemoryKTLogStore(),
signingPrivateKey: operator.privateKey,
signingPublicKey: operator.publicKey,
});
await real.recordRegister('alice', computeBundleHash(fakeBundle(0x10)));
const sth1 = await real.publishSTH();
// Build a divergent log that pretends 'mallory' was the first leaf,
// not 'alice'. The forked tree's STH at size 2 must NOT pass a
// consistency proof against sth1.
const fork = await KTLogManager.create({
crypto,
store: new MemoryKTLogStore(),
signingPrivateKey: operator.privateKey,
signingPublicKey: operator.publicKey,
});
await fork.recordRegister('mallory', computeBundleHash(fakeBundle(0xee)));
await fork.recordRegister('bob', computeBundleHash(fakeBundle(0x20)));
const forkedSth2 = await fork.publishSTH();
const forkedConsistency = await fork.buildConsistencyProof(sth1.treeSize);
const witness = new LightWitness({
crypto,
logPublicKey: operator.publicKey,
fetcher: {
async fetchLatestSTH() {
throw new Error('not used');
},
async fetchConsistencyProof() {
return { proof: forkedConsistency.proof.map((b) => Buffer.from(b).toString('base64')) };
},
},
});
await witness.observe(sth1);
await expect(witness.observe(forkedSth2)).rejects.toThrow();
// sanity: logId pinning still valid
expect(Buffer.from(forkedSth2.logId).toString('hex')).toBe(
Buffer.from(computeLogId(operator.publicKey)).toString('hex'),
);
});
});

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
import { describe, test, expect } from 'bun:test';
import { SubtleCryptoProvider, MemoryStorage } from '@shade/crypto-web';
import { ShadeSessionManager } from '@shade/core';
import {
createPrekeyServerWithKT,
MemoryPrekeyStore,
} from '@shade/server';
import {
KTVerificationError,
LightWitness,
MemoryKTLogStore,
computeLogId,
signSth,
type SignedTreeHead,
} from '@shade/key-transparency';
import { ShadeFetchTransport } from '../src/fetch-transport.js';
const crypto = new SubtleCryptoProvider();
describe('ShadeFetchTransport with KT verifier', () => {
test('fetch verifies inclusion proof against pinned log key', async () => {
const logKp = await crypto.generateEd25519KeyPair();
const { app, kt } = await createPrekeyServerWithKT({
crypto,
store: new MemoryPrekeyStore(),
disableRateLimit: true,
keyTransparency: {
store: new MemoryKTLogStore(),
signingPrivateKey: logKp.privateKey,
signingPublicKey: logKp.publicKey,
},
});
const port = 20100 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 500);
const handle = Bun.serve({ port, fetch: app.fetch });
try {
const baseUrl = `http://localhost:${port}`;
// Bob registers
const bobStorage = new MemoryStorage();
const bobManager = new ShadeSessionManager(crypto, bobStorage);
await bobManager.initialize();
const bobIdentity = await bobStorage.getIdentityKeyPair();
const bobTransport = new ShadeFetchTransport({
baseUrl,
crypto,
signingPrivateKey: bobIdentity!.signingPrivateKey,
});
const bobOTPKs = await bobManager.generateOneTimePreKeys(3);
const bobBundle = await bobManager.createPreKeyBundle();
await bobTransport.register('bob', bobManager.getPublicIdentity(), bobBundle.signedPreKey, bobOTPKs);
// Alice fetches with KT verifier — should succeed
const observed: SignedTreeHead[] = [];
const aliceTransport = new ShadeFetchTransport({
baseUrl,
crypto,
keyTransparency: {
mode: 'observe-strict',
logPublicKey: logKp.publicKey,
onObserveSth: async (sth) => {
observed.push(sth);
},
},
});
const result = await aliceTransport.fetchBundleVerified('bob');
expect(result.bundle.identityDHKey).toEqual(bobManager.getPublicIdentity().dhKey);
expect(result.ktSth).toBeDefined();
expect(result.ktSth!.treeSize).toBe(1);
expect(observed.length).toBe(1);
// Sanity: server-side latest STH matches what client observed
const serverSth = await kt.getLatestSTH();
expect(Buffer.from(serverSth.rootHash).toString('hex')).toBe(
Buffer.from(result.ktSth!.rootHash).toString('hex'),
);
} finally {
handle.stop();
}
});
test('observe-strict throws KTVerificationError on missing proof', async () => {
// Plain server (no KT)
const { createPrekeyServer, MemoryPrekeyStore } = await import('@shade/server');
const app = createPrekeyServer({
crypto,
store: new MemoryPrekeyStore(),
disableRateLimit: true,
});
const port = 20800 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 200);
const handle = Bun.serve({ port, fetch: app.fetch });
try {
const baseUrl = `http://localhost:${port}`;
const bobStorage = new MemoryStorage();
const bobManager = new ShadeSessionManager(crypto, bobStorage);
await bobManager.initialize();
const bobIdentity = await bobStorage.getIdentityKeyPair();
const bobTransport = new ShadeFetchTransport({
baseUrl,
crypto,
signingPrivateKey: bobIdentity!.signingPrivateKey,
});
const bobOTPKs = await bobManager.generateOneTimePreKeys(2);
const bobBundle = await bobManager.createPreKeyBundle();
await bobTransport.register('bob', bobManager.getPublicIdentity(), bobBundle.signedPreKey, bobOTPKs);
const logKp = await crypto.generateEd25519KeyPair();
const aliceTransport = new ShadeFetchTransport({
baseUrl,
crypto,
keyTransparency: { mode: 'observe-strict', logPublicKey: logKp.publicKey },
});
await expect(aliceTransport.fetchBundle('bob')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(KTVerificationError);
} finally {
handle.stop();
}
});
test('forged STH (server signed with wrong key) is rejected', async () => {
const realLogKp = await crypto.generateEd25519KeyPair();
const evilLogKp = await crypto.generateEd25519KeyPair();
const { app } = await createPrekeyServerWithKT({
crypto,
store: new MemoryPrekeyStore(),
disableRateLimit: true,
keyTransparency: {
store: new MemoryKTLogStore(),
// Operator signs with the EVIL key
signingPrivateKey: evilLogKp.privateKey,
signingPublicKey: evilLogKp.publicKey,
},
});
const port = 21100 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 200);
const handle = Bun.serve({ port, fetch: app.fetch });
try {
const baseUrl = `http://localhost:${port}`;
const bobStorage = new MemoryStorage();
const bobManager = new ShadeSessionManager(crypto, bobStorage);
await bobManager.initialize();
const bobIdentity = await bobStorage.getIdentityKeyPair();
const bobTransport = new ShadeFetchTransport({
baseUrl,
crypto,
signingPrivateKey: bobIdentity!.signingPrivateKey,
});
const bobOTPKs = await bobManager.generateOneTimePreKeys(2);
const bobBundle = await bobManager.createPreKeyBundle();
await bobTransport.register('bob', bobManager.getPublicIdentity(), bobBundle.signedPreKey, bobOTPKs);
// Client pinned the REAL log key — verification must fail
const aliceTransport = new ShadeFetchTransport({
baseUrl,
crypto,
keyTransparency: { mode: 'observe-strict', logPublicKey: realLogKp.publicKey },
});
await expect(aliceTransport.fetchBundle('bob')).rejects.toThrow();
} finally {
handle.stop();
}
});
test('observed STH feeds LightWitness; subsequent split-view detected', async () => {
const logKp = await crypto.generateEd25519KeyPair();
const { app, kt } = await createPrekeyServerWithKT({
crypto,
store: new MemoryPrekeyStore(),
disableRateLimit: true,
keyTransparency: {
store: new MemoryKTLogStore(),
signingPrivateKey: logKp.privateKey,
signingPublicKey: logKp.publicKey,
},
});
const port = 21500 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 200);
const handle = Bun.serve({ port, fetch: app.fetch });
try {
const baseUrl = `http://localhost:${port}`;
// Register Bob
const bobStorage = new MemoryStorage();
const bobManager = new ShadeSessionManager(crypto, bobStorage);
await bobManager.initialize();
const bobIdentity = await bobStorage.getIdentityKeyPair();
const bobTransport = new ShadeFetchTransport({
baseUrl,
crypto,
signingPrivateKey: bobIdentity!.signingPrivateKey,
});
const bobOTPKs = await bobManager.generateOneTimePreKeys(2);
const bobBundle = await bobManager.createPreKeyBundle();
await bobTransport.register('bob', bobManager.getPublicIdentity(), bobBundle.signedPreKey, bobOTPKs);
// Witness backed by the real /v1/kt/* endpoints
const witness = new LightWitness({
crypto,
logPublicKey: logKp.publicKey,
fetcher: {
async fetchLatestSTH() {
const res = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/v1/kt/sth`);
return res.json();
},
async fetchConsistencyProof(from, to) {
const res = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/v1/kt/consistency?from=${from}&to=${to}`);
return res.json();
},
},
});
const observedSth = await witness.pollOnce();
expect(observedSth.treeSize).toBe(1);
// Forge a divergent STH at the same tree_size and feed it to the
// witness (this simulates a malicious second view)
const realSth = await kt.getLatestSTH();
const tampered = new Uint8Array(realSth.rootHash);
tampered[0] ^= 0xff;
const forged = await signSth(crypto, logKp.privateKey, {
treeSize: realSth.treeSize,
timestampMs: realSth.timestampMs,
rootHash: tampered,
indexRoot: realSth.indexRoot,
logId: computeLogId(logKp.publicKey),
});
await expect(witness.observe(forged)).rejects.toThrow(/Split view/);
} finally {
handle.stop();
}
});
});