release(v4.0.0): Shade GA — V3.x consolidation + audit prep
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V3.1 → V3.12 consolidated and tagged for the first GA release. Wire format unchanged from 0.4.x — 4.0 peers interoperate with 0.4.x peers byte-for-byte. The version bump is semantic: audit-cycle complete, opt-in surface fully exposed, threat model refreshed for every new surface. Highlights: - All 24 @shade/* packages bumped to 4.0.0 in lockstep. - CHANGELOG 4.0.0 section is the canonical manifest of what landed. - THREAT-MODEL extended (§10 fingerprint gates, §11 WebRTC P2P, §12 Web-Worker boundary) + residual-risks table refreshed. - OpenAPI now covers all 27 routes: prekey, transfer, KT, inbox, bridge, observer, /metrics, /healthz, /ready. - MIGRATION 0.3.x → 4.0 documented + smoke-tested against shade migrate-storage on a real SQLite DB. - docs/audit/REVIEW-BUNDLE.md + SCOPE.md ready for external reviewer. - scripts/soak.ts harness for the GA-stable 2-week soak window. - All V*.md plans archived under docs/archive/ with Status: Done. - Voice/Video carved out into V5.0; 4.0 audit focuses on the frozen non-realtime stack. Tests: TS 1000/1000 + Kotlin 11/11 cross-platform vectors green. Docker: gt.zyon.no/stian/shade-prekey:4.0.0 builds and reports version 4.0.0 on /health. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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# Shade V2.1 — Improvements (infrastructure, storage, operations, security)
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This document describes **improvements** agreed for next-generation work on Shade: clearer product story, stronger storage, mobile parity, operational hardening, transfer abuse, and a formal security narrative.
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**Audience:** **Maintainers and contributors** implementing the changes. Add status fields as items land in code/docs.
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---
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## 1. Clear “who is the server?” and data flow
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**Problem:** New users may think the prekey server is a message hub or that all E2EE traffic goes through the Shade container.
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**Goal:** One consistent explanation across the root README, package READMEs, and optional onboarding: **the prekey server distributes public keys and bundles**; **actual messages and (typically) file chunks go through your app’s own channel** (your transport, your backend, your URLs).
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**Deliverables (proposal):**
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- Diagram + short “keys vs payloads” text in the root README and in `@shade/server` README.
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- Link to `THREAT-MODEL.md` from the same section (MITM on first contact ↔ safety numbers).
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- Optionally one “concept page” (or extend `MIGRATION.md`) with typical architecture: *A ↔ B via app; both talk to the prekey host for X3DH material*.
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**Acceptance criteria:** A new developer without domain background understands in one reading *what* goes to the Shade server and *what* does not.
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---
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## 2. Optional encryption of storage (at-rest)
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**Problem:** `THREAT-MODEL.md` states that a stolen DB + filesystem can expose private keys because Shade does not encrypt the storage layer by default.
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**Goal:** **Opt-in** protection for sensitive state (identity, session, optional stream resume secrets) with keys that **do not** live in plaintext in the DB — e.g. OS keychain/Keystore, passphrase + KDF, or an explicit device key injected by the app.
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**Design principles:**
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- Default developer experience (dev, simple demos) stays unchanged or includes a clear “insecure mode” warning in docs.
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- APIs implementable per platform (Bun/SQLite, Postgres, web/IndexedDB, Android).
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- Document limitations: what remains uncovered (e.g. active memory compromise).
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**Acceptance criteria:** Threat model updated for “when encrypted storage is enabled”; at least one reference implementation + migration note.
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---
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## 3. Android parity and a published roadmap
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**Problem:** `shade-android` is under development; drift from the TS SDK undermines the “byte-compatible” promise.
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**Goal:** A **published roadmap** (milestones + what counts as parity vs TS-only) and **CI running shared test vectors** as a merge gate before release.
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**Deliverables:**
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- Roadmap section in `android/shade-android/README.md` or dedicated `ROADMAP-ANDROID.md` with explicit cross-checkpoints: wire format, fingerprints, rotations, streams (`0x11`) where applicable, resume semantics.
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- CI job that fails on Kotlin vs TS vector mismatch.
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**Acceptance criteria:** Parity coverage is visible and enforceable; the first critical cross-surface (e.g. core ratchet + proto) is green before a “production” label.
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---
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## 4. Operational hardening — prekey container and production
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**Problem:** Many teams deploy the Docker image quickly; mistakes around TLS, backups, and secrets add avoidable risk.
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**Goal:** A **production checklist**: TLS termination, volume backup (`/data`), rotation of `SHADE_OBSERVER_TOKEN`, use of `SHADE_PREKEY_PG_URL` vs SQLite, observability hooks, logging levels, meaning of stale cleanup parameters.
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**Deliverables:**
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- Extend `docs/DEPLOYMENT.md` or add short `docs/PRODUCTION-CHECKLIST.md` with bullet defaults.
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- Link from the main README under “Deployment”.
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**Acceptance criteria:** A checklist operators can follow without reading the whole codebase first.
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---
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## 5. Abuse and resource limits on the transfer plane
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**Problem:** Parallel lanes and large uploads can be abused for resource or storage if consumer mounts of `createTransferRoutes()` share no coherent policy.
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**Goal:** Documented **limits and patterns**: authentication (already an active SDK topic), max stream size, TTL for temporary chunk storage, quotas per identity or IP where sensible.
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**Deliverables:**
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- Guidelines in `docs/streams.md` or a dedicated “Transfer hardening” section.
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- Optional helpers or middleware examples in `@shade/transfer` / server routes for common limits (without forcing every deployment into one DB model).
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**Acceptance criteria:** A clear “recommended minimum” for production that teams can copy.
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---
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## 6. Security review and formal test / narrative
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**Problem:** Enterprises and security-conscious users often ask for independent review and a traceable test matrix.
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**Goal:** Plan for **independent crypto review** (timing, scope, deliverables) and a **published test / threat matrix** linking `THREAT-MODEL.md` to concrete automated tests (replay, tamper, out-of-order, resume, etc.).
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**Deliverables:**
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- Internal checklist “preparing for external review” (which files, assumptions, known limits).
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- Short section in `SECURITY.md` on review status and how to report findings.
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**Acceptance criteria:** One authoritative source for “what is tested automatically” vs “what needs manual/MITM/out-of-band process”.
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---
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## Dependencies and order (proposal)
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| Priority | Topic | Note |
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|---------|-------|------|
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| Low friction | §1, §4 | Documentation and checklists only |
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| Medium | §5 | Design + docs + possibly small API helpers |
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| High effort | §2, §3 | Platform work and long-term maintenance |
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| Coordinated | §6 | Parallel with maturity in §2–§5 |
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---
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## Document versioning
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- **V2.1** — first consolidated plan for the six improvement areas above. Update with dates and short per-section status lines as work starts and completes.
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Gitt der du er nå (post-streams 0.2.0), ville jeg prioritert:
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1. Sosial nøkkel-recovery — løser "hva skjer hvis jeg mister telefonen?" som er det store hullet i alle
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E2EE-systemer
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2. P2P WebRTC transport — naturlig kompletterende til streams; gir massiv throughput-gevinst gratis
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3. E2EE Pub/Sub — lavt scope, høy nytte, og passer perfekt med din "magic drop-in"-filosofi
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Disse tre har alle samme egenskap: de er infrastruktur-features som hver app du bygger fremover vil dra nytte av,
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ikke bare Dispatch. Helt i tråd med "Shade som komponent som dras inn i hvilket som helst prosjekt".
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/btw Hva med Shade videostreaming, VOIP streaming, og lignende?
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Magic drop-in-tilnærming (din filosofi)
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Tenk deg at i en Dispatch-app kan du bare gjøre:
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<ShadeVideoCall to="device:server-admin" />
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<ShadeVoiceButton to={peerAddress} />
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<ShadeBroadcaster streamKey="game-stream-1" />
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<ShadeViewer streamKey="game-stream-1" />
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…og det bare fungerer, E2EE, P2P når mulig, fallback til relay automatisk. Det er det samme mønsteret som streams
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0.2.0, bare for sanntid.
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Realisme-sjekk
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Video/VOIP er det vanskeligste i hele E2EE-verdenen. Signal brukte år på å få det riktig. Du bør:
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1. Ferdigstille streams 0.2.0 først (verifiserer crypto-fundamentet)
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2. Bygge P2P WebRTC-transport som separat milestone
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3. Da har du alle byggeklossene og Voice 0.4.0 blir 70% gjenbruk
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Men ja — dette hører absolutt hjemme i Shade. Shade som "alt-i-ett E2EE-platform" er en mye sterkere posisjon enn
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"bare messaging + filer". Du kan bli til E2EE hva Twilio er til vanlig kommunikasjon.
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