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Shade/packages/shade-files/tests/security/tampered-envelope.test.ts

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feat(files): @shade/files 0.3.0 — E2EE filesystem RPC primitive M-Files-1..6 land the full files-RPC layer + everything 0.3.0 needs to ship. Apps keep their own UI; this layer ships the typed RPC, the streams bridge for content I/O, and production hooks (rate limit, retention, fingerprint gate, metrics). @shade/files (NEW) - Standard ops: list/stat/mkdir/delete/move/read/write/getThumbnail with Zod-validated wire schemas + clean user-handler types. - Custom ops: typed via TypeScript declaration merging on CustomOpsMap + per-op Zod schemas; client.custom('app.foo', {...}) is fully typed. - Content I/O: inline (≤ 256 KiB plaintext) base64-in-RPC; streams (> 256 KiB) ride @shade/transfer via userMetadata.shadeFilesWriteId / shadeFilesReadStreamId correlation. Server-side TransformStream bridges accept inbound transfers immediately (engine rejects chunks that arrive before accept) and park the readable for the matching RPC. - Directory ops: walk(path, opts) async-iterable depth-first walker; uploadDirectory()/downloadDirectory() with bounded concurrency pool (default 4, cap 16), aggregated progress, abort. - Production hooks (callback-based, vendor-neutral): rate-limit (op + byte), idempotency cache (LRU + TTL + in-flight de-dupe), path policy (traversal + percent-decode hardening), fingerprint gate (required/optional/reject), pluggable Ed25519 sig verification with ±5 min replay window, onMetric sink (standard names). - React hooks (subpath @shade/files/react): ShadeFilesProvider, useShadeFiles, useFileList, useFileTransfer/Upload/Download. - Shade.files.serve(handler) + Shade.files.client(peer) high-level entrypoint in @shade/sdk; lazy + memoized; one handler per Shade. Wire format bump - @shade/proto wire VERSION 0x01 → 0x02. Length prefixes changed from u16 to u32. The previous u16 silently truncated payloads above 64 KiB — a hard correctness ceiling that blocked inline file ops up to 256 KiB. Wire-incompatible with 0.2.x peers; new sessions only. Cross-platform Kotlin port (android/shade-android) updated to match; test-vectors/wire-format.json regenerated. Concurrency safety - ShadeSessionManager.encrypt/.decrypt now run under per-peer mutex. Concurrent decryptions of the same peer raced ratchet state (manifested as sporadic "Failed to decrypt — wrong key or tampered data" under load — surfaced once concurrent uploadDirectory pumped many writes in flight). Encrypt was already serialized via Shade.send's encryptChains; decrypt is now serialized at the manager layer too. @shade/streams extension - StreamMetadata.userMetadata?: Record<string, string> for application-level key/value pairs that round-trip verbatim through stream-init plaintext. Used by @shade/files for write/read correlation; available to any consumer. @shade/sdk extension - Shade.files getter (lazy + memoized). - BackgroundHooks.onPruneFiles + periodic timer (default 5 min) + BackgroundTasks.setHook(name, fn) for runtime hook registration. Bundles in-flight 0.2.0 work - packages/shade-streams/, packages/shade-transfer/, related shade-sdk streams-bridge + shade-widgets transfer hooks were uncommitted prior to this session. Including them keeps the workspace consistent at 0.3.0 since @shade/files depends on them. Tests - 74 new tests in @shade/files (572 → 646 workspace pass; 0 fail; 3× stable). Coverage spans unit (inline-threshold + concurrency), integration (read-write inline + streams up to 1 MiB, walk + upload/download directory, custom-op, metrics, SDK namespace end-to-end), and security (tampered-envelope sig verification, replay window, fingerprint gate, rate-limit + quota). Release artifacts - All packages bumped to 0.3.0 via scripts/bump-version.ts. - scripts/publish-all.ts PACKAGES updated with shade-files in topological order (after shade-transfer, before shade-sdk). - bun run publish:dry clean (14 packed, 0 failed). - examples/08-files-browser/ — three-process CLI demo (prekey + Bob server + Alice CLI) covering list/stat/mkdir/delete/upload/download. - docs/files.md — full API + design doc. - CHANGELOG.md 0.3.0 entry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-02 14:00:01 +02:00
import { describe, test, expect, beforeAll, afterAll } from 'bun:test';
import { ed25519 } from '@noble/curves/ed25519.js';
import { setupFileRig, type FileTestRig } from '../integration/helpers/rig.js';
import {
bytesToBase64,
canonicalRpcBytes,
hashArgs,
InvalidSignatureError,
type FileEntry,
NotFoundError,
} from '../../src/index.js';
/**
* The dispatcher's `verifySender` callback gets the canonical bytes the
* client claims they signed. By plugging a real Ed25519 verify in tests,
* we can demonstrate that:
* - A valid sig over the canonical bytes is accepted.
* - Tampering ANY bound field (kind, args, signedAt, sender) breaks
* verification InvalidSignatureError.
*/
describe('Tampered envelope — Ed25519 sig verification', () => {
let rig: FileTestRig;
// Generate a stable Ed25519 keypair for Alice. Bob will pin it.
const alicePriv = ed25519.utils.randomSecretKey();
const alicePub = ed25519.getPublicKey(alicePriv);
beforeAll(async () => {
rig = await setupFileRig({
verifySender: (sender, canonical, sigBase64) => {
// We only know Alice's key for this test. Bob's pub key would be
// looked up similarly in a real app.
if (sender !== 'alice') return false;
// Decode base64 sig
try {
const bin = atob(sigBase64);
const sigBytes = new Uint8Array(bin.length);
for (let i = 0; i < bin.length; i++) sigBytes[i] = bin.charCodeAt(i);
return ed25519.verify(sigBytes, canonical, alicePub);
} catch {
return false;
}
},
stat: async (ctx) => {
if (ctx.path !== '/exists.txt') throw new NotFoundError(ctx.path);
const e: FileEntry = { name: 'exists.txt', kind: 'file', size: 1, mtime: 0, metadata: {} };
return e;
},
});
// Re-create the client with a real signRequest hook.
// (Rig's default fs has signRequest=undefined; we replace it.)
const { createFileClient, ShadeFileRpcChannel, PendingRpcRegistry, attachClientRouting } = await import('../../src/index.js');
const aliceChannel = new ShadeFileRpcChannel(rig.alice);
const alicePending = new PendingRpcRegistry();
attachClientRouting(aliceChannel, alicePending);
rig.fs = createFileClient(rig.alice, aliceChannel, alicePending, 'bob', {
defaultTimeoutMs: 5000,
signRequest: async (canonical) => {
const sig = ed25519.sign(canonical, alicePriv);
return bytesToBase64(sig);
},
});
});
afterAll(async () => {
await rig.teardown();
});
test('valid signature → request succeeds', async () => {
const result = await rig.fs.stat('/exists.txt');
expect(result.name).toBe('exists.txt');
});
test('tampered args → InvalidSignatureError', async () => {
// Craft a request manually: sign over '/a' but ship '/b'.
const { createFileClient, ShadeFileRpcChannel, PendingRpcRegistry, attachClientRouting } = await import('../../src/index.js');
const aliceChannel = new ShadeFileRpcChannel(rig.alice);
const alicePending = new PendingRpcRegistry();
attachClientRouting(aliceChannel, alicePending);
const tamperedFs = createFileClient(rig.alice, aliceChannel, alicePending, 'bob', {
defaultTimeoutMs: 3000,
signRequest: async (_canonical) => {
// Sign over a DIFFERENT canonical (different argsHash), so the
// server's recomputation won't match.
const fake = canonicalRpcBytes({
address: 'alice',
signedAt: 0,
kind: 'shade.fs.list/v1',
id: 'AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA',
argsHash: hashArgs({ tampered: true }),
});
const sig = ed25519.sign(fake, alicePriv);
return bytesToBase64(sig);
},
});
await expect(tamperedFs.stat('/exists.txt')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(InvalidSignatureError);
});
test('valid signature from unknown signer → InvalidSignatureError', async () => {
const { createFileClient, ShadeFileRpcChannel, PendingRpcRegistry, attachClientRouting } = await import('../../src/index.js');
const aliceChannel = new ShadeFileRpcChannel(rig.alice);
const alicePending = new PendingRpcRegistry();
attachClientRouting(aliceChannel, alicePending);
const otherPriv = ed25519.utils.randomSecretKey();
const wrongFs = createFileClient(rig.alice, aliceChannel, alicePending, 'bob', {
defaultTimeoutMs: 3000,
signRequest: async (canonical) => {
const sig = ed25519.sign(canonical, otherPriv);
return bytesToBase64(sig);
},
});
await expect(wrongFs.stat('/exists.txt')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(InvalidSignatureError);
});
});