release(v4.0.0): Shade GA — V3.x consolidation + audit prep
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V3.1 → V3.12 consolidated and tagged for the first GA release. Wire
format unchanged from 0.4.x — 4.0 peers interoperate with 0.4.x peers
byte-for-byte. The version bump is semantic: audit-cycle complete,
opt-in surface fully exposed, threat model refreshed for every new
surface.

Highlights:
- All 24 @shade/* packages bumped to 4.0.0 in lockstep.
- CHANGELOG 4.0.0 section is the canonical manifest of what landed.
- THREAT-MODEL extended (§10 fingerprint gates, §11 WebRTC P2P, §12
  Web-Worker boundary) + residual-risks table refreshed.
- OpenAPI now covers all 27 routes: prekey, transfer, KT, inbox,
  bridge, observer, /metrics, /healthz, /ready.
- MIGRATION 0.3.x → 4.0 documented + smoke-tested against
  shade migrate-storage on a real SQLite DB.
- docs/audit/REVIEW-BUNDLE.md + SCOPE.md ready for external reviewer.
- scripts/soak.ts harness for the GA-stable 2-week soak window.
- All V*.md plans archived under docs/archive/ with Status: Done.
- Voice/Video carved out into V5.0; 4.0 audit focuses on the frozen
  non-realtime stack.

Tests: TS 1000/1000 + Kotlin 11/11 cross-platform vectors green.
Docker: gt.zyon.no/stian/shade-prekey:4.0.0 builds and reports
  version 4.0.0 on /health.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-05-03 18:35:35 +02:00
parent 8b055912b7
commit e6fdf31b49
298 changed files with 37909 additions and 256 deletions

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/**
* KeyManager — owns the masterKey lifecycle for at-rest encryption.
*
* Three sources are supported:
* 1. passphrase — scrypt-derived from a developer-supplied secret
* 2. keychain — fetched from OS keychain via @shade/keychain (optional dep)
* 3. injected — caller supplies the 32-byte raw key directly
*
* The KeyManager pre-derives storageKey at construction time and caches the
* per-(table, column) field keys. masterKey is zeroized after storageKey
* derivation to limit residency.
*/
import { deriveFieldKey, deriveMasterKey, deriveStorageKey, type ScryptParams, DEFAULT_SCRYPT } from './kdf.js';
export type KeySource =
| {
kind: 'passphrase';
passphrase: string;
/** Stable 16+ byte salt persisted alongside the DB. */
salt: Uint8Array;
params?: ScryptParams;
}
| {
kind: 'keychain';
/** Service identifier (e.g. "shade.storage"). */
service: string;
/** Account / key name within the keychain. */
account: string;
/** If true, generate + store a new 32-byte key when one is absent. */
createIfMissing?: boolean;
}
| {
kind: 'injected';
/** Raw 32-byte master key. */
key: Uint8Array;
};
/** Pluggable keychain backend. Implementations live in @shade/keychain. */
export interface KeychainBackend {
get(service: string, account: string): Promise<Uint8Array | null>;
set(service: string, account: string, value: Uint8Array): Promise<void>;
delete(service: string, account: string): Promise<void>;
}
export interface KeyManagerOptions {
/** Required when KeySource.kind === 'keychain'. */
keychain?: KeychainBackend;
}
export class KeyManager {
private readonly storageKey: Uint8Array;
private readonly fieldKeyCache = new Map<string, Uint8Array>();
private constructor(storageKey: Uint8Array) {
this.storageKey = storageKey;
}
/**
* Open a KeyManager from any supported source. May call the OS keychain
* (async) or run scrypt (slow on cold start).
*/
static async open(source: KeySource, opts: KeyManagerOptions = {}): Promise<KeyManager> {
const masterKey = await resolveMasterKey(source, opts);
try {
const storageKey = deriveStorageKey(masterKey);
return new KeyManager(storageKey);
} finally {
// Zeroize whichever buffer we can — never the caller's own buffer
// when source.kind === 'injected', since the caller may still hold it.
if (source.kind !== 'injected') masterKey.fill(0);
}
}
/** Look up (and cache) the AEAD key for a given table+column. */
fieldKey(table: string, column: string): Uint8Array {
const cacheKey = `${table}\x1f${column}`;
let k = this.fieldKeyCache.get(cacheKey);
if (!k) {
k = deriveFieldKey(this.storageKey, table, column);
this.fieldKeyCache.set(cacheKey, k);
}
return k;
}
/** Sanity helper for verifying that a passphrase decrypts the active DB. */
storageKeyFingerprint(): Uint8Array {
// Deterministic 8-byte tag for "is this the same masterKey?" without
// exposing the storageKey itself. Tag-only — not a MAC.
const tag = new Uint8Array(8);
for (let i = 0; i < this.storageKey.length; i++) {
tag[i % 8]! ^= this.storageKey[i]!;
}
return tag;
}
/** Forget all derived keys — call on shutdown. */
destroy(): void {
this.storageKey.fill(0);
for (const v of this.fieldKeyCache.values()) v.fill(0);
this.fieldKeyCache.clear();
}
}
async function resolveMasterKey(source: KeySource, opts: KeyManagerOptions): Promise<Uint8Array> {
switch (source.kind) {
case 'passphrase':
return deriveMasterKey(source.passphrase, source.salt, source.params ?? DEFAULT_SCRYPT);
case 'injected':
if (source.key.length !== 32) throw new Error('injected key must be exactly 32 bytes');
return new Uint8Array(source.key); // copy, in case caller mutates
case 'keychain': {
if (!opts.keychain) {
throw new Error('keychain source requires opts.keychain (install @shade/keychain)');
}
const existing = await opts.keychain.get(source.service, source.account);
if (existing) {
if (existing.length !== 32) throw new Error('keychain returned a non-32-byte key');
return existing;
}
if (!source.createIfMissing) {
throw new Error(`no key in keychain for ${source.service}/${source.account}`);
}
const fresh = new Uint8Array(32);
globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(fresh);
await opts.keychain.set(source.service, source.account, fresh);
return fresh;
}
}
}