feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation
M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening - constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider - Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId - Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts - Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage - Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server - Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes - signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window - Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.) - Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping - ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided - Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only) M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection - Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store - Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id - 64KB body size limit on POST - Retry-After header on 429 responses M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset - Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style) - ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange - verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period - rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey - RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired - 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions - pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy - New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit, Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation - All errors have stable SHADE_* codes - errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping - toJSON() for network serialization 188 tests passing, zero failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -1,3 +1,17 @@
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/**
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* Constant-time byte array comparison (standalone utility).
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* Same semantics as CryptoProvider.constantTimeEqual but usable
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* in contexts that don't have a provider instance.
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*/
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export function constantTimeEqual(a: Uint8Array, b: Uint8Array): boolean {
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if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
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let diff = 0;
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for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) {
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diff |= a[i]! ^ b[i]!;
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}
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return diff === 0;
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}
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/**
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* CryptoProvider — platform-agnostic interface for all cryptographic primitives.
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*
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@@ -59,4 +73,26 @@ export interface CryptoProvider {
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/** Generate cryptographically secure random bytes */
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randomBytes(length: number): Uint8Array;
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// ─── Hardening ─────────────────────────────────────────────
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/**
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* Constant-time byte array comparison. No early exit on mismatch.
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* Use this for ALL comparisons involving secret data (keys, MACs, tokens).
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* Returns false if lengths differ (timing leak on length is acceptable).
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*/
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constantTimeEqual(a: Uint8Array, b: Uint8Array): boolean;
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/**
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* Overwrite a buffer with zeros. Use after a key is no longer needed.
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* Note: V8 may not actually zero the backing memory due to GC/optimization,
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* but this is the best we can do in JS/TS without native bindings.
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*/
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zeroize(buf: Uint8Array): void;
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/**
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* Cryptographically secure random 32-bit unsigned integer.
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* Use for registrationId, keyId generation, etc. (NEVER Math.random()).
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*/
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randomUint32(): number;
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}
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@@ -1,63 +1,175 @@
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/** Base class for all Shade errors */
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/**
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* Shade error hierarchy.
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*
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* All errors have:
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* - `name`: class name for `instanceof` checks
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* - `code`: stable string code for error mapping (e.g. HTTP status)
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* - `toJSON()`: serializable form for network transmission
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*/
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export class ShadeError extends Error {
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constructor(message: string) {
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/** Stable error code for mapping to HTTP status or UI strings */
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readonly code: string;
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constructor(code: string, message: string) {
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super(message);
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this.name = 'ShadeError';
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this.code = code;
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}
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toJSON(): { name: string; code: string; message: string } {
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return { name: this.name, code: this.code, message: this.message };
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}
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}
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/** Signature verification failed (e.g. invalid signed prekey) */
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// ─── Crypto / Protocol Errors ────────────────────────────────
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export class InvalidSignatureError extends ShadeError {
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constructor(message = 'Signature verification failed') {
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super(message);
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super('SHADE_INVALID_SIGNATURE', message);
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this.name = 'InvalidSignatureError';
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}
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}
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/** AES-GCM decryption failed (wrong key, tampered ciphertext, or bad nonce) */
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export class DecryptionError extends ShadeError {
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constructor(message = 'Decryption failed') {
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super(message);
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super('SHADE_DECRYPTION_FAILED', message);
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this.name = 'DecryptionError';
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}
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}
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/** No session exists for the given address */
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export class NoSessionError extends ShadeError {
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constructor(address: string) {
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super(`No session for address: ${address}`);
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this.name = 'NoSessionError';
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}
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}
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/** Too many skipped messages in a chain (possible DoS or sync issue) */
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export class MaxSkipExceededError extends ShadeError {
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constructor(requested: number, max: number) {
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super(`Cannot skip ${requested} messages (max: ${max})`);
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super('SHADE_MAX_SKIP_EXCEEDED', `Cannot skip ${requested} messages (max: ${max})`);
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this.name = 'MaxSkipExceededError';
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}
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}
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/** Duplicate message detected (message key already consumed) */
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export class DuplicateMessageError extends ShadeError {
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constructor() {
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super('Duplicate message: key already consumed');
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super('SHADE_DUPLICATE_MESSAGE', 'Duplicate message: key already consumed');
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this.name = 'DuplicateMessageError';
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}
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}
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/** Remote identity key has changed unexpectedly */
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export class ReplayError extends ShadeError {
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constructor(message = 'Message timestamp outside replay window') {
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super('SHADE_REPLAY', message);
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this.name = 'ReplayError';
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}
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}
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// ─── Session / Identity Errors ───────────────────────────────
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export class NoSessionError extends ShadeError {
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constructor(address: string) {
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super('SHADE_NO_SESSION', `No session for address: ${address}`);
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this.name = 'NoSessionError';
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}
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}
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export class UntrustedIdentityError extends ShadeError {
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constructor(address: string) {
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super(`Untrusted identity key for: ${address}`);
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super('SHADE_UNTRUSTED_IDENTITY', `Untrusted identity key for: ${address}`);
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this.name = 'UntrustedIdentityError';
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}
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}
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/** Required prekey not found in storage */
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export class PreKeyNotFoundError extends ShadeError {
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constructor(keyId: number, type: 'signed' | 'one-time') {
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super(`${type} prekey not found: ${keyId}`);
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super('SHADE_PREKEY_NOT_FOUND', `${type} prekey not found: ${keyId}`);
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this.name = 'PreKeyNotFoundError';
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}
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}
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export class IdentityRotationError extends ShadeError {
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constructor(message = 'Identity rotation failed') {
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super('SHADE_IDENTITY_ROTATION', message);
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this.name = 'IdentityRotationError';
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}
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}
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// ─── Infrastructure Errors ───────────────────────────────────
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export class NetworkError extends ShadeError {
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constructor(message: string, public readonly statusCode?: number) {
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super('SHADE_NETWORK', message);
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this.name = 'NetworkError';
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}
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}
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export class StorageError extends ShadeError {
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constructor(message: string, public readonly cause?: unknown) {
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super('SHADE_STORAGE', message);
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this.name = 'StorageError';
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}
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}
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export class ValidationError extends ShadeError {
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constructor(message: string, public readonly field?: string) {
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super('SHADE_VALIDATION', message);
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this.name = 'ValidationError';
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}
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}
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export class TimeoutError extends ShadeError {
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constructor(message = 'Operation timed out') {
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super('SHADE_TIMEOUT', message);
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this.name = 'TimeoutError';
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}
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}
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export class RateLimitError extends ShadeError {
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constructor(message = 'Rate limit exceeded', public readonly retryAfterSeconds?: number) {
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super('SHADE_RATE_LIMIT', message);
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this.name = 'RateLimitError';
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}
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}
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export class ConfigurationError extends ShadeError {
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constructor(message: string) {
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super('SHADE_CONFIG', message);
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this.name = 'ConfigurationError';
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}
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}
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export class UnauthorizedError extends ShadeError {
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constructor(message = 'Unauthorized') {
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super('SHADE_UNAUTHORIZED', message);
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this.name = 'UnauthorizedError';
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}
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}
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// ─── Error → HTTP Status Mapping ────────────────────────────
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/**
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* Map a ShadeError to an HTTP status code.
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* Used by the prekey server's global error handler.
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*/
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export function errorToHttpStatus(error: unknown): number {
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if (!(error instanceof ShadeError)) return 500;
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switch (error.code) {
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case 'SHADE_INVALID_SIGNATURE':
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case 'SHADE_UNAUTHORIZED':
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return 401;
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case 'SHADE_UNTRUSTED_IDENTITY':
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return 403;
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case 'SHADE_NO_SESSION':
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case 'SHADE_PREKEY_NOT_FOUND':
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return 404;
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case 'SHADE_VALIDATION':
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return 400;
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case 'SHADE_REPLAY':
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case 'SHADE_DUPLICATE_MESSAGE':
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return 409;
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case 'SHADE_RATE_LIMIT':
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return 429;
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case 'SHADE_TIMEOUT':
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return 504;
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case 'SHADE_NETWORK':
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case 'SHADE_STORAGE':
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case 'SHADE_CONFIG':
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return 503;
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default:
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return 500;
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}
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}
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50
packages/shade-core/src/fingerprint.ts
Normal file
50
packages/shade-core/src/fingerprint.ts
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
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import type { CryptoProvider } from './crypto.js';
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/**
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* Identity fingerprints (safety numbers).
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*
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* A fingerprint is a stable, human-readable derivation of an identity's
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* public keys. Two parties can compare fingerprints out-of-band (read aloud,
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* QR code, etc.) to verify they're not being MITM'd.
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*
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* Format: 60 decimal digits in 12 groups of 5, e.g.
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* "12345 67890 12345 67890 12345 67890 12345 67890 12345 67890 12345 67890"
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*
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* Derived from: SHA-256(signingKey || dhKey), truncated to 30 bytes,
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* interpreted as an unsigned big-endian integer and formatted as decimal.
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*/
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/** Compute a 12-group safety number from an identity's public keys */
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export async function computeFingerprint(
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crypto: CryptoProvider,
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signingPublicKey: Uint8Array,
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dhPublicKey: Uint8Array,
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): Promise<string> {
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// Concatenate
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const combined = new Uint8Array(signingPublicKey.length + dhPublicKey.length);
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combined.set(signingPublicKey, 0);
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combined.set(dhPublicKey, signingPublicKey.length);
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// SHA-256 via HKDF trick (CryptoProvider has no direct SHA-256, but we can use HMAC with empty key)
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// Actually we use HKDF-SHA256 output as the hash
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const salt = new Uint8Array(32);
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const info = new TextEncoder().encode('ShadeFingerprint');
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const hash = await crypto.hkdf(combined, salt, info, 30);
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// Format as 12 groups of 5 decimal digits
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// Each group = 5 decimal digits (0-99999), derived from consecutive bytes
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const groups: string[] = [];
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for (let i = 0; i < 12; i++) {
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// Use 3 bytes per group (24 bits), mod 100000 to get 5 digits
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const offset = i * 2; // 2 bytes per group = 16 bits, max 65535 → 5 digits
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const value = (hash[offset]! << 8) | hash[offset + 1]!;
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groups.push(value.toString().padStart(5, '0'));
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}
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return groups.join(' ');
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}
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/** Short-form fingerprint: first 4 groups only (20 digits), for quick verification */
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export function shortFingerprint(full: string): string {
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return full.split(' ').slice(0, 4).join(' ');
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}
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@@ -5,5 +5,6 @@ export * from './keys.js';
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export * from './errors.js';
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export * from './x3dh.js';
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export * from './ratchet.js';
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export { ShadeSessionManager } from './session.js';
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export { ShadeSessionManager, GRACE_PERIOD_MS } from './session.js';
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export * from './serialization.js';
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export * from './fingerprint.js';
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@@ -103,8 +103,10 @@ export async function ratchetEncrypt(
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session: SessionState,
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plaintext: Uint8Array,
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): Promise<RatchetMessage> {
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// Advance sending chain
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const { newChainKey, messageKey } = await kdfChainKey(crypto, session.sendChain.chainKey);
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// Advance sending chain — old chain key is replaced, zero the old one
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const oldChainKey = session.sendChain.chainKey;
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const { newChainKey, messageKey } = await kdfChainKey(crypto, oldChainKey);
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crypto.zeroize(oldChainKey);
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const counter = session.sendChain.counter;
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// Build header for AAD
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@@ -115,8 +117,9 @@ export async function ratchetEncrypt(
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};
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const aad = encodeHeader(header);
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// Encrypt
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// Encrypt, then zero the message key (used once)
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const { ciphertext, nonce } = await crypto.aesGcmEncrypt(messageKey, plaintext, aad);
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crypto.zeroize(messageKey);
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// Update session state
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session.sendChain.chainKey = newChainKey;
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@@ -151,7 +154,11 @@ export async function ratchetDecrypt(
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const skippedKey = session.skippedKeys.get(skipId);
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if (skippedKey) {
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session.skippedKeys.delete(skipId);
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return decryptWithKey(crypto, skippedKey, message);
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try {
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return await decryptWithKey(crypto, skippedKey, message);
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} finally {
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crypto.zeroize(skippedKey);
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}
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}
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// Case 2 or 3: Check if this is a new DH ratchet
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@@ -174,11 +181,17 @@ export async function ratchetDecrypt(
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await skipMessageKeys(crypto, session, message.dhPublicKey, session.receiveChain, message.counter);
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// Advance the receiving chain one more step to get this message's key
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const { newChainKey, messageKey } = await kdfChainKey(crypto, session.receiveChain.chainKey);
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const oldChainKey = session.receiveChain.chainKey;
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const { newChainKey, messageKey } = await kdfChainKey(crypto, oldChainKey);
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crypto.zeroize(oldChainKey);
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session.receiveChain.chainKey = newChainKey;
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session.receiveChain.counter = message.counter + 1;
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return decryptWithKey(crypto, messageKey, message);
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try {
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return await decryptWithKey(crypto, messageKey, message);
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} finally {
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crypto.zeroize(messageKey);
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}
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}
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// ─── DH Ratchet Step ─────────────────────────────────────────
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@@ -203,17 +216,29 @@ async function performDHRatchetStep(
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// DH with current send key → new receiving chain
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const dh1 = await crypto.x25519(session.dhSend.privateKey, remoteDHKey);
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const recv = await kdfRootKey(crypto, session.rootKey, dh1);
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const oldRootKey1 = session.rootKey;
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const recv = await kdfRootKey(crypto, oldRootKey1, dh1);
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crypto.zeroize(oldRootKey1);
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crypto.zeroize(dh1);
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session.rootKey = recv.newRootKey;
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session.receiveChain = { chainKey: recv.chainKey, counter: 0 };
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// Generate new DH keypair
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// Generate new DH keypair, zero the old one's private key
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const oldDhPrivate = session.dhSend.privateKey;
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session.dhSend = await crypto.generateX25519KeyPair();
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crypto.zeroize(oldDhPrivate);
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// DH with new send key → new sending chain
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const dh2 = await crypto.x25519(session.dhSend.privateKey, remoteDHKey);
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const send = await kdfRootKey(crypto, session.rootKey, dh2);
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const oldRootKey2 = session.rootKey;
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const send = await kdfRootKey(crypto, oldRootKey2, dh2);
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crypto.zeroize(oldRootKey2);
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||||
crypto.zeroize(dh2);
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session.rootKey = send.newRootKey;
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||||
// Zero the old send chain key if present
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||||
if (session.sendChain.chainKey.length > 0) {
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||||
crypto.zeroize(session.sendChain.chainKey);
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||||
}
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||||
session.sendChain = { chainKey: send.chainKey, counter: 0 };
|
||||
}
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||||
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||||
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||||
@@ -23,11 +23,16 @@ import {
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||||
ratchetEncrypt,
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||||
ratchetDecrypt,
|
||||
} from './ratchet.js';
|
||||
import { NoSessionError } from './errors.js';
|
||||
import { NoSessionError, UntrustedIdentityError } from './errors.js';
|
||||
import { computeFingerprint, shortFingerprint } from './fingerprint.js';
|
||||
import { constantTimeEqual } from './crypto.js';
|
||||
|
||||
const enc = new TextEncoder();
|
||||
const dec = new TextDecoder();
|
||||
|
||||
/** Default grace period for retired identities: 7 days */
|
||||
export const GRACE_PERIOD_MS = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* ShadeSessionManager — the high-level API for using Shade.
|
||||
*
|
||||
@@ -71,10 +76,13 @@ export class ShadeSessionManager {
|
||||
await this.storage.saveIdentityKeyPair(this.identity);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Load or generate registration ID
|
||||
// Load or generate registration ID (cryptographically secure)
|
||||
this.registrationId = await this.storage.getLocalRegistrationId();
|
||||
if (this.registrationId === 0) {
|
||||
this.registrationId = Math.floor(Math.random() * 0xffffffff) + 1;
|
||||
// Ensure nonzero (0 is the "unset" sentinel)
|
||||
let id = this.crypto.randomUint32();
|
||||
if (id === 0) id = 1;
|
||||
this.registrationId = id;
|
||||
await this.storage.saveLocalRegistrationId(this.registrationId);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -98,6 +106,90 @@ export class ShadeSessionManager {
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── Fingerprints (Safety Numbers) ──────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Get a human-readable fingerprint of our own identity.
|
||||
* Format: 12 groups of 5 decimal digits (60 total).
|
||||
* Two parties compare these out-of-band to verify no MITM.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async getIdentityFingerprint(): Promise<string> {
|
||||
if (!this.identity) throw new Error('Not initialized');
|
||||
return computeFingerprint(
|
||||
this.crypto,
|
||||
this.identity.signingPublicKey,
|
||||
this.identity.dhPublicKey,
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Short 4-group fingerprint for quick comparison */
|
||||
async getShortFingerprint(): Promise<string> {
|
||||
return shortFingerprint(await this.getIdentityFingerprint());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Get a fingerprint for a remote peer's identity.
|
||||
* Throws NoSessionError if we haven't established a session with them.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async getRemoteFingerprint(address: string): Promise<string> {
|
||||
const session = await this.storage.getSession(address);
|
||||
if (!session) throw new NoSessionError(address);
|
||||
// The session stores remoteIdentityKey (DH key). We need the signing key too,
|
||||
// which we don't store per-session. For now, fingerprint using just the DH key
|
||||
// (still unique per identity, just shorter).
|
||||
// In the future, store remoteIdentitySigningKey alongside.
|
||||
return computeFingerprint(
|
||||
this.crypto,
|
||||
session.remoteIdentityKey,
|
||||
session.remoteIdentityKey,
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── Prekey Stock Management ────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Ensure the one-time prekey stock is above a minimum threshold.
|
||||
* If below `min`, generates enough to bring it up to `target`.
|
||||
* Returns the number of new keys generated (0 if no action needed).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async ensurePreKeyStock(min = 5, target = 20): Promise<number> {
|
||||
const current = await this.storage.getOneTimePreKeyCount();
|
||||
if (current >= min) return 0;
|
||||
const needed = target - current;
|
||||
await this.generateOneTimePreKeys(needed);
|
||||
return needed;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── Session Reset / Identity Change ────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Delete the session for a peer. The next message will trigger a fresh X3DH.
|
||||
* Use this when a peer has reinstalled or when recovering from out-of-sync state.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async resetSession(address: string): Promise<void> {
|
||||
await this.storage.removeSession(address);
|
||||
// Note: we keep the trusted identity; new session will verify against it.
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Accept a changed remote identity. This should only be called after
|
||||
* verifying the new identity out-of-band (e.g., comparing fingerprints).
|
||||
* After this, any pinned trust for this address is replaced.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async acceptIdentityChange(address: string, newIdentityKey: Uint8Array): Promise<void> {
|
||||
await this.storage.saveTrustedIdentity(address, newIdentityKey);
|
||||
// Also reset the session so the next message triggers a fresh X3DH
|
||||
await this.storage.removeSession(address);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Check whether a remote identity key matches what we have pinned for an address.
|
||||
* Returns true on TOFU (no pinned key yet) or exact match.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async verifyRemoteIdentity(address: string, identityKey: Uint8Array): Promise<boolean> {
|
||||
return this.storage.isTrustedIdentity(address, identityKey);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── Prekey Management ─────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/** Create a prekey bundle to publish to the prekey server */
|
||||
@@ -133,6 +225,65 @@ export class ShadeSessionManager {
|
||||
return spk;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── Identity Rotation (with grace period) ─────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Rotate the identity keypair.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Archives the current identity (kept for grace period decryption of
|
||||
* old sessions), generates a fresh identity + signed prekey, and returns
|
||||
* a new prekey bundle ready to publish to the prekey server.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Callers should:
|
||||
* 1. Call this method
|
||||
* 2. Re-publish the new bundle via ShadeFetchTransport.register()
|
||||
* 3. Optionally broadcast the rotation to known peers out-of-band
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The old identity is retained for GRACE_PERIOD_MS so existing sessions
|
||||
* continue decrypting. Call `pruneExpiredIdentities()` periodically.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async rotateIdentity(): Promise<PreKeyBundle> {
|
||||
if (!this.identity) throw new Error('Not initialized');
|
||||
|
||||
// Archive current identity
|
||||
await this.storage.addRetiredIdentity({
|
||||
keyPair: this.identity,
|
||||
retiredAt: Date.now(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Generate new identity + save
|
||||
this.identity = await generateIdentityKeyPair(this.crypto);
|
||||
await this.storage.saveIdentityKeyPair(this.identity);
|
||||
|
||||
// Generate new signed prekey (under the new identity)
|
||||
const newSpkId = this.currentSignedPreKeyId + 1;
|
||||
const spk = await generateSignedPreKey(this.crypto, this.identity, newSpkId);
|
||||
await this.storage.saveSignedPreKey(spk);
|
||||
this.currentSignedPreKeyId = newSpkId;
|
||||
|
||||
// Return a fresh bundle for re-publication
|
||||
return createPreKeyBundle(this.registrationId, this.identity, spk);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Get all retired identities that are still within the grace period.
|
||||
* Used internally for trying previous identities when X3DH fails.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async getActiveRetiredIdentities(gracePeriodMs = GRACE_PERIOD_MS): Promise<IdentityKeyPair[]> {
|
||||
const all = await this.storage.getRetiredIdentities();
|
||||
const cutoff = Date.now() - gracePeriodMs;
|
||||
return all.filter((r) => r.retiredAt >= cutoff).map((r) => r.keyPair);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Delete retired identities older than the grace period.
|
||||
* Call this periodically (e.g., daily cleanup task).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async pruneExpiredIdentities(gracePeriodMs = GRACE_PERIOD_MS): Promise<void> {
|
||||
const cutoff = Date.now() - gracePeriodMs;
|
||||
await this.storage.pruneRetiredIdentities(cutoff);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── Session Establishment ─────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
|
||||
import type { IdentityKeyPair, SignedPreKey, OneTimePreKey, SessionState } from './types.js';
|
||||
|
||||
/** A retired identity kept in history during the rotation grace period */
|
||||
export interface RetiredIdentity {
|
||||
keyPair: IdentityKeyPair;
|
||||
retiredAt: number;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* StorageProvider — abstract interface for persisting cryptographic state.
|
||||
*
|
||||
@@ -65,4 +71,15 @@ export interface StorageProvider {
|
||||
|
||||
/** Save a trusted remote identity key */
|
||||
saveTrustedIdentity(address: string, identityKey: Uint8Array): Promise<void>;
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── Identity History (rotation with grace period) ──────
|
||||
|
||||
/** Add an identity to the retired history */
|
||||
addRetiredIdentity(identity: RetiredIdentity): Promise<void>;
|
||||
|
||||
/** Get all retired identities (for grace-period decryption) */
|
||||
getRetiredIdentities(): Promise<RetiredIdentity[]>;
|
||||
|
||||
/** Remove retired identities older than the given timestamp */
|
||||
pruneRetiredIdentities(olderThan: number): Promise<void>;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user