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Shade/packages/shade-sdk/tests/gates.test.ts

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import { describe, test, expect, beforeEach, afterEach, mock } from 'bun:test';
import { createShade, type Shade } from '../src/index.js';
import { FingerprintNotVerifiedError } from '@shade/core';
import { createPrekeyServer, MemoryPrekeyStore } from '@shade/server';
import { SubtleCryptoProvider } from '@shade/crypto-web';
const crypto = new SubtleCryptoProvider();
async function startPrekeyServer(): Promise<{ url: string; stop: () => void }> {
const server = createPrekeyServer({
crypto,
store: new MemoryPrekeyStore(),
disableRateLimit: true,
});
test: stop guessing port numbers Twenty test servers picked a port with `NNNN + Math.floor(Math.random() * 500)` and hoped it was free. Several files guessed inside the *same* range — sdk.test.ts and gates.test.ts both on 19500, three files on 22000, and webrtc-integration.test.ts used 22000 twice within itself — so with test files serving in parallel the collision was not unlikely, it was scheduled. Found from the outside, in Nova, where Shade is vendored: across eight runs of an unchanged tree, two had failures and six were clean. The visible error was Failed to start server. Is port 24287 in use? EADDRINUSE and then a second, louder one: `teardownRig` ran on a rig that setup had never finished building and died on `rig.alice`, so the TypeError from cleanup is what you read first and the real cause scrolled past above it. `Bun.serve({ port: 0 })` lets the OS hand out a free port and `server.port` reads it back. There is no range to collide inside. teardownRig now tolerates a rig that was never built. Cleanup must never be the loudest thing in a failing test. A suite that fails a quarter of the time is worse than a suite that fails: it teaches everyone to re-run it, and then a real regression looks like the flake. Verified: 1198 pass / 0 fail here, and the same fix is going into Nova's vendored copy so the next sync does not bring the guessing back. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014489bKUtUEY1Zgs9xN9mt7
2026-09-08 16:33:40 +02:00
// Port 0 lets the OS hand out a free one. This guessed inside a 500-wide
// range and hoped — and several files here guessed inside the SAME range,
// so with test files serving in parallel the collision arrived about a
// quarter of the time as EADDRINUSE.
const handle = Bun.serve({ port: 0, fetch: server.fetch });
const port = handle.port;
return { url: `http://localhost:${port}`, stop: () => handle.stop() };
}
/**
* Wires Alice ↔ Bob with control + chunk transports backed by in-memory
* routing so tests don't need real HTTP. Both sides see each other's
* envelopes through the same loopback.
*/
function wireLoopback(alice: Shade, bob: Shade): void {
alice.configureTransfers({
resolveBaseUrl: async () => 'mem://bob',
envelopeTransport: { send: async (_addr, env) => bob.acceptTransferEnvelope('alice', env) },
});
bob.configureTransfers({
resolveBaseUrl: async () => 'mem://alice',
envelopeTransport: { send: async (_addr, env) => alice.acceptTransferEnvelope('bob', env) },
});
}
describe('V3.3 fingerprint gates — first-large-file', () => {
let server: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof startPrekeyServer>>;
let alice: Shade;
let bob: Shade;
beforeEach(async () => {
server = await startPrekeyServer();
alice = await createShade({ prekeyServer: server.url, address: 'alice' });
bob = await createShade({ prekeyServer: server.url, address: 'bob' });
wireLoopback(alice, bob);
});
afterEach(async () => {
await alice.shutdown();
await bob.shutdown();
server.stop();
});
test('handler is not invoked for files under threshold', async () => {
const handler = mock(() => true);
alice.beforeFirstLargeFile(1024 * 1024, handler); // 1 MiB threshold
// Establish session so we can compare verification state
const env = await alice.send('bob', 'hi');
await bob.receive('alice', env);
expect(await alice.isPeerVerified('bob')).toBe(false);
// The gate is consulted from `upload()` which we don't actually run
// (loopback transfer plumbing is heavy). Instead we drive the gate
// directly through the public verification state and confirm size
// gating logic by asserting the threshold contract: a verified peer
// skips the handler entirely.
expect(handler).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
test('handler approval marks peer verified for subsequent calls', async () => {
const handler = mock((ctx: { fingerprint: string }) => {
expect(ctx.fingerprint.split(' ').length).toBe(12);
return true;
});
alice.beforeFirstLargeFile(1024, handler);
// Establish session
const env = await alice.send('bob', 'hi');
await bob.receive('alice', env);
expect(await alice.isPeerVerified('bob')).toBe(false);
await alice.markPeerVerified('bob');
expect(await alice.isPeerVerified('bob')).toBe(true);
// Handler should not fire when peer is already verified.
expect(handler).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
test('manual mark/unmark round trips', async () => {
const env = await alice.send('bob', 'hi');
await bob.receive('alice', env);
expect(await alice.isPeerVerified('bob')).toBe(false);
await alice.markPeerVerified('bob');
expect(await alice.isPeerVerified('bob')).toBe(true);
await alice.unmarkPeerVerified('bob');
expect(await alice.isPeerVerified('bob')).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('V3.3 fingerprint gates — backup-import', () => {
let server: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof startPrekeyServer>>;
let alice: Shade;
beforeEach(async () => {
server = await startPrekeyServer();
alice = await createShade({ prekeyServer: server.url, address: 'alice' });
});
afterEach(async () => {
await alice.shutdown();
server.stop();
});
test('handler is invoked with the backup identity fingerprint', async () => {
const ownFp = await alice.fingerprint;
const blob = await alice.exportBackup('correct horse battery staple', []);
// Re-create alice on a fresh storage so importBackup runs against
// a different identity baseline.
await alice.shutdown();
alice = await createShade({ prekeyServer: server.url, address: 'alice' });
let observedFp: string | null = null;
alice.beforeBackupImport((ctx) => {
observedFp = ctx.fingerprint;
return true;
});
await alice.importBackup(blob, 'correct horse battery staple');
expect(observedFp).toBe(ownFp);
});
test('handler rejection throws FingerprintNotVerifiedError and skips writes', async () => {
const blob = await alice.exportBackup('correct horse battery staple', []);
const fpBefore = await alice.fingerprint;
await alice.shutdown();
alice = await createShade({ prekeyServer: server.url, address: 'alice' });
alice.beforeBackupImport(() => false);
await expect(
alice.importBackup(blob, 'correct horse battery staple'),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(FingerprintNotVerifiedError);
// Identity should NOT have been overwritten by the rejected import.
const fpAfter = await alice.fingerprint;
expect(fpAfter).not.toBe(fpBefore);
});
test('no handler registered → warning + TOFU allow', async () => {
const blob = await alice.exportBackup('correct horse battery staple', []);
await alice.shutdown();
alice = await createShade({ prekeyServer: server.url, address: 'alice' });
// Capture console.warn so we can assert the warning fired.
const originalWarn = console.warn;
let warnings = 0;
console.warn = (..._args: unknown[]) => {
warnings += 1;
};
try {
await alice.importBackup(blob, 'correct horse battery staple');
} finally {
console.warn = originalWarn;
}
expect(warnings).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
});
});
describe('V3.3 fingerprint gates — identity rotation invalidates verification', () => {
let server: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof startPrekeyServer>>;
let alice: Shade;
let bob: Shade;
beforeEach(async () => {
server = await startPrekeyServer();
alice = await createShade({ prekeyServer: server.url, address: 'alice' });
bob = await createShade({ prekeyServer: server.url, address: 'bob' });
});
afterEach(async () => {
await alice.shutdown();
await bob.shutdown();
server.stop();
});
test('acceptIdentityChange bumps version and stales prior verification', async () => {
// Establish + manually mark verified
const env = await alice.send('bob', 'hi');
await bob.receive('alice', env);
await alice.markPeerVerified('bob');
expect(await alice.isPeerVerified('bob')).toBe(true);
// Bob rotates identity; Alice accepts the change.
let observedNewDeviceCtx: { peerAddress: string; fingerprint: string } | null = null;
alice.beforeNewDeviceTrust((ctx) => {
observedNewDeviceCtx = { peerAddress: ctx.peerAddress, fingerprint: ctx.fingerprint };
return false; // reject — the verification should already be stale
});
const fakeNewKey = new Uint8Array(32);
fakeNewKey.fill(7);
await expect(
alice.acceptIdentityChange('bob', fakeNewKey),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(FingerprintNotVerifiedError);
// Even though we rejected the gate, the identity-version was bumped
// before the gate ran, so the previous verification is now stale.
// Re-verifying via the *old* fingerprint must still report unverified.
expect(observedNewDeviceCtx).not.toBeNull();
expect(await alice.isPeerVerified('bob')).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('V3.3 fingerprint gates — error metadata', () => {
test('FingerprintNotVerifiedError carries gate + address', () => {
const err = new FingerprintNotVerifiedError('bob', 'first-large-file');
expect(err.peerAddress).toBe('bob');
expect(err.gate).toBe('first-large-file');
expect(err.code).toBe('SHADE_FINGERPRINT_NOT_VERIFIED');
expect(err.name).toBe('FingerprintNotVerifiedError');
});
});