feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation
M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening
- constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider
- Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId
- Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts
- Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage
- Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions
M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server
- Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes
- signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window
- Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.)
- Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping
- ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided
- Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only)
M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection
- Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store
- Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id
- 64KB body size limit on POST
- Retry-After header on 429 responses
M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset
- Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style)
- ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange
- verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison
M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period
- rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey
- RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired
- 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions
- pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup
M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy
- New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit,
Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation
- All errors have stable SHADE_* codes
- errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping
- toJSON() for network serialization
188 tests passing, zero failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 17:45:34 +02:00
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import { describe, test, expect } from 'bun:test';
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import { SubtleCryptoProvider } from '../src/provider.js';
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import { constantTimeEqual } from '@shade/core';
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const crypto = new SubtleCryptoProvider();
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describe('Cryptographic Hardening', () => {
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// ─── constantTimeEqual ───────────────────────────────────
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describe('constantTimeEqual', () => {
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test('equal arrays return true', () => {
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const a = new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3, 4, 5]);
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const b = new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3, 4, 5]);
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expect(crypto.constantTimeEqual(a, b)).toBe(true);
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});
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test('unequal arrays return false', () => {
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const a = new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3, 4, 5]);
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const b = new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3, 4, 6]);
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expect(crypto.constantTimeEqual(a, b)).toBe(false);
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});
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test('different lengths return false', () => {
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const a = new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]);
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const b = new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3, 4]);
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expect(crypto.constantTimeEqual(a, b)).toBe(false);
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});
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test('empty arrays are equal', () => {
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expect(crypto.constantTimeEqual(new Uint8Array(0), new Uint8Array(0))).toBe(true);
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});
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test('works on full 32-byte keys', () => {
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const k1 = crypto.randomBytes(32);
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const k2 = new Uint8Array(k1);
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expect(crypto.constantTimeEqual(k1, k2)).toBe(true);
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k2[31] ^= 0x01;
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expect(crypto.constantTimeEqual(k1, k2)).toBe(false);
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});
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test('standalone function gives same result', () => {
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const a = crypto.randomBytes(32);
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const b = new Uint8Array(a);
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expect(constantTimeEqual(a, b)).toBe(true);
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b[0] ^= 0x01;
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expect(constantTimeEqual(a, b)).toBe(false);
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});
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// Statistical timing test — measure variance between mismatch-at-start vs mismatch-at-end
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// This is noisy on CI but catches obvious early-exit regressions.
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test('timing variance stays bounded across mismatch positions', () => {
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const len = 256;
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const target = crypto.randomBytes(len);
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const mismatchAtStart = new Uint8Array(target);
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mismatchAtStart[0] ^= 0xff;
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const mismatchAtEnd = new Uint8Array(target);
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mismatchAtEnd[len - 1] ^= 0xff;
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2026-09-08 16:42:37 +02:00
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const iterations = 20000;
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const measure = (other: Uint8Array): number => {
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const t0 = performance.now();
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for (let i = 0; i < iterations; i++) crypto.constantTimeEqual(target, other);
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return performance.now() - t0;
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};
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// Warm up before measuring anything. The first loop through this code
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// pays for JIT compilation that the second one does not, which biased
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// whichever side ran first and is why the old version had to "allow 2x
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// for JIT/noise" — a tolerance covering a measurement artefact rather
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// than the property under test.
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measure(mismatchAtStart);
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measure(mismatchAtEnd);
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// Paired, interleaved samples, compared by median. A single pair is one
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// GC pause away from a false alarm: this test failed roughly one run in
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// fourteen on a loaded machine on 08.09.2026, and a security test that
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// cries wolf under load is a security test people learn to re-run until
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// it passes. The median throws out the pause instead of the property.
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const ratios: number[] = [];
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for (let round = 0; round < 5; round++) {
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const a = measure(mismatchAtStart);
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const b = measure(mismatchAtEnd);
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ratios.push(Math.max(a, b) / Math.min(a, b));
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feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation
M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening
- constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider
- Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId
- Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts
- Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage
- Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions
M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server
- Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes
- signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window
- Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.)
- Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping
- ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided
- Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only)
M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection
- Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store
- Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id
- 64KB body size limit on POST
- Retry-After header on 429 responses
M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset
- Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style)
- ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange
- verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison
M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period
- rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey
- RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired
- 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions
- pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup
M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy
- New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit,
Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation
- All errors have stable SHADE_* codes
- errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping
- toJSON() for network serialization
188 tests passing, zero failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 17:45:34 +02:00
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}
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2026-09-08 16:42:37 +02:00
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ratios.sort((x, y) => x - y);
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const median = ratios[Math.floor(ratios.length / 2)]!;
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// The threshold is unchanged and deliberately so: an early-exit compare
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// would take ~256x longer to reach a mismatch in the last byte than the
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// first, on every single round. Nothing about sampling weakens what this
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// catches — it only stops the scheduler from answering for the code.
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expect(median).toBeLessThan(3);
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feat(hardening): M-Hard 1-5 — crypto, auth, rate limit, fingerprints, rotation
M-Hard 1: Cryptographic Hardening
- constantTimeEqual, zeroize, randomUint32 on CryptoProvider
- Fix Math.random() → crypto.randomUint32() for registrationId
- Zero message keys and chain keys after use in ratchet.ts
- Constant-time trust comparison in MemoryStorage + SQLiteStorage
- Timing variance test catches early-exit regressions
M-Hard 2: Self-Authenticated Prekey Server
- Ed25519 signature verification on all write routes
- signPayload/verifyPayload with canonical JSON, ±5 min replay window
- Address validation (NFKC, alphanumeric + :_-.)
- Global ShadeError → HTTP status mapping
- ShadeFetchTransport signs requests when signingPrivateKey provided
- Anonymous bundle fetches still allowed (read-only)
M-Hard 3: Rate Limiting + DoS Protection
- Token bucket rate limiter with pluggable store
- Per-route limits: register 5/h/IP, fetch 60/min/IP, replenish 10/min/id
- 64KB body size limit on POST
- Retry-After header on 429 responses
M-Hard 4: Auto-replenish + Fingerprints + Session Reset
- Safety numbers (12 groups × 5 digits, Signal-style)
- ensurePreKeyStock, resetSession, acceptIdentityChange
- verifyRemoteIdentity for out-of-band comparison
M-Hard 5: Identity Rotation with Grace Period
- rotateIdentity archives old identity, generates fresh signed prekey
- RetiredIdentity storage with addRetired/getRetired/pruneRetired
- 7-day default grace period for decrypting old sessions
- pruneExpiredIdentities for cleanup
M-Hard 8: Error Hierarchy
- New error types: Network, Storage, Validation, Timeout, RateLimit,
Configuration, Unauthorized, Replay, IdentityRotation
- All errors have stable SHADE_* codes
- errorToHttpStatus for consistent HTTP mapping
- toJSON() for network serialization
188 tests passing, zero failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 17:45:34 +02:00
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});
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});
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// ─── zeroize ──────────────────────────────────────────────
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describe('zeroize', () => {
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test('fills buffer with zeros', () => {
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const buf = crypto.randomBytes(32);
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// Make sure it's not already zero
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const anyNonZero = buf.some((b) => b !== 0);
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expect(anyNonZero).toBe(true);
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crypto.zeroize(buf);
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expect(buf.every((b) => b === 0)).toBe(true);
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});
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test('handles empty buffer', () => {
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crypto.zeroize(new Uint8Array(0));
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// Should not throw
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});
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test('handles large buffer', () => {
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const buf = crypto.randomBytes(4096);
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crypto.zeroize(buf);
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expect(buf.every((b) => b === 0)).toBe(true);
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});
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});
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// ─── randomUint32 ─────────────────────────────────────────
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describe('randomUint32', () => {
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test('returns number in 32-bit unsigned range', () => {
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for (let i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
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const n = crypto.randomUint32();
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expect(n).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
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expect(n).toBeLessThanOrEqual(0xffffffff);
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expect(Number.isInteger(n)).toBe(true);
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}
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});
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test('produces different values each call', () => {
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const values = new Set<number>();
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for (let i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
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values.add(crypto.randomUint32());
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}
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// With 32 bits, 100 samples should all be unique
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expect(values.size).toBe(100);
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});
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test('distribution is not biased toward low values', () => {
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// Generate many and check that at least some are above 2^31
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// (would fail if using Math.random() with weird multiplier bugs)
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let highCount = 0;
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for (let i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
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if (crypto.randomUint32() >= 0x80000000) highCount++;
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}
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// Should be around 500, accept 400-600 as "not obviously broken"
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expect(highCount).toBeGreaterThan(400);
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expect(highCount).toBeLessThan(600);
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});
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});
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});
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