Files
Shade/packages/shade-storage-encrypted/package.json

38 lines
867 B
JSON
Raw Normal View History

{
"name": "@shade/storage-encrypted",
fix(session): remember where aliasSession moved a session aliasSession knew that two labels name the same peer, then threw that knowledge away. The binding lived only in the caller's memory, so a restart lost it — and the peer could not repair it from its side. First contact forces the receiver to label a session by the only sender hint a relay surfaces, an 8-byte signing-key fingerprint (`fp:<hex>`). Once the peer announces its canonical address, aliasSession moves the session there. But the peer keeps sending under `fp:<hex>`, because its transport derives the same label from the same hint every time. After a restart the session sat under the canonical address, inbound frames resolved to `fp:<hex>`, and nothing matched. The peer held a valid session so it never re-ran X3DH: the failure was permanent, and only a manual re-link cleared it. Observed in Prism as `No session for address: fp:579c3b335d66e2c0` on every receive for three days, with a phone whose every RPC timed out. StorageProvider gains saveSessionAlias / getSessionAlias / removeSessionAliasesFor, optional so third-party implementations keep compiling, and implemented across all seven backends. Lookups resolve through resolveLabel(), which runs BEFORE the peer mutex — locking the alias while mutating the canonical session would let an aliased and a canonical caller ratchet the same state concurrently. A live session under a label always wins over an alias, and prekey envelopes never resolve: both keep a re-link establishing a fresh session instead of being redirected into the stale one. Aliases are dropped in resetSession and acceptIdentityChange, and memoized so the hot path costs no extra read. The sdk.test.ts case that asserted a dead fp-label encoded the old behaviour; it now pins the new contract. Verified: 1166 tests pass (from 1160). With alias persistence disabled as a negative control, 5 of the 6 new tests fail, including both restart cases. Also drops `baseUrl` from the consumer-strict tsconfig — removed in TS 6.0, and it was failing the typecheck that gates publishing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 19:36:31 +02:00
"version": "4.12.0",
"type": "module",
"main": "src/index.ts",
"types": "src/index.ts",
release(v4.5.0): browser-side encrypted storage + multi-factor unlock Adds the foundations Prism's web client (and any future browser-based Shade app) needs: at-rest-encrypted IndexedDB storage that mirrors the SQLite backend byte-for-byte at the AAD/nonce level, browser-safe subpath imports so Vite/webpack/esbuild stop hitting bun:sqlite, and KeyManager support for argon2id and N-factor composite unlock. @shade/storage-encrypted - EncryptedIndexedDBStorage (subpath: /idb) — full StorageProvider using one object store per _enc table; reuses aeadSeal/aeadOpen + row-codec sealers so a row sealed under the SQLite or Postgres backend decrypts under IDB given the same KeyManager. bumpPeerIdentityVersion is atomic under one IDB transaction. - KeyManager argon2id source — memory-hard KDF for low-entropy secrets (PINs). Backed by @noble/hashes/argon2 (already a transitive dep). DEFAULT_ARGON2ID exported (m=64 MiB, t=3, p=1). - KeyManager composite source — HKDF-combine N sub-sources into one master. Every source mandatory; order significant by design; composite-of-composite rejected; optional info string for app-level domain separation. - Subpath exports (/crypto, /sqlite, /postgres, /idb) plus a `browser` condition on the default import that resolves to a barrel excluding the Bun- and Postgres-specific entries. Browser bundles no longer pull bun:sqlite transitively. Tests - 73 tests in shade-storage-encrypted (was 31). New coverage: argon2id determinism + reject paths, composite same-factors → same master, wrong-PIN/passphrase/order-swap → different master, info domain separation, all 28 StorageProvider methods on EncryptedIndexedDBStorage, fingerprint-mismatch rejection, and cross-impl roundtrip with EncryptedSQLiteStorage proving the AAD/ nonce derivation is implementation-agnostic. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-07 10:58:49 +02:00
"exports": {
".": {
"browser": "./src/index.browser.ts",
"default": "./src/index.ts"
},
"./crypto": "./src/crypto.ts",
"./sqlite": "./src/sqlite.ts",
"./postgres": "./src/postgres.ts",
"./idb": "./src/idb.ts"
},
"dependencies": {
"@noble/hashes": "^2.0.1",
"@shade/core": "workspace:*",
"@shade/crypto-web": "workspace:*",
"@shade/storage-postgres": "workspace:*",
"@shade/storage-sqlite": "workspace:*",
release(v4.5.0): browser-side encrypted storage + multi-factor unlock Adds the foundations Prism's web client (and any future browser-based Shade app) needs: at-rest-encrypted IndexedDB storage that mirrors the SQLite backend byte-for-byte at the AAD/nonce level, browser-safe subpath imports so Vite/webpack/esbuild stop hitting bun:sqlite, and KeyManager support for argon2id and N-factor composite unlock. @shade/storage-encrypted - EncryptedIndexedDBStorage (subpath: /idb) — full StorageProvider using one object store per _enc table; reuses aeadSeal/aeadOpen + row-codec sealers so a row sealed under the SQLite or Postgres backend decrypts under IDB given the same KeyManager. bumpPeerIdentityVersion is atomic under one IDB transaction. - KeyManager argon2id source — memory-hard KDF for low-entropy secrets (PINs). Backed by @noble/hashes/argon2 (already a transitive dep). DEFAULT_ARGON2ID exported (m=64 MiB, t=3, p=1). - KeyManager composite source — HKDF-combine N sub-sources into one master. Every source mandatory; order significant by design; composite-of-composite rejected; optional info string for app-level domain separation. - Subpath exports (/crypto, /sqlite, /postgres, /idb) plus a `browser` condition on the default import that resolves to a barrel excluding the Bun- and Postgres-specific entries. Browser bundles no longer pull bun:sqlite transitively. Tests - 73 tests in shade-storage-encrypted (was 31). New coverage: argon2id determinism + reject paths, composite same-factors → same master, wrong-PIN/passphrase/order-swap → different master, info domain separation, all 28 StorageProvider methods on EncryptedIndexedDBStorage, fingerprint-mismatch rejection, and cross-impl roundtrip with EncryptedSQLiteStorage proving the AAD/ nonce derivation is implementation-agnostic. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-07 10:58:49 +02:00
"idb": "^8.0.3",
"postgres": "^3.4.9"
},
release(v4.5.0): browser-side encrypted storage + multi-factor unlock Adds the foundations Prism's web client (and any future browser-based Shade app) needs: at-rest-encrypted IndexedDB storage that mirrors the SQLite backend byte-for-byte at the AAD/nonce level, browser-safe subpath imports so Vite/webpack/esbuild stop hitting bun:sqlite, and KeyManager support for argon2id and N-factor composite unlock. @shade/storage-encrypted - EncryptedIndexedDBStorage (subpath: /idb) — full StorageProvider using one object store per _enc table; reuses aeadSeal/aeadOpen + row-codec sealers so a row sealed under the SQLite or Postgres backend decrypts under IDB given the same KeyManager. bumpPeerIdentityVersion is atomic under one IDB transaction. - KeyManager argon2id source — memory-hard KDF for low-entropy secrets (PINs). Backed by @noble/hashes/argon2 (already a transitive dep). DEFAULT_ARGON2ID exported (m=64 MiB, t=3, p=1). - KeyManager composite source — HKDF-combine N sub-sources into one master. Every source mandatory; order significant by design; composite-of-composite rejected; optional info string for app-level domain separation. - Subpath exports (/crypto, /sqlite, /postgres, /idb) plus a `browser` condition on the default import that resolves to a barrel excluding the Bun- and Postgres-specific entries. Browser bundles no longer pull bun:sqlite transitively. Tests - 73 tests in shade-storage-encrypted (was 31). New coverage: argon2id determinism + reject paths, composite same-factors → same master, wrong-PIN/passphrase/order-swap → different master, info domain separation, all 28 StorageProvider methods on EncryptedIndexedDBStorage, fingerprint-mismatch rejection, and cross-impl roundtrip with EncryptedSQLiteStorage proving the AAD/ nonce derivation is implementation-agnostic. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-07 10:58:49 +02:00
"devDependencies": {
"fake-indexeddb": "^6.0.0"
},
"peerDependencies": {
"@shade/keychain": "workspace:*"
},
"peerDependenciesMeta": {
"@shade/keychain": {
"optional": true
}
}
}