Files
Shade/packages/shade-files/tests/unit/path-policy.test.ts

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feat(files): @shade/files 0.3.0 — E2EE filesystem RPC primitive M-Files-1..6 land the full files-RPC layer + everything 0.3.0 needs to ship. Apps keep their own UI; this layer ships the typed RPC, the streams bridge for content I/O, and production hooks (rate limit, retention, fingerprint gate, metrics). @shade/files (NEW) - Standard ops: list/stat/mkdir/delete/move/read/write/getThumbnail with Zod-validated wire schemas + clean user-handler types. - Custom ops: typed via TypeScript declaration merging on CustomOpsMap + per-op Zod schemas; client.custom('app.foo', {...}) is fully typed. - Content I/O: inline (≤ 256 KiB plaintext) base64-in-RPC; streams (> 256 KiB) ride @shade/transfer via userMetadata.shadeFilesWriteId / shadeFilesReadStreamId correlation. Server-side TransformStream bridges accept inbound transfers immediately (engine rejects chunks that arrive before accept) and park the readable for the matching RPC. - Directory ops: walk(path, opts) async-iterable depth-first walker; uploadDirectory()/downloadDirectory() with bounded concurrency pool (default 4, cap 16), aggregated progress, abort. - Production hooks (callback-based, vendor-neutral): rate-limit (op + byte), idempotency cache (LRU + TTL + in-flight de-dupe), path policy (traversal + percent-decode hardening), fingerprint gate (required/optional/reject), pluggable Ed25519 sig verification with ±5 min replay window, onMetric sink (standard names). - React hooks (subpath @shade/files/react): ShadeFilesProvider, useShadeFiles, useFileList, useFileTransfer/Upload/Download. - Shade.files.serve(handler) + Shade.files.client(peer) high-level entrypoint in @shade/sdk; lazy + memoized; one handler per Shade. Wire format bump - @shade/proto wire VERSION 0x01 → 0x02. Length prefixes changed from u16 to u32. The previous u16 silently truncated payloads above 64 KiB — a hard correctness ceiling that blocked inline file ops up to 256 KiB. Wire-incompatible with 0.2.x peers; new sessions only. Cross-platform Kotlin port (android/shade-android) updated to match; test-vectors/wire-format.json regenerated. Concurrency safety - ShadeSessionManager.encrypt/.decrypt now run under per-peer mutex. Concurrent decryptions of the same peer raced ratchet state (manifested as sporadic "Failed to decrypt — wrong key or tampered data" under load — surfaced once concurrent uploadDirectory pumped many writes in flight). Encrypt was already serialized via Shade.send's encryptChains; decrypt is now serialized at the manager layer too. @shade/streams extension - StreamMetadata.userMetadata?: Record<string, string> for application-level key/value pairs that round-trip verbatim through stream-init plaintext. Used by @shade/files for write/read correlation; available to any consumer. @shade/sdk extension - Shade.files getter (lazy + memoized). - BackgroundHooks.onPruneFiles + periodic timer (default 5 min) + BackgroundTasks.setHook(name, fn) for runtime hook registration. Bundles in-flight 0.2.0 work - packages/shade-streams/, packages/shade-transfer/, related shade-sdk streams-bridge + shade-widgets transfer hooks were uncommitted prior to this session. Including them keeps the workspace consistent at 0.3.0 since @shade/files depends on them. Tests - 74 new tests in @shade/files (572 → 646 workspace pass; 0 fail; 3× stable). Coverage spans unit (inline-threshold + concurrency), integration (read-write inline + streams up to 1 MiB, walk + upload/download directory, custom-op, metrics, SDK namespace end-to-end), and security (tampered-envelope sig verification, replay window, fingerprint gate, rate-limit + quota). Release artifacts - All packages bumped to 0.3.0 via scripts/bump-version.ts. - scripts/publish-all.ts PACKAGES updated with shade-files in topological order (after shade-transfer, before shade-sdk). - bun run publish:dry clean (14 packed, 0 failed). - examples/08-files-browser/ — three-process CLI demo (prekey + Bob server + Alice CLI) covering list/stat/mkdir/delete/upload/download. - docs/files.md — full API + design doc. - CHANGELOG.md 0.3.0 entry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-02 14:00:01 +02:00
import { describe, test, expect } from 'bun:test';
import * as fc from 'fast-check';
import { validatePath } from '../../src/index.js';
describe('validatePath — happy path', () => {
test('accepts simple absolute paths', () => {
expect(validatePath('/foo')).toEqual({ ok: true, normalized: '/foo' });
expect(validatePath('/foo/bar/baz.txt')).toEqual({
ok: true,
normalized: '/foo/bar/baz.txt',
});
expect(validatePath('/')).toEqual({ ok: true, normalized: '/' });
});
test('normalizes redundant slashes and dots', () => {
expect(validatePath('//foo//bar/./baz/').normalized).toBe('/foo/bar/baz');
expect(validatePath('/./foo').normalized).toBe('/foo');
});
test('UTF-8 paths are accepted', () => {
expect(validatePath('/Документы/файл.txt').normalized).toBe('/Документы/файл.txt');
expect(validatePath('/絵文字 😀/foo').normalized).toBe('/絵文字 😀/foo');
});
});
describe('validatePath — security', () => {
test('rejects raw `..` segments', () => {
expect(validatePath('/../etc/passwd').ok).toBe(false);
expect(validatePath('/foo/../etc').ok).toBe(false);
expect(validatePath('/..').ok).toBe(false);
});
test('rejects percent-encoded `..`', () => {
expect(validatePath('/%2e%2e/etc').ok).toBe(false);
expect(validatePath('/foo/%2E%2E/etc').ok).toBe(false);
});
test('rejects forbidden control bytes', () => {
expect(validatePath('/foo\x00bar').ok).toBe(false);
expect(validatePath('/foo\r\nbar').ok).toBe(false);
expect(validatePath('/foo\x7f').ok).toBe(false);
expect(validatePath('/foo\x01').ok).toBe(false);
});
test('rejects backslashes (Windows-style)', () => {
expect(validatePath('/foo\\bar').ok).toBe(false);
});
test('rejects relative paths', () => {
expect(validatePath('foo').ok).toBe(false);
expect(validatePath('./foo').ok).toBe(false);
expect(validatePath('').ok).toBe(false);
});
test('rejects over-length paths', () => {
expect(validatePath('/' + 'a'.repeat(4096)).ok).toBe(false);
expect(validatePath('/foobar', { maxLength: 5 }).ok).toBe(false);
expect(validatePath('/abc', { maxLength: 5 }).ok).toBe(true);
});
});
describe('validatePath — rootScope', () => {
test('accepts paths inside scope', () => {
expect(
validatePath('/srv/data/foo', { rootScope: '/srv/data' }).ok,
).toBe(true);
expect(validatePath('/srv/data', { rootScope: '/srv/data' }).ok).toBe(true);
});
test('rejects paths outside scope', () => {
expect(validatePath('/etc/passwd', { rootScope: '/srv/data' }).ok).toBe(false);
expect(validatePath('/srv/dataX', { rootScope: '/srv/data' }).ok).toBe(false);
// Boundary check: /srv/database is NOT inside /srv/data
expect(validatePath('/srv/database/x', { rootScope: '/srv/data' }).ok).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('validatePath — extra hook', () => {
test('extra reject takes precedence', () => {
const result = validatePath('/secret/foo', {
extra: (p) => (p.includes('secret') ? 'reject' : 'allow'),
});
expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
});
test('extra allow is the default', () => {
expect(
validatePath('/foo', {
extra: () => 'allow',
}).ok,
).toBe(true);
});
});
describe('validatePath — property-based', () => {
test('any string with a forbidden control byte is rejected', () => {
fc.assert(
fc.property(
fc.string({ minLength: 1, maxLength: 100 }),
fc.constantFrom('\x00', '\x07', '\x0a', '\x0d', '\x7f', '\\'),
(prefix, bad) => {
const p = `/${prefix}${bad}`;
expect(validatePath(p).ok).toBe(false);
},
),
{ numRuns: 200 },
);
});
test('any path inside rootScope normalizes within rootScope', () => {
fc.assert(
fc.property(
fc.array(fc.string({ minLength: 1, maxLength: 20 }).filter(
(s) => /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(s),
), { minLength: 1, maxLength: 5 }),
(segments) => {
const root = '/srv';
const path = `${root}/${segments.join('/')}`;
const r = validatePath(path, { rootScope: root });
if (r.ok) {
expect(r.normalized.startsWith(root)).toBe(true);
}
},
),
{ numRuns: 200 },
);
});
});