android: V4.9 + V4.10 Kotlin ports + KeystoreStorage adapter
Pure-JVM additions to shade-android (no Android SDK needed): - V4.9 blob primitives: BlobKdf (HKDF deriveBlobSlotId/Key/SigningSeed), BlobAead (nonce||ct||tag with shade-profile-aad-v1:<slot> AAD), BlobClient (java.net.http with hand-written canonical JSON signing matching TS signPayload output), Profile high-level namespace. - V4.10 approval helpers: CanonicalProfileBlob schema with denormalized trustedApproverFingerprints, build/sign/verify proxy approvals via length-prefixed u16 BE UTF-8 canonical signing payload. - Password KDFs: scrypt + argon2id via Bouncy Castle, NFKC-normalized. - SessionStateJson at-rest serializer for persistence layer. Cross-platform vectors (test-vectors/blob.json, approval.json) gate byte-identical output between TS and Kotlin, including a TS-signed Ed25519 signature the Kotlin port verifies and reproduces (Ed25519 is deterministic). New shade-android-keystore sibling Gradle module (Android-specific): - KeystoreMasterKey: hardware-backed AES-256-GCM with BIOMETRIC_STRONG gating, StrongBox-backed when available, invalidated on enrollment. - BiometricUnlock: coroutine wrapper around BiometricPrompt with tagged cancellation/failure exceptions. - KeystoreStorage: StorageProvider over biometric-gated AES-encrypted SharedPreferences with AAD-bound row keys. All 25 SDK packages typecheck clean; 104 SDK tests + 24 new Kotlin tests + 11 cross-platform vector tests all green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -7,7 +7,11 @@ Kotlin implementation of the Shade E2EE protocol for Android apps. Byte-for-byte
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**M-Cross 1 ✅** — keys + HKDF + X3DH + fingerprint.
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**M-Cross 2 ✅** — full ratchet step (encrypt + decrypt roundtrip) + wire 0x02 (RatchetMessage and PreKeyMessage with/without OTPK).
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**M-Cross 3 ✅** — streams 0x11 (KDF labels with embedded NULs, deterministic chunk nonce/AAD, wire 0x11 encode/decode).
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**M-Cross 4 ✅** — backup-key HKDF + AES-GCM, group sender-key step (`kdfChainKey` + Ed25519 sign over `aad ‖ ct`), storage HKDF (storageKey/fieldKey/rowNonce). Pending: scrypt master-key, argon2id swap, Android KeystoreStorage (sibling module).
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**M-Cross 4 ✅** — backup-key HKDF + AES-GCM, group sender-key step (`kdfChainKey` + Ed25519 sign over `aad ‖ ct`), storage HKDF (storageKey/fieldKey/rowNonce).
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**M-Cross 5 ✅** — V4.9 blob KDF + AEAD (`deriveBlobSlotId / deriveBlobKey / deriveBlobSigningSeed`, AAD-bound seal/open), `BlobClient` HTTP, `Profile` namespace. Cross-platform vectors in `blob.json`.
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**M-Cross 6 ✅** — V4.10 cross-host approval routing: canonical profile-blob schema (`hosts[]` / `clients[]` / `trustedApproverFingerprints[]`), build/sign/verify proxy approvals via `canonicalApprovalSigningBytes` (length-prefixed u16 BE UTF-8). Cross-platform vectors in `approval.json`, including a TS-signed Ed25519 signature that the Kotlin port verifies.
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**M-Cross 7 ✅** — scrypt + argon2id password-KDF wrappers (Bouncy Castle), NFKC-normalized inputs.
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**M-Cross 8 ✅** — `:shade-android-keystore` sibling module: `KeystoreMasterKey` (StrongBox-backed AES-256-GCM, BIOMETRIC_STRONG-gated, invalidated on biometric enrollment), `BiometricUnlock`, `KeystoreStorage` (`StorageProvider` over biometric-gated AES-encrypted SharedPreferences).
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Cross-platform test vectors in `/test-vectors/` are loaded by both the TS
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and Kotlin test suites; any byte-divergence fails CI within 60 s. See
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