release(v4.0.0): Shade GA — V3.x consolidation + audit prep
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V3.1 → V3.12 consolidated and tagged for the first GA release. Wire
format unchanged from 0.4.x — 4.0 peers interoperate with 0.4.x peers
byte-for-byte. The version bump is semantic: audit-cycle complete,
opt-in surface fully exposed, threat model refreshed for every new
surface.

Highlights:
- All 24 @shade/* packages bumped to 4.0.0 in lockstep.
- CHANGELOG 4.0.0 section is the canonical manifest of what landed.
- THREAT-MODEL extended (§10 fingerprint gates, §11 WebRTC P2P, §12
  Web-Worker boundary) + residual-risks table refreshed.
- OpenAPI now covers all 27 routes: prekey, transfer, KT, inbox,
  bridge, observer, /metrics, /healthz, /ready.
- MIGRATION 0.3.x → 4.0 documented + smoke-tested against
  shade migrate-storage on a real SQLite DB.
- docs/audit/REVIEW-BUNDLE.md + SCOPE.md ready for external reviewer.
- scripts/soak.ts harness for the GA-stable 2-week soak window.
- All V*.md plans archived under docs/archive/ with Status: Done.
- Voice/Video carved out into V5.0; 4.0 audit focuses on the frozen
  non-realtime stack.

Tests: TS 1000/1000 + Kotlin 11/11 cross-platform vectors green.
Docker: gt.zyon.no/stian/shade-prekey:4.0.0 builds and reports
  version 4.0.0 on /health.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-05-03 18:35:35 +02:00
parent 8b055912b7
commit e6fdf31b49
298 changed files with 37909 additions and 256 deletions

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/**
* Key derivation primitives for at-rest storage encryption.
*
* Hierarchy:
* masterKey (from passphrase / keychain / app-injected)
* │
* ├─ HKDF("shade-storage-v1") → storageKey (32 bytes)
* │ └─ HKDF(storageKey, table || ":" || column) → fieldKey (32 bytes)
* │
* └─ HKDF("shade-storage-version-v1") → versionKey (used during rotation)
*/
import { scryptAsync } from '@noble/hashes/scrypt.js';
import { hkdf } from '@noble/hashes/hkdf.js';
import { sha256 } from '@noble/hashes/sha2.js';
const TEXT = new TextEncoder();
/** scrypt parameters — interactive; sized for sub-second derivation on commodity HW */
export interface ScryptParams {
N: number;
r: number;
p: number;
dkLen: number;
}
/** Default: N=2^17, r=8, p=1, 32-byte output. ~250ms on a modern laptop. */
export const DEFAULT_SCRYPT: ScryptParams = { N: 1 << 17, r: 8, p: 1, dkLen: 32 };
/**
* Derive a 32-byte master key from a passphrase + salt using scrypt.
* The salt MUST be persisted alongside the encrypted database (16-byte random).
*/
export async function deriveMasterKey(
passphrase: string,
salt: Uint8Array,
params: ScryptParams = DEFAULT_SCRYPT,
): Promise<Uint8Array> {
if (passphrase.length === 0) {
throw new Error('passphrase must be non-empty');
}
if (salt.length < 16) {
throw new Error('salt must be at least 16 bytes');
}
return scryptAsync(TEXT.encode(passphrase.normalize('NFKC')), salt, params);
}
/** HKDF-SHA-256 with explicit info string. */
export function hkdfDerive(ikm: Uint8Array, info: string, length = 32, salt?: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
return hkdf(sha256, ikm, salt, TEXT.encode(info), length);
}
/** Derive the storageKey from masterKey. Stable, deterministic. */
export function deriveStorageKey(masterKey: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
return hkdfDerive(masterKey, 'shade-storage-v1', 32);
}
/** Derive the per-(table, column) field key. Stable, deterministic. */
export function deriveFieldKey(storageKey: Uint8Array, table: string, column: string): Uint8Array {
return hkdfDerive(storageKey, `shade-field-v1:${table}:${column}`, 32);
}
/**
* Derive a deterministic 12-byte AEAD nonce from a row key (typically the
* field key) plus (table, pk) binding. With per-field keys, deterministic
* nonces are safe because each (key, plaintext) pair appears at most once
* — re-saving the same row reuses the (nonce, key) pair only because the
* plaintext also changes (chain ratchet, prekey state, etc.). The AAD
* also binds (table, column, pk) so swapping is rejected on decrypt.
*/
export function deriveNonce(rowKey: Uint8Array, table: string, pk: string): Uint8Array {
const out = hkdfDerive(rowKey, `shade-row-nonce-v1:${table}:${pk}`, 12);
return out;
}
/** Build the AAD that binds (table, column, pk) to a ciphertext. */
export function buildAad(table: string, column: string, pk: string): Uint8Array {
return TEXT.encode(`shade-aad-v1|${table}|${column}|${pk}`);
}