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Shade/packages/shade-storage-encrypted/package.json

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{
"name": "@shade/storage-encrypted",
release(v4.11.0): streaming Double-Ratchet sub-sessions (ShadeStream) Answers Vyvern FR shade-ws-streaming-ratchet.md with a first-class streaming-session API rather than the documented-contract fallback. The Double-Ratchet crypto was already safe for high-frequency one-directional use; the send/receive wrapper was not (per-frame saveSession keystore write; shared per-peer mutex + single stored session row coupling reuse to the HTTP path). - @shade/core: stream.ts — identity-bound 3-DH seeding (X3DH-minus- prekeys, no prekey-server round trip, mutually authenticated against the parent session's pinned identities), bootstrapStreamSession reusing init{Sender,Receiver}Session verbatim, in-memory-only StreamRatchet (own op-mutex, never persisted, zeroized on close). beginStream/acceptStream on ShadeSessionManager; Stream{Closed, Handshake}Error; stream.opened/closed events. - @shade/proto: STREAM_OPEN/OPEN_ACK/FRAME wire (0x31/0x32/0x33), additive; inspectEnvelopeType extended. - @shade/sdk: Shade.openStream/acceptStream → ShadeStream (handshakeFrame/handleHandshake/seal/open/close), transport- agnostic, independent of encrypt/decrypt queues + parent session, identical server (sqlite:) and browser (IndexedDB) — touches no storage. - Tests: 5000-frame one-directional burst (bounded skipped keys + FS zeroize), parent-session independence, replay/rewind rejection, mutual-auth, proto wire round-trips. Full suite green (1159 pass). - docs/streaming-sessions.md (R1–R7 contract); SECURITY.md matrix rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-15 11:29:09 +02:00
"version": "4.11.0",
"type": "module",
"main": "src/index.ts",
"types": "src/index.ts",
release(v4.5.0): browser-side encrypted storage + multi-factor unlock Adds the foundations Prism's web client (and any future browser-based Shade app) needs: at-rest-encrypted IndexedDB storage that mirrors the SQLite backend byte-for-byte at the AAD/nonce level, browser-safe subpath imports so Vite/webpack/esbuild stop hitting bun:sqlite, and KeyManager support for argon2id and N-factor composite unlock. @shade/storage-encrypted - EncryptedIndexedDBStorage (subpath: /idb) — full StorageProvider using one object store per _enc table; reuses aeadSeal/aeadOpen + row-codec sealers so a row sealed under the SQLite or Postgres backend decrypts under IDB given the same KeyManager. bumpPeerIdentityVersion is atomic under one IDB transaction. - KeyManager argon2id source — memory-hard KDF for low-entropy secrets (PINs). Backed by @noble/hashes/argon2 (already a transitive dep). DEFAULT_ARGON2ID exported (m=64 MiB, t=3, p=1). - KeyManager composite source — HKDF-combine N sub-sources into one master. Every source mandatory; order significant by design; composite-of-composite rejected; optional info string for app-level domain separation. - Subpath exports (/crypto, /sqlite, /postgres, /idb) plus a `browser` condition on the default import that resolves to a barrel excluding the Bun- and Postgres-specific entries. Browser bundles no longer pull bun:sqlite transitively. Tests - 73 tests in shade-storage-encrypted (was 31). New coverage: argon2id determinism + reject paths, composite same-factors → same master, wrong-PIN/passphrase/order-swap → different master, info domain separation, all 28 StorageProvider methods on EncryptedIndexedDBStorage, fingerprint-mismatch rejection, and cross-impl roundtrip with EncryptedSQLiteStorage proving the AAD/ nonce derivation is implementation-agnostic. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-07 10:58:49 +02:00
"exports": {
".": {
"browser": "./src/index.browser.ts",
"default": "./src/index.ts"
},
"./crypto": "./src/crypto.ts",
"./sqlite": "./src/sqlite.ts",
"./postgres": "./src/postgres.ts",
"./idb": "./src/idb.ts"
},
"dependencies": {
"@noble/hashes": "^2.0.1",
"@shade/core": "workspace:*",
"@shade/crypto-web": "workspace:*",
"@shade/storage-postgres": "workspace:*",
"@shade/storage-sqlite": "workspace:*",
release(v4.5.0): browser-side encrypted storage + multi-factor unlock Adds the foundations Prism's web client (and any future browser-based Shade app) needs: at-rest-encrypted IndexedDB storage that mirrors the SQLite backend byte-for-byte at the AAD/nonce level, browser-safe subpath imports so Vite/webpack/esbuild stop hitting bun:sqlite, and KeyManager support for argon2id and N-factor composite unlock. @shade/storage-encrypted - EncryptedIndexedDBStorage (subpath: /idb) — full StorageProvider using one object store per _enc table; reuses aeadSeal/aeadOpen + row-codec sealers so a row sealed under the SQLite or Postgres backend decrypts under IDB given the same KeyManager. bumpPeerIdentityVersion is atomic under one IDB transaction. - KeyManager argon2id source — memory-hard KDF for low-entropy secrets (PINs). Backed by @noble/hashes/argon2 (already a transitive dep). DEFAULT_ARGON2ID exported (m=64 MiB, t=3, p=1). - KeyManager composite source — HKDF-combine N sub-sources into one master. Every source mandatory; order significant by design; composite-of-composite rejected; optional info string for app-level domain separation. - Subpath exports (/crypto, /sqlite, /postgres, /idb) plus a `browser` condition on the default import that resolves to a barrel excluding the Bun- and Postgres-specific entries. Browser bundles no longer pull bun:sqlite transitively. Tests - 73 tests in shade-storage-encrypted (was 31). New coverage: argon2id determinism + reject paths, composite same-factors → same master, wrong-PIN/passphrase/order-swap → different master, info domain separation, all 28 StorageProvider methods on EncryptedIndexedDBStorage, fingerprint-mismatch rejection, and cross-impl roundtrip with EncryptedSQLiteStorage proving the AAD/ nonce derivation is implementation-agnostic. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-07 10:58:49 +02:00
"idb": "^8.0.3",
"postgres": "^3.4.9"
},
release(v4.5.0): browser-side encrypted storage + multi-factor unlock Adds the foundations Prism's web client (and any future browser-based Shade app) needs: at-rest-encrypted IndexedDB storage that mirrors the SQLite backend byte-for-byte at the AAD/nonce level, browser-safe subpath imports so Vite/webpack/esbuild stop hitting bun:sqlite, and KeyManager support for argon2id and N-factor composite unlock. @shade/storage-encrypted - EncryptedIndexedDBStorage (subpath: /idb) — full StorageProvider using one object store per _enc table; reuses aeadSeal/aeadOpen + row-codec sealers so a row sealed under the SQLite or Postgres backend decrypts under IDB given the same KeyManager. bumpPeerIdentityVersion is atomic under one IDB transaction. - KeyManager argon2id source — memory-hard KDF for low-entropy secrets (PINs). Backed by @noble/hashes/argon2 (already a transitive dep). DEFAULT_ARGON2ID exported (m=64 MiB, t=3, p=1). - KeyManager composite source — HKDF-combine N sub-sources into one master. Every source mandatory; order significant by design; composite-of-composite rejected; optional info string for app-level domain separation. - Subpath exports (/crypto, /sqlite, /postgres, /idb) plus a `browser` condition on the default import that resolves to a barrel excluding the Bun- and Postgres-specific entries. Browser bundles no longer pull bun:sqlite transitively. Tests - 73 tests in shade-storage-encrypted (was 31). New coverage: argon2id determinism + reject paths, composite same-factors → same master, wrong-PIN/passphrase/order-swap → different master, info domain separation, all 28 StorageProvider methods on EncryptedIndexedDBStorage, fingerprint-mismatch rejection, and cross-impl roundtrip with EncryptedSQLiteStorage proving the AAD/ nonce derivation is implementation-agnostic. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-07 10:58:49 +02:00
"devDependencies": {
"fake-indexeddb": "^6.0.0"
},
"peerDependencies": {
"@shade/keychain": "workspace:*"
},
"peerDependenciesMeta": {
"@shade/keychain": {
"optional": true
}
}
}